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1. Introduction
Digital systems and Internet are nowadays spanning most domains of our lives. They are respon-
sible for communication between people, institutions, for controlling airport systems, transport
systems, managing medical systems, etc. Digital systems start to appear everywhere and are
responsible for more and more important and conﬁdential processes. We are ﬂooded with digital
data, which are not always easy to authenticate, manage and secure. Generally majority of com-
mon users of digital systems do not care much about authentication, conﬁdentiality, integrity and
security of their data. They are still little aware of possibilities of stealing, tampering or using
their digital data or what is worse their digital identity (identity fraud is a serious threat [90]).
They are even less aware of consequences resulting from such abuses or negligence of security
matters [90, 63].
Fortunately security awareness slowly increases mainly due to rapid development and increase
of number of services performed in a digital way. People start to perceive the meaning (necessity)
of securing data. Everyone wants to securely perform banking transactions, safely sign impor-
tant documents, protect conﬁdential data (tax, medical, etc.) or just safely shop online. On
the other hand, nobody wants to be bothered about securing data and nobody wants that the
process will in any way interrupt normal work of a system. Luckily most system developers have
information security awareness and tend to equip digital systems and communication channels
with eﬃcient security mechanisms, depending on application and requirements. The security of
a system has to be very often veriﬁed because although users start to take precautions and new
ways for securing data are developed, new ways of stealing and tampering data also appear.
The science, which provides us with means to secure data, is called cryptography [66, 99].
Cryptography dates back to ancient times [43]. It was used to cipher messages to prevent adver-
saries from reading it. First ciphers were very naive but usually suﬃcient due to the fact that
most people were illiterate. As centuries passed and elementary education became a standard,
ciphers had to become more and more sophisticated. Nowadays, cryptography has to exploit
properties of NP-hard mathematical problems (see [6] on computational complexity) to provide
us with new means of data security. The mathematicians working on encryption algorithms
constantly adapt them to arising needs and computer scientists create new information secu-
rity systems employing them (for more details see [91]). With development of new technologies
designers tend to create faster and more eﬃcient cryptographic systems. Unfortunately as the
technical and theoretical possibilities of securing data increase, the number of ways of tamper-
ing communication and recovering secret and hidden data also increases. In fact cryptography,
treating about concealing the secret, is just one branch of a wider science: cryptology. The
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other branch of cryptology, evolving simultaneously is cryptanalysis, which concerns breaking
the ciphers and data security (see [100, 105]). Due to developments in cryptanalysis, modern
cryptographic systems suﬀer from more threats than their predecessors. They have not only to
be mathematically secure but also physically secure.
At ﬁrst it was suﬃcient to employ a simple, secure, mathematically unbreakable cryptographic
algorithm. Then it occurred that with development of computational power of computer systems
and new means of communication (Internet, wireless communication), the mathematical security
of most algorithms should be revised, and either new algorithms should be developed or their
parameters have to be changed [99]. After managing the problems of algorithms’ mathemati-
cal security, it was proven that there exist other ways of extracting secrets from cryptographic
systems. Cryptanalysts came up with idea to eavesdrop work of digital cryptographic systems
developed to secure data [68]. They propose to analyse power trace, current signatures, execu-
tion time and other leaking information, concerned useless, in order to correlate them directly
with the secret or with operations executed on secret in the cryptographic system.
Unfortunately their approach for recovering the secret was successful [53] and nowadays it
is not only suﬃcient to employ mathematically secure cryptographic algorithms but also to se-
cure their implementations as well as systems and devices performing cryptographic operations
against adversaries. It implies that safe and mathematically unbreakable algorithm is not enough
to secure the data; one needs also to secure hardware or software solutions against information
leakage. It is proven that it is possible to record power trace, current trace or electromagnetic
emissions, or observe execution time and by analysis of obtained information deduce secret data.
Such approach is called side-channel analysis or side-channel attack (SCA), see [103]. Until very
recently, information leaking from the device during its work was concerned as useless noise and
designers did not especially bothered to decrease or control it. Fortunately, now security systems
developers/researchers are aware that every information “leaking” from the cryptographic device
can be useful to the attacker. To avoid loss of secret data developers analyse the behaviour of
their devices in order to make them secure against eavesdropping. New ways of securing data
and cryptographic processors are being developed making attackers job harder. Simultaneously
methods for secret data retrieving also develop, decreasing the strength of added security issues
(countermeasures) [105].
There are few families of possible side-channel analysis attacks [88] depending on which side
channel the attacker is exploiting. To retrieve secret the attacker analyses timings of the op-
eration, power consumed by the device or the character of electromagnetic radiations. The
side-channel analysis attacks are so called passive attacks, they are based on the information
eavesdropped during circuit work, they do not interfere with the device. There exist also active
attacks in which the attacker manipulates cryptographic device and/or its environment, see [7].
Usually the attacker tries to insert errors (fault-injection attacks) in device work, tries to force
unnormal behaviour of the device or manipulates clocks to observe changes in device behaviour
which may give information about secret.
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In our researches we are motivated by the possibility of ensuring more powerful physical se-
curity of cryptographic systems especially against power analysis attacks. There are still many
ideas for countermeasures to verify and there are still units of cryptographic systems, which were
not considered during security level evaluation, i.e. for which no countermeasures against SCA
were yet provided. We aim at fulﬁlling parts of those security gaps.
Adding countermeasures against SCA is not a trivial task [35]. Some may overload crypto-
graphic device and degrade its performance. Some countermeasures may protect against one
type of SCA but may make the other type more feasible to succesfully perform [26]. The ideal
countermeasures are such that do not decrease the overall performance, eﬃciency and do not
increase the cost of the cryptographic system too much. The cryptographic systems are already
complex circuits due to the fact that they employ a lot of arithmetic computations on large
numbers. Thus overloading them with useless subcircuits generating additional activity may
cause serious decrease of eﬃciency, especially in terms of area. Moreover adding noise to blind
the operations performed is speculative because there exist eﬀective denoising methods in signal
processing, see [87]. Additionally the noise adding countermeasures are insuﬃcient as an au-
tonomous countermeasures. They can serve as an additional protection element [60].
Thus we are motivated by a possibility of increasing the security of cryptographic system
in such a way that it will not result in degradation of its eﬃciency and overall cost increase.
What is more we want to increase the overall eﬃciency of cryptographic system and decrese its
cost. To be able to achieve our goals we ﬁrst have to propose very eﬃcient computation units
dedicated to work in cryptographic systems and then try to insert the countermeasures in such a
way that elaborated eﬃciency of our units will not decrease. That way we presume we may im-
prove overall cryptographic system performance (by increasing eﬃciency of its basic units) and
cryptographic system security (by inserting necessary countermeasures against eavesdropping).
Utilising reconﬁgurable circuits, for instance Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) [46,
37], as a target platforms for our cryptographic devices seems to provide a lot of possibilities in
our ﬁeld of research. Such circuits allow for quick evaluation of proposed solutions and inserted
countermeasures. They are relatively cheap, ﬂexible and provide a great mean for prototyp-
ing circuits before implementation in more expensive Application Speciﬁc Integrated Circuits
(ASIC). Another advantage of FPGA solution is that it is much harder to successfully attack
them than a solution implemented on microprocessors, due to for example sequential and pre-
dictable nature of operation of a microprocessor.
Cryptographic systems rely on arithmetic operations and complex mathematics, they exploit
certain mathematical problems, which are infeasible to solve. There exist two types of modern
cryptographic systems, utilising: secret-key cryptography or public-key cryptography (PKC).
Our work concerns the second type, the public-key cryptography. There are three most widely
used types of PKC systems. They are divided regarding the mathematical problem their secu-
rity is based on. The most commonly exploited problems are [36]: integer factorisation problem
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(e.g. RSA system), discrete logarithm problem (e.g. ElGamal system) and elliptic curve dis-
crete logarithm problem (Elliptic Curve Cryptography system). We have decided to consider
in our research security and eﬃciency of cryptographic systems based on elliptic curve discrete
logarithm problem; that is Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [36] systems. The ECC is very
advantageous especially due to the fact that it operates on much smaller numbers than for ex-
ample RSA , in order to provide the same level of security. This fact should create the possibility
to propose much more eﬃcient cryptographic hardware solutions.
The elliptic curve cryptography concerns/exploits mathematical properties of elliptic curves
deﬁned over ﬁnite ﬁelds. Main ECC protocols operations are performed on points of such elliptic
curves. To perform those operations (curve-level operations) one needs to perform operations
on the coordinates of elliptic curve points, i.e. on the elements of the underlying ﬁnite ﬁeld.
Due to this, the operations on the elements of ﬁnite ﬁelds are the ones on which really the work
of any ECC protocol depends. The eﬃciency of ﬁnite-ﬁeld computation units is crucial for the
eﬃciency of ECC systems.
There exist many ways of protecting the operations performed on points of elliptic curves
(curve-level operations) or operations performed by ECC cryptographic protocols, see [26]. How-
ever there are not yet known any means for securing the operations in the underlying ﬁnite ﬁeld
(ﬁeld-level operations). According to the fact that eﬃciency and work of ECC systems depend
on the performance of the operations performed in ﬁnite ﬁelds [97], we ﬁnd that security of
whole system may also depends on the ﬁnite ﬁeld arithmetic units security. The motivation for
our research is the possibility to increase the security and eﬃciency of whole ECC system via
securing and improving ﬁnite-ﬁeld arithmetic operators responsible for performing vital compu-
tations in ECC systems.
For breaking ECC, many SCAs [80] have been proposed. To protect circuits against those at-
tacks researchers propose various countermeasures, or protections, see [39]. Moreover, speciﬁc
protections at the arithmetic level (curve-level operations arithmetic) have been proposed. For
instance, addition chains allow performing only one type of operation, point addition, during
scalar multiplications [14]. In [15] randomisation techniques are used. But these protections are
at the curve-level not the ﬁnite-ﬁeld one. At the moment the means and eﬀects of protecting
ﬁnite-ﬁeld arithmetic operators are not yet exploited. It seems that if except just securing curve
level operations of the ECC processor we will secure also arithmetic operators, which eﬃciency is
crucial for curve-level operations, we can make our cryptographic system more diﬃcult to break
(to attack successfully). We presume that leaking information are much harder to analyse and
to correlate with a secret when the basic arithmetic units operations are secured against eaves-
dropping. Our objective is to protect cryptographic devices as much as possible against some
SCAs. Usually the only thing, which stops cryptanalysts from recovering secret data (breaking
the device), is insuﬃcient computational power of available computer systems. The more coun-
termeasures and protections the more computational power needed to break the system.
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Summing up, we recognise the following problems to analyse and to solve. First problem
concerns the eﬃciency of ECC systems. Its eﬃciency strongly depends on the eﬃciency of
ﬁnite-ﬁeld arithmetic operators. Thus we need to perform research, which will allow us to come
up with very eﬃcient hardware ﬁnite-ﬁeld arithmetic units. In order to provide solution to this
problem and elaborate our own eﬃcient algorithm easily translatable to hardware it is necessary
to analyse as many existing algorithms as possible.
There are two types of ﬁnite ﬁelds over which elliptic curves are deﬁned to serve cryptographic
purposes. Prime ﬁelds GF (p) and binary extension ﬁelds GF (2m) [36]. Binary extension ﬁelds
GF (2m) allow for carry-free operations. Thus we may avoid taking care of long carry chains.
According to many sources GF (2m) ﬁelds are more suitable for hardware solutions, i.e. [111, 47].
Thus we have decided to focus on GF (2m) rather than GF (p) arithmetic operators. Generally
there are two operators deﬁned in a ﬁeld: addition and multiplication. All other operations (i.e.
squaring, inversion) can be implemented by means of addition and multiplication. Addition in
a binary ﬁeld is very simple, it is a bitwise XOR operation. However managing large operands
even during such a simple operation may yield problems. ECC applications require performing
operations on operands of size 150-600 bits [32]. Multiplication is more complex and furthermore
it is a modular operation (modulo speciﬁc irreducible polynomial generating the ﬁeld). It means
that we need not only to perform multiplication but also reduce obtained result. There are
many multiplication algorithms and their improvements presented in literature, however most
are just theoretically evaluated. This means that proposed mathematical improvements might
not give desired enhancements when implemented in hardware. In our work we are motivated
by a possibility of ﬁnding such modiﬁcations of algorithms, which may yield real hardware im-
provements, i.e. energy and area savings, design acceleration (speed-up). Our goal is to provide
such algorithms, which will be suitable for eﬃcient implementation in hardware.
Second problem, which inﬂuences the structures of elaborated algorithms, is the need to se-
cure algorithms’ implementations against physical attacks (here we consider SCA). As stated
by Micali and Reyzin in [68], when they ﬁrst deﬁned group of physical attacks, “computation
and only computation leaks information”, thus our goal is that our computations leak as small
amount of information useful to an adversary as possible. In fact we are not able to prevent
electronic device from leaking information, however we may make the leaking information as
useless as possible by controlling the behaviour of our devices to a feasible extent. We want
that our solutions are as robust as possible to side channel attacks. We focus on preventing
successful power analysis attacks due to the fact that they are the most popular types of SCA
attacks, i.e. they receive a lot of attention from researchers and cryptanalysts [61]. Moreover
according to [61] they are very powerful and can be conducted relatively easy.
The thorough analysis of ﬁnite ﬁeld operations algorithms should reveal the possibilities of
securing them. It should reveal their features, advantages and potentialities for inserting coun-
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termeasures. In order to counteract to possible attacks, we have to propose modiﬁcations at
algorithm level as well as at the architecture level. The goal is to propose them in such a way
that resulting overhead will be sensible and that they will be transferable to other hardware
architectures (ASICs).
As mentioned developers usually add protections in ECC systems at curve-level operations and
as proven such protections usually secure only against certain families of physical attacks [53].
For example the device strongly secured against timing attacks can be very weak against power
attacks and otherwise [79]. In this research, we are strongly motivated by the presumption that
securing all computations performed in ECC system (ﬁnite-ﬁeld operations, curve-level oper-
ations, protocol operations) allows creating a system strongly secure against most families of
side-channel attacks.
Third problem, which needs to be investigated, is the trade-oﬀ between security issues and
eﬃciency. On one hand we want the device to be very secure but on the other it still has to
be very eﬃcient. If we overload operators with security issues (countermeasures) their speed
may drastically decrease and their size/cost may dramatically increase. However if we insert
not enough countermeasures, cryptographic system might be easily attacked. The elaborated
eﬃcient hardware arithmetic operators units should allow for inserting countermeasures with-
out adding much overheads to the solution (without degrading performance of the solution and
increasing its cost). The impact of added countermeasures on the parameters and behaviour of
the solution should be very carefully evaluated. If a countermeasure degrades speed too much or
causes an explosion of its size, it should be either avoided and substituted by other or thoroughly
reconsidered (and possibly improved).
The alongside problem, having impact on all the others, is the size of data to be manipulated
by the operators. As they need to serve ECC purposes they need to operate on numbers of size
approximately 150-600 bits [32]. Large binary vectors are not easy to handle and what is more
sometimes they may cause synchronisation and routing problems, i.e. be the cause of hazards
or strange delays. Usually with growth of operands size, the operator solutions grow and their
speed decrease, so our objective is to provide very eﬃcient solutions for arithmetic operators
working on vectors of large sizes.
In the following sections some cryptography basics, necessary to understand the purpose of
our researches, will be presented.
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1.1. Modern cryptology - basics, goals, applications and threats
In this section a short introduction to cryptography is presented. We provide brief overview of
most popular cryptographic techniques and more detailed description of the techniques to which
our researches will apply.
We introduce also cryptanalysis and describe brieﬂy code breaking techniques. The short
introduction to those topics is necessary to understand the objectives of our researches. More
detailed introduction to some attacks is presented in Chapter 4.
1.1.1. Cryptology basics
Cryptology comprises cryptography and cryptanalysis. To introduce reader to our problem we
present brieﬂy both branches. We give here classical deﬁnitions. Presently cryptology domain
concerns not only mathematics but also computer science. This is due to the fact that the
modern cryptology deals with digital data and digital systems. Nowadays to use cryptographic
techniques it is necessary not only to know a secure mathematical algorithm but also to eﬃ-
ciently implement it in a digital system.
Cryptography
Cryptography is a branch of cryptology treating about information security. It provides means
for securing communication and information exchange in presence of adversaries.
Definition 1.1.1. (according to [66, 99]) Cryptography is a study of mathematical* tech-
niques related to aspects of information security such as confidentiality, data integrity, entity
authentication and data origin authentication. Cryptography treats about prevention, detection
of tampering and other malicious activity of which physical and digital data can suffer.
*modern cryptography as mentioned above concerns also computer science discipline
Modern cryptography concerns the following four security objectives [66, 99]:
• conﬁdentiality (privacy) - no information can be extracted by unauthorised entity from
messages send over unsecured channel or data stored on unsecured media (in unsecured
area/zones);
• authentication - a process by which one may ascertain for example data origin; comprises
entity authentication and data origin authentication;
• data integrity - ensures that a message has not been tampered with (altered in unauthorised
way);
• non-repudiation - the message is bound to the sender, i.e. the receiver can be sure that it
comes from the sender and the sender cannot deny sending it;
The most popular cryptographic tools for providing information security are symmetric cryp-
tography and asymmetric cryptography. Both comprise algorithms, which security bases on
intractability of underlying mathematical problems and on security of a secret key. Short expla-
nation of some basics of those algorithms is presented in next subsections.
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Cryptanalysis
The second, equally interesting, branch of cryptology is cryptanalysis.
Definition 1.1.2. (according to [66, 99]) Cryptanalysis is a study of mathematical* techniques
related to analysis of secured communication, ciphers and cryptographic systems in order to
discover their weaknesses, which may allow retrieving secret data. Modern cryptanalysis treats
about breaking mathematical systems as well as physical devices implementing them. It validates
cryptographic system security and points out the features, which need to be improved.
*modern cryptography as mentioned above concerns also computer science discipline
Cryptanalysts study breaking codes, breaking cryptographic systems and recovering the secret.
We may say that their task is to validate a cryptographic system. To prove that it is breakable
in any way or to conﬁrm its security level. Before popularisation of digital systems, the aim
of cryptanalysts was just to ﬁnd a way to solve an intractable mathematical problem. Nowa-
days when underlying mathematical problems are really hard to solve and the ability to solve
them usually depends on available computing power, the cryptanalysts seek for other, easier,
complementary and less expensive, ways of recovering the secret. Due to the fact that physical
documents are being replaced by digital ones, to secure and handle them researchers/designers
tend to provide eﬃcient digital systems, either software or hardware, implementing cryptographic
algorithms. Hence the cryptanalysts turn their interest to observation of designed devices and
systems implementations in order to ﬁnd cheaper and more eﬀective ways of recovering secrets.
Unfortunately for system designers it occurred that by observation of the behaviour of a device
implementing cryptographic system: power consumption, time of execution, electromagnetic
emissions, it is possible to break the system [68, 5]. It was proven that plenty of information
leaking from the system might be useful to a cryptanalyst (an adversary, eavesdropper). Thus
in order to create secure cryptographic system, it is necessary not only to ﬁnd secure algorithm
but also to be aware of possible information leakage advantageous to an adversary [4, 61].
Communication model
Figure 1.1 shows a typical communication model. In this model entity A communicates with
E
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  c h a n n e lA BM
s e c u r e  z o n e
u n s e c u r e  z o n e
s e c u r e  z o n e
Figure 1.1.: Typical plain (not secured) communication model
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entity B. Entity E tries to tamper the communication either by stealing exchanged messages,
altering them or destroying them. The goal of cryptography is to secure communication between
A and B against actions of E. The goal of cryptanalysis is to ﬁnd a way to tamper the secured
communication or to retrieve secret data (M, key).
Secure communication model
The model is illustrated on Figure 1.2. In secure communication model entity A, before trans-
E
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  c h a n n e lA B
s e c u r e  z o n e
u n s e c u r e  z o n e
s e c u r e  z o n e C
C D(C)=MM E(M)=C
Figure 1.2.: Secure communication model
mitting the message to B, enciphers it. Upon receiving the ciphered message (ciphertext) entity
B must decipher it to be able to read it. It should be infeasible for E to tamper the commu-
nication or to decipher message sent by A. This infeasibility should be ascertained by proper
cryptographic techniques. Nowadays the most popular techniques for securing communication
are key-based techniques. Key-based means that their security depends on secrecy of the key.
The cryptographic problem in this model (Figure 1.2) is how to eﬀectively encipher the mes-
sage (plaintext) to have it deciphered by B but not by E. The idea of key-based algorithm is to
rely entirely on the secrecy of a key. In such algorithms the encryption/decryption process is
done in the following way:
plaintext
K
−→ ciphertext
K
−→ plaintext.
Let Ki ∈ keyspace, plaintext be denoted by M , ciphertext (ciphered plaintext) by C. Let us
also denote encryption by E and decryption by D. Thus (see [66]):
EKe(M) = C
DKd(C) =M,
where EKe denotes encryption with key Ke and DKd decryption with key Kd.
Entity A transforms plaintext M (message) into a ciphertext, using encryption key Ke and
transmits the ciphertext to B. Entity B receives ciphertext C and transforms it back to plaintext
M, again using a key, this time decryption key Kd (somehow correlated with Ke). Depending
on how we deﬁne, correlate and distribute the pair of keys we may distinguish two diﬀerent
key-based cryptographic techniques: symmetric cryptography and asymmetric cryptography.
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1.1.2. Symmetric cryptography (Secret-Key Cryptography)
In symmetric-key cryptography, called also secret, single, one-key [66], we perform (see also
Figure 1.3):
1. Key exchange / key distribution
2. EKe(M) = C
DKd(C) =M,
where Ke can be calculated from Kd and otherwise [66]. In fact in this cryptographic scheme
usually Ke = Kd = K.
In symmetric-key cryptography, before starting to communicate, A and B have to exchange
s e c u r e  z o n e
u n s e c u r e  z o n e
A BK
A
E
BC
C D (C)=MKM E (M)=CK
2
1
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  c h a n n e l
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  c h a n n e l
s e c u r e  z o n e s e c u r e  z o n e
Figure 1.3.: Secret-key cryptography communication model
secret key via some secured channel, see step 1 on Figure 1.3. The key must remain secret as long
as communication has to remain secret. The problem of secure key distribution and management
is crucial for symmetric key cryptography. It leads to many other problems and although secret-
key cryptography is very eﬃcient, due to key management problems it cannot be safely used in
all communication schemes, especially in secure communication over the Internet. What is more
secret-key cryptography does not fully implement all abovementioned cryptographic objectives
(i.e. authentication, non-repudiation) [66].
The most popular symmetric-key cryptography algorithms are [36]:
• Data Encryption Standard (DES), Triple DES,
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• Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),
• RC4 stream cipher (Rivest Cipher 4),
• Message Authentication Codes (MAC/HMAC).
Even though secret-key cryptographic techniques are characterised by high eﬃciency they cannot
be used before the key is safely exchanged. To overcome this problem public-key cryptography
was proposed [22, 67].
The secret-key cryptography is out of scope of our researches thus we do not present the
algorithms in more details. For further reading we suggest NIST (National Institute of Standards
and Technology) standards or [99, 66].
1.1.3. Asymmetric cryptography (Public-Key Cryptography)
Public-key cryptography (PKC) was introduced in 1975 by Diﬃe, Hellman [22] and Merkle [67]
as an attempt to solve problems arising in secret-key cryptography. Deﬁnition according to
Diﬃe and Hellman [22] is presented below (see also Figure 1.4):
Definition 1.1.3. [22] A Public-Key Cryptosystem is a pair of families {EK}K∈{K} and
{DK}K∈{K} of algorithms representing invertible transformations,
EK : {M} → {M}
DK : {M} → {M}
on a finite message space M , such that
• for every K ∈ {K}, EK is the inverse of DK
• for every K ∈ {K} and M ∈ {M}, the algorithms EK and DK are easy to compute,
• for almost every K ∈ {K}, each easily computed algorithm equivalent to DK is computa-
tionally infeasible to derive from EK ,
• for every K ∈ {K}, it is feasible to compute inverse pairs EK and DK from K.
In public-key communication model, communicating entities avoid exchanging secret key. In-
stead of one secret key, which is hard to distribute (transmit) securely, the entities A, B use a
pair of keys. One, which is private (secret) and not transmitted; and the other, which is public
and can be distributed freely. Each entity has its own pair of keys (Ke,Kd). The public-key
communication scheme is as follows:
1. Key distribution
2. EKe(M) = C
DKd(C) =M
where Ke 6= Kd and Ke (public key) can be calculated from Kd (secret key) but Kd cannot be
calculated from Ke. Only the entity which wants to communicate distributes its public key.
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AE
B
1
KeKd(   ,   )
Ke
u n s e c u r e  z o n e
u n s e c u r e  z o n e
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  c h a n n e l
s e c u r e  z o n es e c u r e  z o n e
BA
E
C
D  (C)=MCM E  (M)=C
2
Ke Kd
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  c h a n n e l
s e c u r e  z o n e s e c u r e  z o n e
Figure 1.4.: PKC communication model
Everyone can encipher messages using key Ke but only the owner of paired key Kd is able to
decrypt and read them. According to Figure 1.4 the communication is conducted as follows. If
entity B wants to securely communicate with entity A, it generates the pair of keys (Ke,Kd).
It keeps Kd for itself and sends Ke to entity A. Upon receiving Ke from B, A is able to send
encrypted messages to B. In order to send the message to B, A encrypts it using Ke. Entity B,
receives encrypted message sent by A and in order to read it, decrypts it using key Kd. That
way no one except B can read message encrypted with Ke key. In case of digital signature public
key Ke is used by entity A for veriﬁcation of B’s signature (B’s document received).
The property and simultaneously the requirement for PKC key security states that it should
be computationally infeasible to compute the private key Kd from public key Ke and otherwise.
The public key is used to encrypt messages and only private key can be used to decrypt them.
Thus if it would be feasible to compute Kd knowing Ke it would be possible to break the system
and make communication unsecure.
Although the public-key cryptography solves the problem of key management and distribution,
it is slower and much harder to implement eﬃciently than secret-key cryptography (see Table 1.1
for comparison). Thus it is popular to use PKC for secret key exchange and later proceed with
communication secured with symmetric cryptography techniques. The key pair generation is a
crucial point of asymmetric cryptography. The pair should be generated in such a way that it is
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Table 1.1.: Comparison of secret- and public-key cryptography
Secret-Key Cryptography Public-Key Cryptography
Advantages Disadvantages Advantages Disadvantages
high eﬃciency
key distribution problem solves key distribution lower eﬃciency,
key management problem problems higher cost
lower cost
cannot fully implement fully implements all due to more complex
authentication and cryptographic objectives computations and
non-repudiation longer keys
infeasible to inverse the process. The private key is believed to be safe as long as a mathematical
problem involved in its derivation is believed to be intractable. The following mathematical
problems, infeasible to solve for certain sizes of arguments, form bases for security of private
key:
• Integer factorisation problem
• Discrete logarithm problem (DLP)
• Elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP)
Regarding the underlying mathematical problems one can distinguish three groups of algo-
rithms. The most popular algorithms based on integer factorisation problem are RSA public-key
encryption and signature schemes [54]. ElGamal cryptographic schemes [23] exploit discrete log-
arithm problem. The last group of algorithms based on elliptic curves exploiting ECDLP [36]
problem is of most concern to us. Thus in Chapter 2 we provide more detailed description of
elliptic curve cryptographic techniques and schemes.
In our researches we have decided to focus on ECC because it is proven that it can be more
eﬃcient than RSA [109, 56, 36], which is the most popular PKC scheme. In key-based cryp-
tography where security depends on a key the infeasibility of computing it from publicly known
data is crucial. It is recognised that the abovementioned mathematical problems are feasible to
solve for some arguments (usually small but also for certain types of arguments). To make the
problems infeasible to solve the mathematicians proposed the arguments to be primes of speciﬁc
sizes. For too small primes the accessible computational power is enough to solve the problems in
reasonable time. The safe, suitable for cryptographic purposes, argument (key) sizes are given in
cryptographic standards (e.g. NIST , SECG . The standards are often veriﬁed by cryptanalysts
and updated if the computational power, which continuously grows, becomes enough to break
the cryptographic algorithm secured with a key of a certain size or if new type of attack, which
makes retrieving the secret feasible, appears. The key sizes, for which RSA achieves the same
security level as ECC, are much bigger than the ones required for ECC. For example, RSA key
size of 3072 bits gives equivalent security level as ECC key of size 256 bits [109]. More detailed
comparison of diﬀerent key-based techniques and their security levels depending on the key size
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is presented below.
Comparison of security strength of different cryptographic key-based techniques
Table 1.2 (according to [109]) conﬁrms and explains the abovementioned advantages and dis-
advantages of all presented types of cryptographic techniques. We can clearly see why one
technique is more eﬃcient than the other. The key sizes for symmetric encryption algorithms
are much smaller than the ones used in asymmetric encryption schemes. It is especially visible
when we compare key sizes of RSA with symmetric key sizes. The diﬀerence between key sizes
providing equivalent security strength for ECC and symmetric algorithms is much smaller. That
feature makes ECC very attractive. With smaller keys the computations are simpler and faster,
thus also the computational devices are smaller and less demanding.
Table 1.2.: Comparison of key sizes [109]
security (bits) symmetric encryption algorithm
minimum size (bits) of Public-Key
DSA/DH RSA ECC
80 Skipjack 1024 1024 160
112 3DES 2048 2048 224
128 AES-128 3072 3072 256
192 AES-192 7680 7680 384
256 AES-256 15360 15360 512
1.1.4. Modern cryptosystems - application, requirements, security (robustness)
Definition 1.1.4. (according to [66, 99]) Cryptosystem is a set of cryptographic algorithms
with all possible ciphertexts, plaintexts, keys and key management processes. It is a set of cryp-
tographic techniques (primitives) used to provide security services for communication over unse-
cured channel.
Nowadays we perceive cryptosystem as an embedded digital system implementing crypto-
graphic primitives in order to provide information security. Before digital information era,
security of information depended on the manner in which we have sealed our document, on type
of media we have used to record and pass the message, and usually on communication channel
(messenger, furnisher). Due to digitalisation of data and popularity of digital techniques and
networks high percent of conﬁdential transactions became digital. The electronic cash transac-
tion, electronic conﬁdential documents exchange (tax data, health data), communication with
banks and important oﬃces, it all becomes more and more popular. With growth of popularity
of digital data exchange, grows the need to secure such communications. The digital documents
exchange is usually done over Internet, which is a very demanding, unsecured communication
channel. The cryptographic techniques evolve to fulﬁll the arising requirements and their im-
plementations adapt to new conditions.
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Applications The applications of digital cryptosystems spread many domains. The ﬁrst and the
most popular is securing data exchange in communication over Internet. The number of services
possible to do over Internet still grows. The most popular ones are: messages exchange (e-mail),
banking transactions (electronic credit and debit card transactions, bank account management),
all transactions involving electronic cash, e-commerce, digital signatures, business transactions,
communications with oﬃces (e.g. tax oﬃce) and many many more.
Other applications involve not only data exchange but also data storing. The digital data
importance grows. Many people and companies start to rely mostly on digital documents and
data, instead of keeping many useless paper copies. Many jobs now are performed using com-
puters and many people’s job depends on the security of data stored either on hard drives or
somewhere over Internet. We start to deposit our data on external servers thus they can be
more vulnerable to unauthorised actions. The so called “cloud computing” service providing
computing power and storage capacity, becomes very popular. Therefore our data should be
secured/encrypted before transmitting/depositing it somewhere over the Internet. The loss or
unauthorised alteration of such data may cause huge problems to a company and similarly to a
common user.
What is more, many oﬃces and institutions tend to digitalise their databases, e.g. to ease the
access to it. In hospitals and clinics the vital medical data have to be secured properly to avoid
stealing or tampering. The same applies to tax oﬃces, the tax data need to be secured properly
to avoid embezzelments.
Another problem to which cryptosystems can be applied is a wireless communication. Number
of wireless applications communicating grows rapidly thus also the demands for its quality, i.e.
speed, range, security. Wireless communication is especially easy to eavesdrop or tamper. To do
this the adversary does not even need to have direct access to the communicating entities [74].
What is more, nowadays, with modernisation of healing techniques, there arise a need to se-
cure medical appliances. Besides usual medical apparel hard to disturb without direct access to
them, there were developed a microchip devices delivering drugs [42], which can be used instead
of regular injections. Such a device is implanted in a patient and is responsible for oozing out
the right dose of a drug in proper time intervals. If the microchip work would be disturbed due
to external malicious actions, it could cause irreversible damage of one’s health.
Finally, the most obvious application: military application. Cryptosystems apply to almost
all areas in military domain. They are responsible for securing information exchange between
governments, for distribution of conﬁdential orders, etc. They provide means for securing remote
controls of military equipment (for example: rocket launcher), for securing ﬂow of information
between units in order to avoid being eavesdropped or discovered and many, many more.
Requirements Depending on the application the requirements vary. However the digital cryp-
tosystem should always fulﬁll the following objectives in order to serve any application.
The proper cryptosystems should be:
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• very eﬃcient (fast, small, not very demanding when it comes to power consumption)
• mathematically robust (they should use up-to-date speciﬁcations of cryptographic systems)
• physically robust (they should be secure against eavesdropping and tampering)
• adaptable (they should properly work in given environment - depends on application)
Characteristics of a good cryptosystem:
• theoretical/mathematical security - hardness of underlying mathematical problem,
• key length - the smaller the key the easier and more eﬃcient the computation,
• speed-efficiency of encryption/decryption process,
• implementation - eﬃciency of implementation,
• scalability - ”the unit can be reused or replicated in order to generate long precision result
independently of the data path precision for which the unit was originally designed” [8]
• interoperability - ability to exchange information with external sources.
• physical security - security against side channel attacks, security of a device
Robustness Security strength of an cryptographic algorithm depends on quality of the algo-
rithm and underlying mathematical problem, length of the key and nowadays also on quality
of the implementation of the algorithm or we may say robustness of the cryptographic device
(device performing cryptographic operations). The cryptanalysts describe the security of the
system using the notion of level of security. Level of security is usually given in terms of the
amount of work (number of operations), using the best methods currently known, needed to be
performed to break the system [66].
Figure 1.5 presents diﬀerent layers of a cryptosystem. Each of these layer should be somehow
secured in order to obtain a secure communication scheme. For us the most interesting is the
bottom layer. For ECC it can be divided further, see Figure 1.6. It can be divided into three
parts (sub-layers):
• [k]P sub-layer - multiplication of the base point of the curve by a large scalar [k] (key,
secret),
• 2P , P +Q (doubling, addition) - operations on points of the curve,
• arithmetic operations in GF (2m) - operations on coordinates of the points, on elements of
the underlying ﬁeld.
There are already known techniques for securing the ﬁrst two sub-layers. On some we were
working together in IRISA laboratory (Lannion, France) with other PhD student Thomas
Chabrier [15]. However there are not yet known any propositions for securing at the arith-
metic level the operations performed on the elements of the underlying ﬁeld.
1.2. Dissertation overview
In the next chapter, we will provide a short introduction to elliptic curves for use in cryptography
and elliptic curve cryptography techniques. Then we will explain the arithmetic in ﬁnite ﬁelds
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Applications: secure e-mail exchange, 
digital cash, e-commerce, firewalls,  
banking transactions,...
Authentication protocols: SSL/TLS/WTLS, 
IPSEC, IEEE 802.11, ...
Cryptographic Primitives: Encryption/Decryption,
Signature, Verification 
Security Services: confidentiality, integrity, 
authentication, non-repudiation 
Cryptographic Techniques: 
Secret - Key Cryptography : AES, DES, RC4...
Public-Key Cryptography: RSA, DSA, ECC 
Arithmetic operations: addition/subtraction, 
multiplication/division, squaring, exponentiation
Figure 1.5.: Security layer model [8, 98]
[k]P
2P, P+Q
arithmetic operations
m over GF(2 )
Figure 1.6.: ECC cryptosystem layers
and provide more details about binary extension ﬁelds GF (2m). Finally we will formulate the
main thesis we want to prove with our researches. Third chapter contains detailed description
of hardware arithmetic operators elaborated during the researches. Followingly the subsequent
chapter introduces the side channel attacks, especially the power analysis attacks and presents
our ideas for securing the previously described hardware arithmetic operators against them.
Eventually we summarise our work, draw conclusions and present future prospects.
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2. Elliptic curves over finite fields -
application to cryptography (overview)
In this chapter we present brief overview of the most important, from cryptographic point of
view, properties of elliptic curves and ﬁnite ﬁelds. We present their application to modern
cryptography, which is of most interest to us. We give a short overview of the application of
ﬁnite ﬁelds to elliptic curve cryptography. We will try to show what is the impact of ﬁnite-ﬁeld
arithmetic operators on ECC system, how important those operators are for the computations
performed by the ECC system.
All presented here elliptic curve theory is based on [49, 102, 55, 10, 65]. Finite ﬁeld description
is written according to [59, 58, 64, 96, 48]. Those sets of references contain complete knowledge
about elliptic curves and ﬁnite ﬁelds.
2.1. Elliptic curves and cryptography
Elliptic curves were studied long before they were introduced to cryptography. In 1985, indepen-
dently Neal Koblitz [49] and Victor Miller [69] proposed to use them in public-key cryptographic
systems due to their speciﬁc properties. It occurs that the problem on which the security of
most popular public-key techniques depends, i.e. the discrete logarithm problem (DLP), de-
ﬁned for elliptic curves (ECDLP) is more complex than in usual case (in case of DLP). Elliptic
curve cryptography techniques were popularised in 90’s. Their use in security applications have
been approved and recommended by many. Their attractiveness lies especially in fact that to
achieve the same security level as RSA, they require much smaller keys i.e. they operate on
much smaller numbers, see Table 1.2 in Chapter 1 on page 14 for comparison. The smaller are
the numbers on which the arithmetic units operate the simplest (the smallest, the fastest) the
ﬁnal cryptographic device.
In the following sections we brieﬂy introduce elliptic curve arithmetic, then present their appli-
cation to security schemes. The ECDLP problem, guarding security of ECC protocols, will also
be explained along with the description of few ECC security schemes.
Understanding elliptic curve arithmetic is not necessary to be able to provide eﬃcient GF (2m)
arithmetic units. However it is crucial when we want to add protections against SCA to those
units. We ought to be conscious, which operations need to be secured and in what way they can
be insecure or vulnerable to attacks.
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2.1.1. Elliptic curves
Definition 2.1.1. (according to [24]) An elliptic curve E over a field K can be defined by
Weierstrass equation of the form:
E : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a6, (2.1)
where a1, a3, a2, a4, a6 ∈ K.
The following quantities are related to E:
∆ = −b22b8 − 8b
3
4 − 27b
2
6 + 9b2b4b6
j =
c34
∆
for ∆ 6= 0
b2 = a
2
1 + 4a2
b4 = 2a4 + a1a3
b6 = a
2
3 + 4a6
b8 = a
2
1a6 + 4a2a6 − a1a3a4 + a2a
2
3 − a
2
4
c4 = b
2
2 − 24b4.
Element ∆ is called discriminant of E and determines whether the Weierstrass equation is
singular or not, j is its j-invariant. The quantities bi and ci are deﬁned to simplify the deﬁnition
of ∆. K is called the underlying ﬁeld and can be the ﬁeld R of real numbers, Q rational numbers,
C complex numbers or Fq ﬁnite ﬁeld. If E is deﬁned over K then it is deﬁned over any extension
of K. An elliptic curve E deﬁned over a ﬁeld K can be also denoted as E/K.
The set of points of an elliptic curve E deﬁned over any extension L of ﬁeld K forms an
abelian group and is deﬁned in the following way:
E(L) =
{
(x, y) ∈ L× L : y2 + a1xy + a3y − x
3 − a2x
2 − a4x− a6 = 0 ∪ {∞}
}
,
where ∞ is a point at inﬁnity. The elliptic curve over K is the set of points (x, y) satisfying a
Weierstrass equation. Depending on the underlying ﬁeld K, the equation 2.1 can be simpliﬁed.
During our researches, we focus on elliptic curves deﬁned over ﬁnite ﬁelds of characteristic 2
(GF (2m)). For GF (2m) the basic Weierstrass equation deﬁning elliptic curve may be simpliﬁed
as follows from Deﬁnition 2.1.1.
Definition 2.1.2. If K is a finite field of characteristic 2 (K = GF (2m)) then E/K can be
defined by:
E1 : y
2 + cy = x3 + ax+ b, for a = 0,∆ = c4 6= 0 (supersingular curve) (2.2)
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or
E2 : y
2+xy = x3+ax2+ b, for a 6= 0,∆ = b 6= 0 (non-supersingular curve) (2.3)
All the arithmetic principles of elliptic curves are best visualised geometrically on elliptic curves
deﬁned over R. Below we present graphs of curves deﬁned over R (Figure 2.1) as well as curves
deﬁned over prime ﬁnite ﬁelds (Figure 2.2). The exemplary curves were plotted using SAGE.
E1 : y
2 = x3 − 5x+ 4 E2 : y
2 = x3 + 1
Figure 2.1.: Elliptic curves over R.
E1(F571) : y
2 = x3 + 1 E2(F7919) : y
2 = x3 + 7914x+ 4
Figure 2.2.: Elliptic curves over Fp.
Group Law (according to [36]) The basic operation on elliptic curve group is point addition.
It is best explained geometrically with chord-and-tangent rule for elliptic curves deﬁned over
R. Let P (x1, y1), Q(x2, y2), R(x3, y3) be three distinct points on E(K) (xi, yi ∈ K) such that
Equations 2.2/ 2.3 hold. Then
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Additive identity
If P is the point at inﬁnity, i.e. P = ∞, then −P = ∞ and P + Q = Q. Point ∞
(zero element) serves as additive identity of the group of points
Negatives
The negative −P is on the curve whenever P is. The point −P has the same
x-coordinate as P but negative y-coordinate, i.e. −(x1, y1) = (x1,−y1). The addition
P + (−P ) gives as a result point at the inﬁnity.
Addition of two distinct points P, Q (see Figure 2.3 left part)
Let R ∈ E(K) be the result of P+Q. To obtain R we draw a line through P and Q.
The third point, at which this line intersects E(K) is the reﬂection about x-axis of
the sum R.
Point addition algebraic formula for non-supersingular E(F2m) : y
2+xy = x3+ax2+b
x3 = λ
2 + λ+ x1 + x2 + a y3 = λ(x1 + x3) + x3 + y1,
where λ = (y1+y2)(x1+x2)
Point addition algebraic formula for supersingular E(F2m) : y
2 + cy = x3 + ax+ b
x3 = λ
2 + x1 + x2 y3 = λ(x1 + x3) + y1
where λ = (y1+y2)(x1+x2)
Doubling P (see Figure 2.3 right part)
Let Q ∈ E(K) be the result of 2P operation. To obtain Q we draw a line tangent
to elliptic curve at P . The point, at which this line intersects E(K) is the reﬂection
about x-axis of the resulting point Q.
Point doubling algebraic formula for non-supersingular E(F2m) : y
2+xy = x3+ax2+b
x3 = λ
2 + λ+ a = x21 +
b
x2
1
y3 = x
2
1 + λx3 + x3
where λ = x1 +
y1
x1
Point doubling algebraic formula for supersingular E(F2m) : y
2 + cy = x3 + ax+ b
x3 = λ
2 y3 = λ(x1 + x3) + y1 + c
where λ = (x
2
1
+a
c )
Point on elliptic curve can be represented using diﬀerent types of coordinates. Each type
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Figure 2.3.: Addition and Doubling of a point on E(K)
has his advantages and disadvantages. For instance, projective coordinates does not require
inversion when performing operations on elliptic curve points [36]. All the above formulas are
derived for curves described by aﬃne coordinates. For other types of coordinates: projective,
Jacobian, mixed, etc., those formulas are diﬀerent [36].
For more details about elliptic curves we suggest reading [49, 102, 55, 10, 65].
2.1.2. Elliptic Curve Cryptography
The elliptic curve cryptographic techniques exploit properties of elliptic curves deﬁned over
ﬁnite ﬁelds Fq. The elliptic curve cryptography schemes depend on the hardness of elliptic curve
discrete logarithm problem (below we present deﬁnition from [36]).
Definition 2.1.3. Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) [36]
Given an elliptic curve E defined over finite field Fq, a point P ∈ E(Fq) of order n, and a point
Q ∈ 〈P 〉, find the integer l ∈ [0, n− 1] such that Q = lP . The integer l is called the discrete
logarithm of Q to the base P, denoted l = logPQ.
Elliptic curve domain parameters D: q - ﬁeld order; FR - ﬁeld representation; S - seed;
a, b ∈ Fq, which deﬁne the equation of elliptic curve E; point P (xp, yp) ∈ Fq; order n of P ;
cofactor h = #E(Fq), to be used in cryptography are usually deﬁned in standards (NIST [32],
SECG [92, 93]). Only for speciﬁc values of those parameters the cryptographic schemes resist
all known mathematical attacks on ECDLP.
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Exemplary ECC security schemes The ECC is used in many cryptographic schemes. We will
provide some details of how some schemes work and give exemplary algorithms. Our goal is to
point out the operations in elliptic curve based security schemes, which are the attackers target.
The most important algorithm used in all types of public-key schemes is the key pair (Q, d)
generation, where Q is a public key and d is the corresponding private key. On the secrecy of
the key d depends the security of cryptographic techniques/schemes.
Algorithm 1 Key pair generation [36]
Input: Domain parameters D = {q, FR, S, a, b, P, n, h}.
Output: Public key Q, private key d.
1: Select d ∈R [1, n− 1]
2: Compute Q = dP
3: Return (Q, d)
The computation of d having Q and P is the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. As the
problem for properly chosen domain parameters D is intractable the security of d is ensured.
Signature scheme
Signature schemes are used to sign digital documents in the same way as handwritten signatures
are used to sign paper documents. With them we can provide the following security services:
authentication, data integrity and non-repudiation.
The signature scheme consists of the following steps [36]:
1. Domain parameter generation - to perform any of the next steps, we need set D =
{q, FR, S, a, b, P, n, h}; for cryptographic purposes those sets are deﬁned in standards:
NIST [32], SECG [92, 93];
2. Key pair generation - generation of key pair {Q, d}, see Algorithm 1;
3. Signature generation - generation of a signature Σ of message m, using set D and private
key d (see Algorithm 2);
4. Signature verification - signature is veriﬁed, using set D, public key Q, and received sig-
nature Σ, in order to reject or accept incoming message m, see Algorithm 3.
One of the most popular scheme is Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA).
Algorithm 2 ECDSA signature generation [36]
Input: Domain parameters D = {q, FR, S, a, b, P, n, h}, private key d, message m
Output: Signature (r, s)
1: Select k ∈R [1, n− 1]
2: Compute kP = (x1, y1) and convert x1 to an integer x1
3: Compute r = x1 mod n. If (r = 0) go to step 1.
4: Compute e = H(m) // H is a hash function //
5: Compute s = k−1(e+ dr) mod n. If (s = 0) go to step 1.
6: Return (r, s)
The other popular elliptic curve signature scheme is Elliptic Curve Korean Certiﬁcate-based
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Algorithm 3 ECDSA signature veriﬁcation [36]
Input: Domain parameters D = {q, FR, S, a, b, P, n, h}, public key Q, message m, signature
(r, s)
Output: Acceptance or rejection of the signature
1: Verify that r, s are integers in the interval [1, n− 1]. If verification=fail then return “reject
the signature”
2: Compute e = H(m) // H is a hash function //
3: Compute w = s−1 mod n
4: Compute u1 = ew mod n and u2 = rw mod n
5: Compute X = u1P + u2Q. If (X =∞) then return ‘reject the signature”
6: Convert the x-coordinate x1 of X to an integer x1; Compute v = x1 mod n
7: If v = r return (r, s)
Digital Signature Algorithm (EC-KCDSA). For more details see standards: ANSI X9.62 see [2],
FIPS 186-3 see [32], IEEE 1363-2000 see [3], ISO/IEC 15946-2 see [1].
Public-key encryption schemes
Public-key encryption schemes provide conﬁdentiality service. It comprises the following steps [36]:
1. Domain parameter generation - to perform the scheme, we need setD = {q, FR, S, a, b, P, n, h};
for cryptographic purposes those sets are deﬁned in standards: NIST [32], SECG [92, 93];
2. Key pair generation - generation of key pair {Q, d}, see Algorithm 1;
3. Encryption - encryption of a message m, using set D and public key Q, preparation of
ciphertext c, see Algorithm 4;
4. Decryption - either rejects the ciphertext as invalid or produces plaintext m using domain
parameters D, private key d, and received ciphertext c, see Algorithm 5; it is assumed that
D and Q are valid. The decryption algorithm always accepts (D, d, c) and outputs m if c
was indeed generated by the encryption algorithm on input (D,Q,m).
As an example we will provide algorithms used in elliptic curve analogue of ElGamal encryp-
tion scheme (see Algorithms 4, 5). Other popular elliptic curve based public key encryption
schemes are Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES), see [101], and Provably Se-
cure Encryption Curve Scheme (PSEC), see [78].
Algorithm 4 Basic ElGamal elliptic curve encryption [36]
Input: Domain parameters D = {q, FR, S, a, b, P, n, h}, public key Q, message m
Output: Ciphertext (C1, C2)
1: Represent the message m as a point M in E(Fq).
2: Select k ∈R [1, n− 1]
3: Compute C1 = kP
4: Compute C2 =M + kQ
5: Return (C1, C2)
Observing the structures of Algorithms 1, 2, 4, one can spot that if the values d, k will be known
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Algorithm 5 Basic ElGamal elliptic curve decryption [36]
Input: Domain parameters D = {q, FR, S, a, b, P, n, h}, public key Q, ciphertext (C1, C2)
Output: Message m
1: Compute M = C2 − dC1
2: Return m
to an adversary the cryptographic schemes will not serve their purpose anymore. Knowing the
algorithm and those values an adversary will be able to negatively aﬀect the communication.
Finding those values mathematically is equivalent to solving ECDLP problem, which is in-
tractable for certain sets of elliptic curve domain parameters. Unfortunately except theoretical
attacks, there exist physical attacks. By analysis of the behaviour of the device performing
cryptographic operations it is possible to discover the secret values, in ECC case, the values
such as the private key d or k (see algorithms in this section). Thus it is necessary to secure all
operations involving values d and k.
2.2. Finite Fields
The general theory of ﬁnite ﬁelds starts in the beginning of 19th century with works of Carl
Friedrich Gauss (1777–1855) and Evariste Galois (1811–1832). We will introduce the most
important algebraic theories. For a complete introduction to ﬁnite ﬁelds we suggest read-
ing [59, 58, 64, 96, 48]. The contents of this section are based on those references.
Groups [59]
Definition 2.2.1. A group is a set G together with binary operation * on G such that following
properties hold:
• ∗ is associative; for any a, b, c ∈ G a ∗ (b ∗ c) = (a ∗ b) ∗ c
• there is an identity (unity) element e ∈ G, such that for all a ∈ G: a ∗ e = e ∗ a = a
• for each a ∈ G, there exists an inverse element a−1 ∈ G such that a ∗ a−1 = a−1 ∗ a = e
If for all a, b ∈ G, a ∗ b = b ∗ a, then the group is called abelian (commutative).
Definition 2.2.2. A multiplicative group G is called cyclic if there is an element a ∈ G such
that for any b ∈ G there is some integer j with b = aj. The element a is called a generator of
the cyclic group, and we note G =< a >. Every cyclic group is commutative.
Definition 2.2.3. A group is called finite (resp. infinite) if it contains finitely (resp. infinitely)
many elements. The number of elements in a finite group is called its order. We shall write:
|G| for the order of the finite group G.
Rings [59]
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Definition 2.2.4. A ring (R,+, ·) is a set R, together with two binary operations, denoted by
+ and ·, such that:
1. R is an abelian group with respect to +
2. · is associative - that is, (a · b) · c = a · (b · c) for all a, b, c ∈ R.
3. The distributive laws hold: that is, for all a, b, c ∈ R we have a · (b+ c) = a · b+ a · c and
(b+ c) · a = b · a+ c · a.
Element 0 (the zero element) is the identity element of the abelian group R with respect to
addition. Element −a is the additive inverse of a. Rings can be classiﬁed as follows:
Definition 2.2.5. Rings classification
1. A ring is called a ring with identity if the ring has a multiplicative identity - that is, if
there is an element e such that a · e = e · a = a for all a ∈ R.
2. A ring is called commutative if · is commutative.
3. A ring is called an integral domain if it is a commutative ring with identity e 6= 0 in
which ab = 0 implies a = 0 or b = 0.
4. A ring is called a division ring (or skew field) if the nonzero elements of R form a group
under · operation.
5. A commutative division ring is called a field.
Fields [59]
Definition 2.2.6. A field is a set F with two binary operations, addition and multiplication,
containing two distinguished elements 0 (zero element) and e (identity element) with 0 6= e.
A field F is an abelian group with respect to addition having 0 as the identity element. The
elements of F that are 6= 0 form an abelian group with respect to multiplication with e as the
multiplicative identity element, usually denoted by 1. Addition and multiplication are charac-
terised by the following distributive laws a · (b+ c) = a · b+ a · c, (b+ c) · a = b · a+ c · a.
Definition 2.2.7. Extension field
Let F be a field. A subset K of F that is itself a field under the operations of F will be called
a subfield of F . Then, F is called an extension (field) of K. If K 6= F , then K is a proper
subfield of F . If K is a subfield of the finite field Fp, p prime, then K must contain the elements
0 and 1, and all other elements of Fp by the closure of K under addition. It follows that Fp
contains no proper subfields.
Definition 2.2.8. Field as a vector space
If L is an extension field of K, then L may be viewed as a vector space over K. The elements
of L (“vectors”) form an abelian group under addition. Moreover, each “vector” α ∈ L can be
multiplied by a “scalar” r ∈ K so that rα is again in L ( rα is simply the product of the field
elements r and α of L) and the laws for multiplication by scalars are satisfied: r(α+β) = rα+rβ,
(r + s)α = rα+ sα, (rs)α = r(sα), and 1α = α, where r, s ∈ K and α, β ∈ L.
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Definition 2.2.9. Existence and uniqueness
The order of a finite field is the number of elements in the field. There exists a finite field F
of order q if and only if q is a prime power, i.e., q = pn. If n = 1, then F is called a prime field.
If n = 2, then F is called an extension field. For any prime power q, there is essentially only one
finite field of order q; informally, this means that any two finite fields of order q are structurally
the same except that the labeling used to represent the field elements may be different. We say
that any two finite fields of order q are isomorphic and denote such a field by Fq.
Number of elements of a field. [59]
Theorem 2.2.1. Let F be a finite field. Then F has pn elements, where the prime p is the
characteristic of F and n is the degree of F over its prime subfield.
Proof. Since F is finite, its characteristic is a prime p according. Therefore the prime subfield
K of F is isomorphic to Fp and thus contains p elements.
Constructing finite fields. [59]
Starting from the prime ﬁelds Fp, we can construct other ﬁnite ﬁelds by the process of root
adjunction. If f ∈ Fp[x] is an irreducible polynomial over Fp of degree n, then by adjoining a
root of f to Fp we get a ﬁnite ﬁeld with pn elements.
Bases of the finite field. [59, 36]
Definition 2.2.10. We regard a finite extension F = Fqm of the finite field K = Fq as a vector
space over K. Then F has dimension m over K, and if {α1, ..., αm} is a basis of F over K,
each element α ∈ F can be uniquely represented in the form
α = c1α1 + · · ·+ cmαm with cj ∈ K for 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
Definition 2.2.11. Let K be a finite field and F a finite extension of K. Then two bases
{α1, ..., αm} and {β1, ..., βm} of F over K are said to be dual (or complementary) bases if
for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m we have:
TrF/K(αi, βj) =
{
0 for i 6= j
1 for i = j
Trace
The trace function TrF/K serves for a description of all linear transformations from F into K.
For more detailed information we suggest Chapter 3 of [58].
Definition 2.2.12. Let K = Fq and F = Fqm. Then a basis of F over K of the form
{α, αq, ..., αq
m
} consisting of a suitable element α ∈ F and its conjugates with respect to K,
is called a normal basis of F over K.
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2.2.1. Binary finite field extensions GF (2m)
The two most popular ﬁnite ﬁelds used in cryptography are prime ﬁelds GF (p), where p is
prime, and ﬁnite ﬁelds of characteristic 2 (binary extension ﬁeld) GF (2m), denoted also by
F2m . The described research work in this thesis, concerns the second type of ﬁelds that is
binary extension ﬁelds GF (2m). Binary extension ﬁelds GF (2m) are considered advantageous for
hardware solutions because their elements are represented by polynomials (binary polynomials)
instead of integers and polynomial addition and modular reduction are regarded as simpler than
operations on integers [113].
To construct a binary ﬁnite ﬁeld extension an irreducible polynomial f(x) over GF (2) of
degree m is used, it is assumed that α is its root, i.e. f(α) = 0. The irreducible polynomial is
of the form :
f(x) = xm + fm−1x
m−1 + · · ·+ f2x
2 + f1x+ 1, (2.4)
where fi ∈ GF (2).
The ﬁeld can be viewed as a vector space, which elements are represented with a use of
a speciﬁc basis. The most commonly used basis, of the form {1, α, α2, . . . , αm−1}, is called
polynomial (canonical) basis of the ﬁeld. The elements of the ﬁnite ﬁeld GF (2m) represented in
this basis are as follows:
A =
m−1∑
i=0
aiα
i = am−1α
m−1 + am−2α
m−2 + · · ·+ a2α
2 + a1α
1 + a0α
0, (2.5)
where ai ∈ GF (2) = {0, 1} and α is a root of f(x). Thus we may say that all elements of
GF (2m) are polynomials of degree at most (m− 1).
2.3. Problem definition
This section will provide the reader with problems of our interest existing in described domain,
which for us seems worth solving. There are two main objectives when creating a cryptographic
system:
1. The system has to be very efficient in terms of speed, size (implementation cost), power
consumption, performance.
2. The system should be secure against attempts of stealing the secret data.
Efficiency of cryptographic system Modern cryptographic systems have numerous applica-
tions. In order not to negatively impact the performance of larger electronic systems they need
to be integrated with, they should be very eﬃcient. By eﬃciency we mean that they are fast,
relatively small and eﬀective. That they protect our data without slowing down other operations
and disturbing our work.
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As the data size on which cryptographic systems operate constantly grows, we need to con-
stantly adapt existing cryptographic systems to arising needs. In ECC systems all operations
depend on the operations performed by ﬁnite-ﬁeld arithmetic operators. If their performance
is inferior they negatively impact the work of the whole cryptosystem. Even if highly eﬃcient
higher-level solution will be provided (see Figure 1.6 for what is a higher-level operation), the
system will fail due to poor performance of the most important modules: arithmetic operators.
It is not easy to create a really eﬃcient solution. We have to take into account many things,
such as ﬁnite ﬁeld elements representation, arithmetic operation algorithm, size of operands
(for ECC solutions they are of size 150–600 bits), if it is worth and possible to parallelise the
algorithm. It is necessary to ﬁnd a trade-oﬀ between size and speed of a solution. It is possible
to create extremely fast solutions but huge and otherwise. The problem is to balance those two
parameters so that the overall eﬃciency/performance and cost will be satisfying.
Security of cryptographic system If we will implement the elliptic curve cryptographic system
according to requirements stated in the newest standards we can be sure that our cryptographic
system is safe against theoretical (mathematical) attacks. However as mentioned in the intro-
duction, there were developed attacks called side channel analysis attacks. SCA attacks exploit
the correlation between behaviour of the cryptographic device, such as power consumption,
emitted electromagnetic ﬁeld, timing of the operation, and the secret data, such as private keys,
on which the device operates. The SCA is a very serious threat for a cryptographic system.
The weak implementations of cryptographic techniques allow even not well skilled adversary
to discover a private key. With the discovery of private key the whole communication system
becomes insecure.
Recently there have been proposed many methods for securing ECC systems, however they
focus on the top layers of the system; that is on operation [k]P (multiplication of the point on
a curve P by a scalar k) and primitive operations on points of elliptic curves (2P , P +Q). We
presume that securing just curve-level operations of ECC system is not enough. For simple side
channel analysis, where just one power trace sample is analysed, it is suﬃcient. However in case
of diﬀerential power analysis (where hundreds of samples are analysed) such countermeasures
may be too weak. We do not know any sources discussing countermeasures for ﬁnite ﬁeld arith-
metic operators. The topic seems not yet exploited.
We presume it is necessary to secure all layers of a cryptographic system to make it really
secure. Because even if the upper layers of a cryptographic system are very secure, the informa-
tion leaking in lowest layer may signiﬁcantly decrease the level of security of the whole system.
We ﬁnd that implementing SCA countermeasures on each layer of ECC system should increase
much the level of the security of the cryptographic device.
Trade-off between objectives One may say that presented objectives for a cryptographic
system exclude one another. That, if we want to have eﬃcient cryptosystem it cannot be loaded
with countermeasures because they would limit much its eﬃciency. On the other hand very
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eﬃcient cryptosystem without any countermeasure is useless nowadays. The problem is to ﬁnd
a trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency of the system and its security, i.e. to ﬁnd a way to secure the
system without degrading its elaborated eﬃciency.
2.4. Thesis formulation and research objectives
According to the formulated problems we may deﬁne the research objectives. The two main ones
are: to create eﬃcient GF (2m) arithmetic operators and to make the operators secure against
some types of SCAs.
In order to create eﬃcient GF (2m) basic arithmetic operators we have to familiarise ourselves
with details of operations on ﬁnite ﬁelds. Then it is necessary to perform a vast research and
choose most suitable basis to represent ﬁnite-ﬁeld elements. Later we have to carefully study
existing algorithms for operations deﬁned over GF (2m). Then we have to translate the most
promising ones to hardware and analyse meticulously their work in order to be able to create
our own solutions as eﬃcient as possible.
The second objective is to secure the created arithmetic operators. There are many types of
SCAs, we have decided to secure our operators against family of power analysis attacks. The
power analysis attacks exploit the correlation between power consumed by the cryptosystem and
operations performed inside. We want to ﬁnd eﬀective algorithmic and architectural counter-
measures against those type of attacks.
Working on those two objectives we have to remember to verify the countermeasures impact
on the overall performance of arithmetic operators. If the countermeasure degrades much the
work of the solution then we have to rethink the countermeasure and either upgrade it or aban-
don the idea.
We have summarised all objectives of our research in the following plan:
1. Study of elliptic curve cryptography, ﬁnite ﬁelds, arithmetic operators, side channel attacks
and countermeasures.
2. Study of parameters of GF (2m) arithmetic operators - number representation, algorithms,
requirements.
3. Design and development of hardware GF (2m) arithmetic operators solutions.
4. Theoretical and practical evaluation of designed operators’ performances in FPGA circuit
- the operators’ eﬃciency is evaluated and if necessary improved until the results are
satisfying, and ﬁnal versions of eﬃcient operators are provided
5. Design and development of test environment for evaluating security of elaborated operators
- experiments using simulators, speciﬁc FPGA boards, FPGA dedicated internal signals
analysers, probes and oscilloscope.
6. Evaluation of security of designed arithmetic operators, elaboration of countermeasures.
7. Insertion and evaluation of countermeasures - evaluations of their eﬃciency, analysis of
their impact on the performance of the operators, if the results are not satisfying return
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to previous point.
8. Proposition of eﬃcient and secure basic GF (2m) arithmetic operators and their ﬁnal eval-
uation.
9. Analysis, documentation and publication of obtained results.
Having identiﬁed the existing problems we may formulate now the main thesis we want to
prove with our researches. The thesis is as follows:
It is possible to create efficient and secure against some side-channel power anal-
ysis attacks GF (2m) arithmetic operators dedicated to reconfigurable hardware.
We ﬁnd that it is possible to create very eﬃcient GF (2m) arithmetic modules dedicated for
elliptic curve cryptosystems, working on operands of sizes up to 600 bits, and that it is possible
to secure them against information leakage without signiﬁcant overhead. Moreover we claim that
it is possible to develop such countermeasures against power analysis attacks which would not
decrease signiﬁcantly the performance of our elaborated modules but will signiﬁcantly increase
their security against power analysis attacks.
The following chapters describe the researches conducted to prove our thesis.
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3. Arithmetic operators on GF (2m)
There are two main operations deﬁned in GF (2m): addition and multiplication. All other op-
erations (inversion, division, squaring, etc) can be performed using multiplication and addition.
The complexity of some operations depends on the representation of the elements of the ﬁeld.
The most popular bases (for deﬁnition see Chapter 2, Section 2.2) used for representing ele-
ments in cryptographic applications are [36]: polynomial (canonical basis), normal basis and its
variations (optimal normal bases, gaussian normal bases), dual basis. Choosing right basis is
not a simple task. We have performed vast research on bases of ﬁnite ﬁelds elements taking into
account our target devices, results described in known literature obtained for each basis and the
application of developed ﬁnite ﬁelds arithmetic operators. The basic theory about each basis is
presented in Chapter 2, Section 2.2, here we will present the most popular applications of each
basis, its advantages, disadvantages and reasons why we have chosen the certain basis.
For our solutions we have chosen polynomial (standard, canonical basis). At ﬁrst we have
eliminated from our choices the dual basis. Mainly due to the fact that it was mentioned in few
articles, such as [72], that it is not suitable for large m (ﬁeld size). What is more all described
dual basis solutions were designed for very small m (up to 16). We have observed that dual basis
is used usually in error correcting codes applications, which does not require use of large ﬁnite
ﬁelds. It is usually used for smaller ﬁelds because it requires basis transformation operation,
which heavily depends on ﬁeld generator (irreducible polynomial) form.
The hardest was to eliminate either polynomial or normal basis. Both standard and normal
basis seem to have properties suitable for assumed application of our arithmetic operators. Below
we present a summarised characteristics of those bases, and some comments found in literature.
Polynomial basis:
- characterised by regularity and simplicity (during implementation yields regular and simple
structures of the solution),
- clear and easy to understand from the mathematical point of view,
- the highest clock rate is achieved for polynomial basis solutions,
- multiplication in polynomial basis oﬀers scalability,
- according to [45]: “The time and space complexities of bit-parallel canonical basis multipli-
ers are much better than that of multipliers based on the normal basis.”
Normal bases:
- squaring operation is very simple, it is just a rotation of vector elements,
- yields irregular structures,
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- requires large area,
- it is claimed that for Optimal Normal Bases (ONB) [73] very fast solutions can be achieved,
- using ONBs, requires basis conversion from normal to optimal normal basis, which may
be costly.
The features of both bases presented here were collected during study of literature on the
subject. Some information contradict the other, thus it is hard to choose the right basis. Finally
we have decided to choose polynomial basis mainly due to the fact that it yields regular and
simple structures. As to this feature all known to us sources agree. We presume that for
hardware implementation it is much better when the structure is regular and simple. Otherwise
we may experience synchronisation, routing or hazard problems [85]. The more irregular and
complex architecture inserted into FPGA circuit the harder to control it.
Moreover according to [36], a very important position in literature on ECC : “Experience
has shown that optimal normal bases do not have any significant advantages over polynomial
bases for hardware implementation. Moreover, field multiplication in software for normal basis
representations is very slow in comparison to multiplication with a polynomial basis;”. However
we ﬁnd that normal bases group maybe very promising and it would be worth analysing it in
the future.
The other important operators’ parameters are the ﬁeld sizem (operands size) and ﬁeld generator
f(x). Designed arithmetic operators should serve ECC applications thus we will use the values
recommended in ECC standards [32]. The most recent values are presented in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1.: NIST recommended parameters [32]
ﬁeld size m irreducible polynomial f(x)
163 f(x) = x163 + x7 + x6 + x3 + 1
233 f(x) = x233 + x74 + 1
283 f(x) = x283 + x12 + x7 + x5 + 1
409 f(x) = x409 + x87 + 1
571 f(x) = x571 + x10 + x5 + x2 + 1
We target all our solutions to Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA), for simulation and
testing purposes we use Xilinx circuits. We will implement our operators in small Spartan-
3E XC3S1200E device [116] and one of the biggest FPGAs: Virtex-6 LX240T [20]. For test-
ing robustness against side-channel we also implement our circuits in Virtex-II Pro XC2VP7
FPGA [115] mounted on SASEBO-G board [94]. The elaborated solutions architectures are
described in VHDL, and synthesised, placed and routed, and implemented using Xilinx ISE 12.2
(for Virtex-6 and Spartan-3E) and ISE 9.2 (Spartan-3E, Virtex-II Pro) environments and their
tools. All the behavioral and post-route simulations are performed using built-in ISim simulator
or ModelSim simulator from Menthor Graphics. All the implementation results given in this
chapter are values predicted/calculated by Xilinx ISE environment.
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3.1. Finite Field Addition
Addition is a very simple operation. In case of polynomial basis, it is a polynomial addition,
which can be viewed as a XOR operation of two m-bit binary vectors (m is a ﬁeld size). Let a(x)
and b(x), two polynomials of size m, be the elements of GF (2m) and let c(x) be its sum and also
an element of the ﬁeld. Addition of two polynomials is carried out under modulo 2 arithmetic,
i.e. to obtain c we have to perform the bitwise exclusive OR operation. This operation is regarded
as a very simple one due to the fact that we do not need to bother about carry propagation and
length of carry chains. On the other hand, if we perform very simple operation but on large
numbers, we may experience some problems. If we XOR large numbers the operation, although
simple, may take a lot of hardware resources.
Summarising, addition is rather fast operation however for large numbers it may take large
amount of area and should be well synchronised. In order to see if there exist real problems with
this operation we have designed few very simple operators.
It is very easy to paralellise this operation and it is possible to perform on-the-ﬂy addition
while receiving consecutive parts of both operands with no need for storing them as well as the
result. In terms of eﬃciency the design of addition unit does not cause many problems. However
in terms of security the addition may be very problematic what will be shown in next chapter.
The ECC processor, in which the designed units will be built-in, assumes sending data over
buses in words (16, 32-bit words). According to this assumption we propose some addition
operator solutions.
We have studied the following cases:
1: Addition on-the-ﬂy of a, b words, putting partial results in shifted register c (solution 1);
2: Addition on-the-ﬂy of a, b words, putting partial results in memory block (solution 2);
3: Waiting for the whole a, b vectors, adding them at the end (solution 3);
The results we have obtained shown us that this operation is rather simple and should not gen-
erate a lot of problems. We do not present here values obtained for the solution 3. This solution
is really very simple, we may say that it is a translation of input signal to the output, thus it is
diﬃcult to synthetise it to obtain some credible values.
Looking at the results presented in Table 3.2 it is easy to observe that addition in GF (2m)
is really simple. Our solutions are very small, around 20-30 LUTs and fast. With growth of
the size of input operands the area grows slightly, the same applies to the decrease of maximum
speed of the solution. However for solution 1 and the biggest ﬁeld the frequency in comparison
for the smaller solutions drastically drops. In practice, in complete ECC system, addition is
usually performed parallely to other operations or interleaved with them due to its simplicity.
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Table 3.2.: Addition solutions (Virtex-6)
ﬁeld size solution 1 solution 2
m [LUT] [MHz] [LUT] [MHz]
163 21 771 26 562
233 21 771 26 562
283 22 767 28 560
409 22 767 28 560
571 24 578 31 558
3.2. Finite Field Multiplication
The second basic operation deﬁned in ﬁnite ﬁeld is multiplication. Multiplication in contrary to
addition is regarded as a complex operation.
Designing an eﬃcient hardware algorithm for multiplication in binary ﬁnite ﬁeld extensions
is one of the aims of this thesis, thus the thorough analysis of existing methods and solutions is
necessary. Our solutions will not be totally novel due to the fact that we base on old and known
mathematical theories. Our goal is to modify or merge the existing algorithms in order to fulﬁll
demanding cryptographic requirements. We also have to ﬁnd the best way of translating the
algorithms to hardware and not losing much of their features. Our operators are aimed for ECC
applications thus they need to perform multiplication on large numbers (150–600 bits) and simul-
taneously be very fast and occupy reasonable amount of area of the target device. Moreover their
structures should be easily modiﬁable (ﬂexible) to add countermeasures against physical attacks.
Finite ﬁeld multiplication can be regarded as modular operation because it consists of two
steps: multiplication and reduction. In order to obtain the ﬁnite ﬁeld multiplication result
we have to multiply operands and then reduce the product with use of ﬁeld generator, so the
resulting element will be the element of the same ﬁeld. Let a, b ∈ GF (2m), be the (m−1) degree
polynomials where a = a(x) =
(m−1∑
i=0
aix
i
)
= a0 + a1x + a2x + . . . + am−2x
m−2 + am−1x
m−1
and b = b(x) =
(m−1∑
j=0
bjx
j
)
= b0 + b1x + b2x + . . . + bm−2x
m−2 + bm−1x
m−1, and let f =
f(x) = 1+f1x+f2x+ . . .+fm−2x
m−2+fm−1x
m−1+fmx
m be m degree irreducible polynomial
generating the ﬁeld (for examples of irreducible polynomials used in cryptography see 3.1).
We want to perform:
c(x) = a(x)b(x) mod f(x) (3.1)
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First we have to perform multiplication:
d(x) = a(x)b(x)
= a(x)
(m−1∑
i=0
bix
i
)
=
(m−1∑
i=0
bia(x)x
i
)
=
(
b0a(x) + b1a(x)x+ b2a(x)x
2 + ...+ b(m−1)a(x)x
(m−1)
)
(3.2)
and then reduction [25] (the degree 2m− 2 polynomial d(x) is reduced iteratively by irreducible
polynomial f(x) of degree m):
d(2m−2) = d(x)
d(k−1) = d(k)(x) + f(x)d
(k)
k x
k−m, m ≤ k ≤ 2m− 2,
(3.3)
where d(k) is a partial remainder and d(2m−2)(x) = c(x).
Generally GF (2m) multiplication algorithms can be divided in two groups: two-step algo-
rithms, in which we perform separately multiplication and reduction (in two consecutive steps),
and interleaved algorithms, in which we interleave/combine multiplication with reduction.
The most popular algorithms of both groups are presented and discussed below.
We have analysed many algorithms and their diﬀerent versions to be able to take and combine
those features of the algorithms, which will allow us to create the most eﬃcient algorithm ful-
ﬁlling, assumed requirements. Here we present only the most interesting results of our analysis.
3.2.1. Two-step algorithms
One of the most popular group of algorithms comprises two-step algorithms. Two-step because
to perform ﬁnite ﬁeld multiplication we need to perform two separate steps: multiplication
d = ab and reduction c = d mod f . There exist many versions of two-step multipliers. They
combine diﬀerent methods for multiplication and reduction in order to achieve the best, the
most eﬃcient solutions.
In the following paragraphs, diﬀerent methods for performing multiplication and reduction are
presented. Their features are thoroughly analysed in terms of hardware design and eﬃciency.
Finally the chosen combinations of multiplication and reduction are described and compared in
order to expose their advantages and disadvantages.
Multiplication step Here we will present the analysis of some widely known polynomial mul-
tiplication methods.
Schoolbook multiplication method (shift-and-add method). The simplest and the most
known polynomial multiplication method is so called schoolbook method (shift-and-add method).
Having two polynomials a(x) and b(x) of degreem−1 we obtain product d(x) of degree 2m−2 in
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the way presented in Equation 3.2. We multiply polynomial a by each coeﬃcient of polynomial
b, i.e. we successively shift the polynomial a by each coeﬃcient of polynomial b, and add (XOR
in our case) the partial results. One may regard the a and b polynomials as two binary vectors.
Vector a, which is being shifted left (multiplied by 2n) by 2, 4, 8, etc., and vector b, which bits
decide if we should accumulate the particular shift of vector a or not. The illustrative example
for m = 4 is shown below:
a3a2a1a0
× b3b2b1b0
—————————————–
⊕ a3a2a1a0 ∧ b0
⊕ a3a2a1a0 ∧ b1
⊕ a3a2a1a0 ∧ b2
⊕ a3a2a1a0 ∧ b3
—————————————–
= d6d5d4d3d2d1d0
The method is very simple and allows creating regular combinatorial designs. However if we
want to use it to multiply large numbers it can be ineﬃcient, especially regarding chip space
utilisation.
All basic polynomial multiplication algorithms are usually some kind of variations of this
method. The diﬀerence between variations usually lies in the way the operands are repre-
sented. There exists a simple vector version, matrix-vector version and divide-and-conquer
version (operands are partitioned). Diﬀerent representations of operands strongly inﬂuence the
hardware structures elaborated to perform the multiplication. Some cause acceleration of the
solution but on the other hand they increase amount of resources used, some decrease the area
cost but also degrade speed of the solution. If we want to ﬁnd the eﬃcient solution, we always
have to look for some trade-oﬀ between resources occupied and time needed to execute the al-
gorithm. Diﬀerent representations of operands let us also perceive new ideas of optimisation of
the basic algorithm.
In order to eﬃciently design hardware unit for a polynomial multiplier it is important to no-
tice the advantages of diﬀerent mathematical algorithms and to ﬁnd the tradeoﬀs between area
and speed of the elaborated solution. Unfortunately even the best theoretical optimisations and
simpliﬁcations of the algorithms do not give the expected eﬃciency increase when translated
to hardware. We have analysed many of the theoretical improvements by translating them to
hardware in order to see and maybe use their advantageous properties. However we were not
very satisﬁed with obtained results. In practice many of those improvements either yielded
hardware structures similar to original proposition or decreased eﬃciency of hardware solution.
In many cases it was not clear to what ﬁeld sizes the algorithm improvements target. As we
would present, there exist improvements suitable only for certain ﬁeld sizes, while for the other
they does not work as expected. However basing on the theoretical approaches presented in the
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literature it is possible to extract the best parts, promising for hardware solution design, of all
the proposals and merge them to create an eﬃcient hardware algorithm.
Matrix-vector approach. One of the most popular variations of the shift-and-add method
is its matrix-vector version [25]. There, polynomial a(x) is represented by a speciﬁc matrix A
of size (2m − 1) ×m, in which each column represents consecutive shifts left of a(x). Element
b(x) is represented by m size vector and product d(x) is also a vector but of size (2m− 1).
Instead of d(x) = a(x)b(x) we perform:
d = Ab =


d0
d1
...
dm−1
dm
dm+1
...
d2m−3
d2m−2


=


a0 0 0 . . . 0 0
a1 a0 0 . . . 0 0
...
...
. . . . . .
. . .
...
am−2 am−3 am−4 . . . a0 0
am−1 am−2 am−3 . . . a1 a0
0 am−1 am−2
. . . a2 a1
0 0 am−1 . . . a3 a2
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 0 . . . am−1 am−2
0 0 0 . . . 0 am−1




b0
b1
b2
...
bm−3
bm−2
bm−1


(3.4)
As mentioned above and what can be observed comparing Equation 3.2 and Equation 3.4
each column of matrix A represents shifted vector a, index of column indicates how many times
vector a was left shifted. Further, as in case of shift-and-add method, bits of vector b denote
which column of matrix A (which shift of vector a) should be accumulated to obtain the prod-
uct vector d. We have implemented this algorithm in hardware in order to compare it with
the schoolbook version and concluded that they give basically the same implementation results.
However the matrix representation of a(x) reveals to us more ideas of optimisation of hardware
realisation. Combining elements of standard algorithm with the operands representation used
in matrix-vector approach allowed us creating an eﬃcient algorithm for polynomial multiplica-
tion in GF (2m). The implementation results and more details concerning implementation are
presented below.
Divide-and-conquer algorithm and Karatsuba Ofman trick. One of the most popular
improvements of the classical multiplication method is Karatsuba-Ofman trick [44]. The trick
improves divide-and-conquer version of multiplication algorithm. Theoretically it decreases num-
ber of the most complex operations we have to perform to get product of a and b.
The aim of divide-and-conquer algorithms is to reduce large (hard) problem into a set of
smaller (easier) problems. In our case we partition input polynomials (multiplicands) so instead
of performing one multiplication of very large polynomials we perform many multiplications of
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much smaller polynomials and ﬁnally combine the partial results. It is even possible to partition
our inputs into single coeﬃcients, however this may not be very eﬃcient.
The method assumes the following partitioning of the input parameters. For polynomials of
size m = 2t (m is even) we have:
AH AL
0m-1 -1m2m2
a(x) = x
m
2 AH +AL = x
m
2 (x
m
2
−1am−1 + · · ·+ am
2
) + (x
m
2
−1am
2
−1 + · · ·+ a0)
BH BL
0m-1 -1m2m2
b(x) = x
m
2 BH +BL = x
m
2 (x
m
2
−1bm−1 + · · ·+ bm
2
) + (x
m
2
−1bm
2
−1 + · · ·+ b0)
Hence one can denote multiplication as follows:
d(x) = a(x)b(x)
= (x
m
2 AH +AL)(x
m
2 BH +BL)
= xmAHBH + x
m
2 (AHBL +ALBH) +ALBL.
(3.5)
According to Equation 3.5 in order to multiply a and b one has to perform: four sub-multiplications
and three additions.
Karatsuba and Ofman [44] had modiﬁed the Equation 3.5 in such a way that the number of
needed sub-multiplications decreased. However the number of necessary additions, XOR opera-
tions, increased. The modiﬁed equation employing Karatsuba-Ofman trick is as follows:
d(x) = a(x)b(x)
= (x
m
2 AH +AL)(x
m
2 BH +BL)
= xmAHBH + x
m
2 ((AH +AL)(BH +BL)−AHBH −ALBL) +ALBL.
(3.6)
The number of necessary multiplications is now three and number of XOR operations needed is
six. It is assumed that multiplication operation is more costly than addition. If we operate
on single coeﬃcients and we assume that multiplication equals to AND operation and addition
is equivalent to XOR operation than this assumption does not hold, especially in case of FPGA
circuit.
In theory when we build FPGA circuits on LUTs there is no diﬀerence if we use XOR or AND
gate because each of those gates can take one LUT if they yield the values of diﬀerent outputs.
However if we assume that LUT size is ﬁnite (the function size, which can be implemented is
limited) then the XOR gates take more space. We have conducted some tests on this matter and
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found that this is caused by the fact that however one describes the XOR gate in HDL (hardware
description language) it is always substituted by the combination of AND and OR gates. This can
be observed while inspecting technology schematics generated by the Xilinx ISE environment.
According to this the XOR function can be regarded as three gates plus inverters. Thus it is
obvious that it is more costly than a single AND gate. All that proves the opposite to what is
assumed; that is that XOR function is suggested to be the trivial operation, on the contrary it
appears to be a source of delay and space problems in the design.
Taking into consideration our observations we have decided to test the performances of ba-
sic divide-and-conquer algorithm (Equation 3.5) alongside with testing the algorithm involving
Karatsuba-Ofman trick (Equation 3.6).
The ﬁrst obtained results conﬁrmed our observations concerning addition and multiplication
complexity. The straightforward implementation of Karatsuba-Ofman optimisation for short bi-
nary vectors did not yield solutions more eﬃcient than the algorithm with four multiplications,
on the contrary, ﬁrst attempts for small input vectors (4-bit) had shown that the optimisation is
not eﬃcient at all and yields bigger and slower designs. The advantage of Karatsuba-Ofman trick
could be observed starting from 16-bit input vectors as will be discussed later. The implemen-
tation analysis presented further will describe the practical eﬀectiveness of Karatsuba-Ofman
optimsation.
The main problem, which occurs during the implementation of divide-and-conquer algorithms,
is how to wisely partition the polynomials (operands) to make the designed multiplier really eﬃ-
cient. In order to ﬁnd the most eﬃcient partitioning, we had performed vast analysis of various
possibilities.
We have started our tests and analysis from implementation of small number multipliers.
We presumed that starting from implementations of large number multipliers might cause that
some algorithms’ properties will be invisible due to being masked by other problems existing in
extensive designs.
Multiplication step - hardware realisation. The presented multiplication algorithms can be
translated to hardware in two manners: straightforward as a combinatorial circuits or can be
partitioned to perform the multiplication steps sequentially. Combinatorial circuits are usually
very fast but also very extensive whereas sequential ones are slower, but better synchronised
and more compact. The best solution will be to combine combinatorial and sequential features.
In hardware it is important to ﬁnd trade-oﬀs between those two types of realisations in order
not to end up with extensive and very slow solutions.
To ease the comparison of elaborated solutions a new measure, the AT eﬃciency factor is
introduced.
Definition 3.2.1. The efficiency factor AT is the measure of efficiency in terms of execution
time of the operation and area taken by the circuit.
AT = (area × execution time)
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It is a normalised product of area taken by the solution and the time needed to perform the
operation.
To calculate AT for combinatorial designs we have multiplied maximum delay value given
by Xilinx ISE environment by predicted area. In case of sequential designs we have multiplied
number of clocks needed to obtain result by minimal period given by ISE environment and by
predicted area. All the AT values were normalised to ease comparison.
During the primary analysis we have assumed that big number multipliers will be designed as
a combination of smaller number multipliers. We have presumed that such approach will yield
best results.
We begin our study of each algorithm for a very small input numbers (4-bit) and then observe
what are the best combinations and best sizes of primary multipliers when it comes to designing
bigger multipliers. Such approach seems advisable if one wants to create large number multipli-
ers of various sizes it should make the multiplier architectures scalable and ﬂexible.
The ﬁrst analysed multiplication method was the shift-and-add method. We have started from
the straightforward implementation and created pure combinational structures multiplying two
vectors. The simplest version of the circuit was a translation of Equation 3.2. To each bit of
resulting polynomial d a combination of XORed values were assigned as presented for m = 4 in
Figure 3.1.
We have started the analysis with implementation of 4-bit multiplier. The synthesis of the 4-
bit multiplier circuit yielded satisfying and promising results. Created design has quite regular
structure and works rather fast. It is compact (11 LUTs) and a total combinatorial path delay
is fairly low - around 7.7 ns (for Spartan-3E). With the doubling of the size of the input polyno-
mial the number of LUTs taken increases approximately 4 times. For 4-bit inputs the multiplier
circuit takes 11 LUTs, for 8-bit it is already over 40, then for 16 its nearly 200, thus for 32-bit
it is approximately 800 LUTs. According to this 256-bit multiplier will take over 52000 LUTs.
Spartan-3E has 17344 LUTs, which means that purely combinatorial design of 256-bit multiplier
far exceeds number of available resources. One may say that there are bigger devices available.
That is why as the second target FPGA we have chosen Virtex-6, which has 150720 LUTs, so
such multiplier will ﬁt in but will occupy 1/3 of the chip. For bigger multiplier, 512-bit, the
design grows four times so probably it will have approx. 200000 LUTs, which exceeds also the
area of Virtex-6. Of course there exist still bigger chips, in Virtex-6 family of FPGAs the biggest
one has 566784 6-input LUTs, so that one will ﬁt 512-bit combinational multiplier. However
building a design with the assumption that there is always newer and bigger FPGA, which will
ﬁt it, is nonsense unless we always have huge amount of spare money to spend. Nowadays in
a world where one of the most important features of the device is the cost of its production,
the excessive, usually containing much redundancy, designs are useless. Additionally the routing
costs and delay problems are smaller if we connect the units inside the chip instead of connecting
the chips with some external buses. As a result of our study one may conclude that it is not wise
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Figure 3.1.: Idea of circuit performing shift-and-add method for m = 4
to create purely combinatorial circuit for a large number multiplier. Although they are fast (the
combinatorial path delay increases slightly with the increase of the size of the input parameter,
around 0.5 ns or even less), for large inputs, they take a huge amount of hardware resources,
which makes them not suitable for integration with other units. The overall hardware cost will
be too big. Extensive designs cause also routing and synchronisation problems.
Thus we may conclude that big straightforward combinatorial multipliers are very area in-
eﬃcient. However such regular structures seem to be very appropriate to be implemented in
FPGAs. Our next idea was to use small combinational multipliers to build bigger solutions.
The biggest implemented by us fully combinatorial multiplier was 32-bit multiplier. All ob-
tained results are presented in Table 3.3.
Because purely combinatorial circuit yields huge solutions for large sizes of input operands we
have decided to test what are the results and advantages of sequential solutions. The question
arising in this case was how to “sequence” (partition) the design to obtain a compact and fast
multiplier.
The ﬁrst idea was to observe the purely sequential solution, which means to perform each
stage of Equation 3.2, each XOR operation, in a separate clock cycle. The primary size of input
operands was 4 bits as in previous cases. The resulting hardware structure in Spartan-3E is
very regular and can work with high frequencies, around 300 MHz. However such a solution
43
requires, for 4-bit inputs, more LUTs (35 LUTs) than the combinatorial solution. Such a result
is not surprising and could be predicted. What is surprising is the fact that for larger input
vectors its area increases almost similarly as in case of combinatorial circuits. Hence it requires
more space than the combinatorial circuit, simultaneously requiring more time to perform the
task. Probably it caused by the synthesizer settings which duplicate gates structures, instead of
reusing just one structure in each clock cycle (state of ﬁnite state machine).
Our next idea was to create the sequential circuit utilising the classical combinatorial multi-
plier units. We have analysed the behaviour of few 32-bit multipliers built as a sequential
combination of 16, 8 and 4-bit multipliers. To combine obtained partial results we have used
divide-and-conquer algorithm. 32-bit multiplier is still small in comparison to ones we ought
to create (150–600 bits), however it may show us what is the best way of partitioning input
operands in order to achieve the best eﬃciency. In the following equations Ai, Bi denote i-bit
A, B elements (vectors). Our ﬁrst proposition was to create a circuit using sixteen times one
8-bit sub-multiplier according to the equation 3.7.
A32B32 = A
H
16B
H
16 +A
H
16B
L
16 +A
L
16B
H
16 +A
L
16B
L
16
= AHh8 B
Hh
8 +A
Hh
8 B
Hl
8 +A
Hl
8 B
Hh
8 +A
Hl
8 B
Hl
8
+AHh8 B
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8 +A
Hh
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8 +A
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(3.7)
Each expression of the form AIi8BIi8 symbolises one operation performed by the 8-bit sub-
multiplier. Second proposed solution uses four times one 16-bit sub-multiplier.
A32B32 = A
H
16B
H
16 +A
H
16B
L
16 +A
L
16B
H
16 +A
L
16B
L
16. (3.8)
Here each expression of the form AI16BI16 symbolises one operation performed by the 16-bit
sub-multiplier. The last combination uses four 8-bit sub-multipliers four times. In the equa-
tion 3.7 each row of the form AIi8 B
Ii
8 +A
Ii
8 B
Ii
8 +A
Ii
8 B
Ii
8 +A
Ii
8 B
Ii
8 symbolises operations performed
by one 8-bit sub-multiplier.
Those tests were made to see what is the best combination of sub-multipliers. The best result
was obtained for combination 3.8: the solution takes the smallest number of LUTs and can work
at high frequencies; what is more it needs small number of clock cycles to perform a, b multipli-
cation. We have compared that solution with the combinational one using four 16-bit units. In
terms of area taken the second solution seems to be much worse. Comparing AT eﬃciency fac-
tors (see Deﬁnition 3.2.1), for sequential solution we have ATseq = 2.213ns×6× 277 ≈ 3678 and
for combinational ATcomb = 12.076ns×789 ≈ 9527, we can see that sequential solution is overall
three times better than the combinational one. The solution using four 8-bit sub-multipliers
yields similar results to the one using one 16-bit unit, however we have to deal with more sub-
blocks. The worse solution happens to be the one using only one 8-bit unit. Mainly due to the
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Table 3.3.: Schoolbook multiplication - implementation results (Spartan-3E)
Multiplier
Combinatorial delay [ns] /
area (4-1 LUT) ATMaximum frequency [MHz]
(# of clock cycles)
4-bit 7.68 ns 11 84
8-bit 8.9 ns 43 383
16-bit 9.4 ns 195 1833
32-bit, combinational,
12 ns 818 9816
four 16-bit multipliers
32-bit, sequential,
451 MHz (6 clks) 277 3685
one 16-bit multiplier: eq.3.8
32-bit, sequential,
451 MHz (14 clks) 318 9871
one 8-bit multiplier: eq.3.7
32-bit, sequential,
451 MHz (6 clks) 279 3712
four 8-bit multipliers: eq.3.7
fact that it needs the greatest number of clock cycles to compute the result. We have analysed
many more variations of 32-bit sequential multiplier reusing combinatorial multipliers, but those
presented seemed to be the most interesting from our point of view, for further analysis of big-
ger multipliers. The results of implementations for Spartan-3E FPGA are presented in Table 3.3.
Before starting the analysis of matrix-vector approach we have attempted to build bigger
multipliers employing just the schoolbook approach and divide-and-conquer methods. We have
built 64-bit multipliers and 128-bit multipliers but we were not very satisﬁed with results so we
have switched to analysis of matrix-vector approach.
On the other hand the analysis of 64-bit multipliers allowed us to see advantages of Karatsuba-
Ofman optimisation. In Table 3.4, we present results obtained for two 64-bit multipliers, built
from the same elements (built of 32-bit sub-multipliers, built of 16-bit sub-multipliers, which are
built of 8-bit combinational sub-multipliers). One multiplier combines all partial results using
standard divide-and-conquer approach (see Figure 3.2.1) and the other using Karatsuba-Ofman
trick (see Figure 3.2.1).
Table 3.4.: Classic divide-and-conquer technique and Karatsuba-Ofman trick comparison
64-bit multiplier
Area (LUTs) Maximal delay (ns) AT
Spartan-3E Virtex-6 Spartan-3E Virtex-6 Spartan-3E Virtex-6
Divide-and-conquer 2897 1782 14.25 3.79 41270 6746
Karatsuba-Ofman 1754 1424 13.37 5.13 23442 7301
According to the results presented in Table 3.4 it is clear that the design using Karatsuba-
Ofman trick is much faster and smaller than the one using standard version of divide-and-conquer
method.
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Figure 3.2.: Classic divide-and-conquer approach
Figure 3.3.: Karatsuba-Ofman approach
The last multiplier built with use of pure combinational sub-multipliers was 128-bit multiplier.
The most eﬃcient classic 128-bit multiplier designed, however we did not explored all possibil-
ities, was built of eight 16-bit sub-multipliers. The idea for this multiplier was to divide input
polynomials into 16-bit words. Thus for 128-bit inputs we had to use eight times eight 16-bit
sub-multipliers. That is in each clock cycle we multiply each 16-bit word of vector a by succes-
sive 16-bit words of vector b. Finally we combine all partial results. The constructed multiplier
has the parameters presented in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5.: Classic divide-and-conquer technique and Karatsuba-Ofman trick comparison
128-bit multiplier
Area (LUTs) Max.frequency (MHz) AT
Spartan-3E Virtex-6 Spartan-3E Virtex-6 Spartan-3E Virtex-6
2919 1561 288 775 101354 20142
The most advantageous feature of the circuit is that it needs only 10 clock cycles to perform
multiplication, thus it seems rather eﬃcient in terms of speed.
46
Further analysis aimed at investigating how the area of combinatorial Karatsuba-Ofman de-
signs depend on the size of input polynomials. By analysis of 32, 64 and 128-bit multipliers we
saw that the design area grows almost 4 times for doubling of the size of the input arguments.
However in contrary to pure combinatorial schoolbook method solutions areas, which were each
time, multiplied by more than 4 (for large numbers the multiplication factor grows to 5), here
areas of multipliers grow by less than four. For example pure combinatorial 64-bit multiplier has
taken over 2000 LUTs but Karatsuba-Ofman multiplier took about 1750 LUTs. Nevertheless in
case of this approach the combinatorial path delay increases faster and for 64-bit multipliers it
is over 16 ns while in case of previous solution it is about 12 ns. The results for diﬀerent sizes
of divide-and-conquer multipliers are compared in Table 3.6. Observing parameters of obtained
designs we can clearly see that Karatsuba-Ofman trick is eﬃcient for large operands. Up to
16-bit input vectors it is visibly less eﬃcient than classic divide-and-conquer method.
Table 3.6.: Divide-and-conquer methods implementations
Multiplier (basic unit) Type
Delay Area Eﬃciency
[ns] [LUT] AT
8-bit
4-bit combinatorial multiplier
dq 9 ns 45 405
KO 9.3 ns 46 427
16-bit
4-bit combinatorial multiplier dq 12.6 ns 158 1991
8-bit combinatorial multiplier
dq 10.3 ns 172 1772
KO 11.7 ns 159 1860
8-bit Karatsuba-Ofman multiplier KO 12.7 ns 170 2159
32-bit
(16-bit divide-and-conquer multiplier
dq 11.9 ns 518 6167
built of 8-bit combinational multipliers)
(16-bit Karatsuba-Ofman multiplier
KO 13.3 ns 429 5708
built of 8-bit combinational multipliers)
64-bit
(32-bit Karatsuba-Ofman multiplier )
KO 16 ns 1753 28048built of 16-bit Karatsuba-Ofman multiplier)
built of 8-bit combinational multiplier)
*(dq: classic divide-and-conquer, KO: Karatsuba-Ofman optimisation)
Next we have analysed what advantages yield matrix-vector approach.
Initially we have implemented the method straightforward for small multipliers, but for exam-
ple for 4 bits we have obtained exactly the same structure as in case of shift-and-add method.
Thus we have reanalysed the Equation 3.4 used in matrix-vector approach and came out with
new idea for structure of a multiplier. It seemed obvious that storing whole matrix A during
the computations and XORing its rows in the end would yield enormous solutions, especially in
the case of large operands. For example in case of 4-bit inputs, matrix A would be of size 6× 4
which could be regarded as six 4-bit vectors. So instead of having one 6-bit output vector and
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two 4-bit inputs we have one 6-bit input and seven 4-bit inputs. Thus the redundancy here is
big. For example if m = 100 we would need 2m − 2 = 198 additional vectors. Our idea is to
store only two columns of the matrix A at a time, which in fact means working on two registers
representing matrix A columns. In the ﬁrst we exchange values of consecutive columns of A and
in the second we accumulate partial results. We may actually regard one register as a column
of matrix A and the other as our product d. The solution is sequential and due to the fact
that we have to process each column of matrix A and we have only one register for storing its
values (we may use more registers to process more columns at a time) it requires for m-bit input
2m clock cycles to perform multiplication. The analysed implementation can multiply at most
600-bit operands. Exactly the same structure can be used for multiplying for example 2, 4 or
8-bit operands. Depending on how many bits of our “column” vectors we use Xilinx synthetiser
optimises the area taken by the solution. Table 3.7 presents parameters of matrix-vector designs
for few values of m.
Table 3.7.: Matrix-vector approach implementation results (Virtex-6)
m Area [LUT]
Maximal frequency
AT
[MHz]
32 230
520
28.3
128 838 412.2
163 1050 658.5
233 1490 1335.3
256 1632 1606.9
283 1820 1981
409 2617 4116.7
571 3644 8002.8
600 3707 8554.6
The solution can be optimised, for example number of clock cycles needed to obtain the result
could be minimised by increasing the area of the solution, i.e. increasing the number of matrix
A’s columns stored. We can also try to reuse small multipliers and combine partial results by
means of divide-and-conquer techniques. There exist many possibilities. So far the algorithm
was the easiest to implement eﬃciently. The resulting circuit was sequential. The structure as
in previous cases was regular and fairly simple.
Next we have analysed if it is possible to increase the eﬃciency of matrix-vector solutions
by utilisation of divide-and-conquer techniques, increasing number of “columns” used in com-
putation process or storing whole matrices. Obtained results with comments are presented in
Table 3.8.
It can be observed that inserted optimisations did not really increased the eﬃciency of the
designs. Some of them caused signiﬁcant decrease of number of clock cycles needed to compute
the product, from 2m to m/2, however in the same moment they have increased area. Inter-
48
Table 3.8.: Modiﬁed matrix-vector multipliers: implementation results (Spartan-3E)
m
Area Max. frequency/delay
Description AT
[LUT] [MHz]/[ns]
15 132 205 MHz/30 clks
Simple solution,
19.3
2 columns used
15 324 218 MHz/8 clks
Optimised solution,
11.9
8 columns used
15 171 9.4 ns
Combinational solution,
1.6
whole matrices “stored”
64 511 228 MHz/128 clks
Simple solution,
286.88
2 columns used
64 984 223 MHz/64 clks
Uses three 32-bit
282.4
matrix-vector multipliers
64 1626 233 MHz/32 clks
Uses four 32-bit
223.3
matrix-vector multipliers
64 1299 225 MHz/32 clks
Optimised solution,
184.7
8 columns used
256 1955 231 MHz/512 clks
Simple solution,
4333.2
2 columns used
256 5070 217 MHz/128 clks
Optimised solution,
2990.6
8 columns used
256 2118 220 MHz/228 clks
Uses three 128-bit
2195
matrix-vector multipliers
512 3881 234 MHz/1024 clks
Simple solution,
16983.5
2 columns used
512 10983 198 MHz/256 clks
Optimised solution,
14200.2
8 columns used
512 10445 220 MHz/256 clks
Uses three matrix-vector
12154.2256-bit multipliers built of
three 128-bit matrix-vector units
512 6596 220 MHz/512 clks
Uses three 256-bit
15350.7
matrix-vector multipliers
esting seem the designs utilising three sub-multipliers and employing Karatsuba-Ofman trick.
Those ones need small number of clock cycles and do not need much more area than in case
of simple solution. In fact their eﬃciency factor AT is better then the one obtained for simple
matrix-vector solution.
To start the process of design of required NIST size, i.e. large size multipliers we have compared
our most eﬃcient hardware solutions for classic and matrix-vector approach in order to decide
which design approaches are most worth utilising. We have considered designs of 32-bit, 64-bit
and 128-bit multipliers, see Table 3.9.
For us the most promising solutions are matrix-vector solutions utilising Karatsuba-Ofman
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Table 3.9.: Comparison of classic and matrix-vector approach implementations results (Virtex-6)
Multiplier
Area Max. freq.(#clks)/delay
AT
[LUT] [MHz]/[ns]
32-bit
Three 16-bit multipliers
540 13.3 ns 7.2built of three 8-bit
combinational multipliers (KO)
matrix-vector multiplier 230 520 MHz (64 clks) 28.3
64-bit
Multiplier built of 32-bit
1424 5.13 ns 7.3
Karatsuba-Ofman units built of
16-bit Karatsuba-Ofman built of
8-bit combinational multipliers
matrix-vector multiplier 433 520 MHz (128 clks) 106.6
Karatsuba-Ofman multiplier built
810 535 MHz (64 clks) 96.9
of 32-bit matrix-vector units
Divide-and-conquer multiplier
1476 533 MHz (32 clks) 88.6
built of 32-bit mv multipliers
Matrix-vector multiplier
1112 520 MHz (32 clks) 68.4
(matrix divided into 4 parts)
128-bit
Multiplier built of eight 16-bit
1561 775 MHz (10 clks) 20.1
combinational multipliers
Matrix-vector multiplier 838 520 MHz (256 clks) 412.6
256-bit
Matrix-vector multiplier 1632 520 MHz (512 clks) 1606.9
Matrix-vector multiplier
4580 520 MHz (128 clks) 1127.4
(matrix divided into 4 parts)
Karatsuba-Ofman multiplier,
2009 535 MHz (228 clks) 856.2
(128-bit matrix-vector units)
512-bit
Matrix-vector multiplier 3268 463 MHz (1024 clks) 7227.7
Matrix-vector multiplier
8769 520 MHz (256 clks) 4317
(matrix divided into 4 parts)
Karatsuba-Ofman multiplier,
10357 528 MHz (256 clks) 5021.6built of 256-bit mv multipliers)
built of 3 128-bit mv multipliers
Karatsuba-Ofman multiplier
6026 535 MHz (512 clks) 5766.9
(256-bit multipliers)
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optimisation, working on halved input operands. They occupy a reasonable amount of area and
they are quite fast. However according to Table 3.9 their AT coeﬃcients are not always the best
ones, they are usually average. Examining closer the results we may also see that those solutions
which occupy more area can perform multiplication faster, and otherwise. Furthermore we ﬁnd
that the solutions with average AT factors usually contain some trade-oﬀs between space and
speed. In fact the designer always have to decide what parameter is the most important and
then decide which type of solution to choose.
Initially we have assumed that the best hardware solutions for large number multipliers are
the ones working on vectors of regular sizes. By regular we mean 32, 64, 128, 256, 512, i.e.
power of 2 sizes. Thus we have created such multipliers to have them as reference designs, i.e.
to compare them with multipliers of NIST (irregular, prime) sizes and to see if it is really better
(more eﬃcient) to have redundant but regular multiplier or the one optimised for certain prime
size. We have assume that it is possible to perform multiplication of:
• m = 163, 233-bit vectors using 256-bit multiplier,
• m = 283, 409-bit vectors using 512-bit multiplier,
• m = 571-bit vectors using 1024-bit multiplier.
It can be observed that for m = 283 and 571 the redundancy is huge, thus in those cases we are
rather sure that optimised to recommended sizes solutions will give better results.
Table 3.10.: Classic approach implementations of 163-bit multiplier (Virtex-6)
Multiplier
Area Max. freq.(#clks)
AT
[LUT] [MHz]/[ns]
163-bit matrix-vector multiplier 1050 520 MHz (326 clks) 658.5
256-bit matrix-vector multiplier 1625 520 MHz (512 clks) 1600
163-bit multiplier built of three
1977 535 MHz (164 clks) 606
82-bit matrix-vector units
256-bit multiplier built of three
2009 535 MHz (228 clks) 856.2
128-bit matrix-vector units
163-bit multiplier built of two
2098 535 MHz(256clks) 1003.9128-bit matrix-vector multipliers
and one 64-bit matrix-vector unit
256-bit matrix-vector multiplier
4580 520 MHz (128 clks) 1127.4
(matrix divided into 4 parts)
We have started from 163-bit multipliers and obtained solutions with parameters presented
in Table 3.10. The best seems to be our multiplier based on Karatsuba-Ofman trick, utilising
three 82-bit matrix-vector multipliers. Quite nice results gives also simple matrix-vector 163-bit
multiplier. It is slower than modiﬁed version but much smaller, what is more its AT factor is
not much higher. Another conclusion, which can be drawn from the results is that “regular”
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size solution does not give better results either in terms of area or in terms of speed. However
diﬀerence between 163 and 256 is rather big thus we could predict such comparison results.
Unfortunately another “regular” value close to 163 is 128 which is too small. We have also tried
to combine smaller “regular” size multipliers to create 163-bit multiplier (see 5th solution in Ta-
ble 3.10) however, as could be observed, the results were not very satisfying.
After evaluation of big number multipliers (see tables in this section for results) and mul-
tipliers, which can perform 163-bit multiplication, we have concluded that the best solutions
which can be achieved with classical methods, are multipliers based on three matrix-vector mul-
tipliers. In those solutions the sub-multipliers size is half the size of original input polynomial.
To combine partial results obtained from sub-multipliers we base on Karatsuba-Ofman trick.
Regarding those conclusions we have created multipliers of size 233, 283, 409, 571. The results
are presented in Table 3.11. Next we have switched to analysis of reduction methods to be able
to create complete ﬁnite ﬁeld multipliers.
Table 3.11.: 233, 283, 409 and 571-bit multipliers (Virtex-6)
Multiplier
Area Max.freq.(#clks)
AT
[LUT] [MHz]
233-bit multiplier built of three
2625 520 MHz (234 clks) 1181.3
117-bit matrix-vector units
283-bit multiplier built of three
3381 535 MHz (284 clks) 1794.8
142-bit matrix-vector units
409-bit multiplier built of three
4834 535 MHz (412 clks) 3722.6
206-bit matrix-vector units
571-bit multiplier built of three
7095 522 MHz (572 clks) 7774.6
286-bit matrix-vector units
Reduction step Generally there exist two reduction methods. One method employs a classic
scheme, see Equation 3.3 on page 37, the other employs a speciﬁc reduction matrix R (see [25]).
However many variations of a classic method optimised for a speciﬁc irreducible polynomials
(trinomials, pentanomials, equally spaced polynomials) have been proposed (see [36]).
Classic reduction. The classical method in case of polynomials may be interpreted as follows:
we look for bits equal to 1 in the upper part of d(x), that is on positions: (2m − 2) down
to m, and step by step reduce vector d(x), XOR vector d(x) by appropriate shift of irreducible
polynomial f(x) (see Algorithm 6).
The drawback of this reduction method is that it is very time consuming (we need at least
m clock cycles to perform reduction). Utilising properties of special irreducible polynomials
one may optimise classical algorithm. The aim of optimisations is usually to decrease number
of sequential XOR operations needed to reduce polynomial d(x), thus to reduce time needed to
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obtain result.
Algorithm 6 Classic reduction (our interpretation)
Input: d(x), f(x)
Output: c(x) = d(x) mod f(x)
1: for i = 2m− 2 to m do
2: if di = 1 then
3: e = shift f by (i−m) // producing shift of vector e //
4: d = d XOR e // reducing d //
5: end if
6: end for
7: return d
Reduction matrix method. [25] As in case of multiplication the matrix approach to reduction
was derived. To reduce the product we need special reduction matrix R. The reduction matrix
method allows signiﬁcantly speeding up reduction process.
Having polynomial d(x) = a(x)b(x) = d0 + d1x + · · · + d2m−2x2m−2 in order to reduce it we
partition it in two parts. The lower part containing the least signiﬁcant bits of d : d(L)(x) =
d0 + d1x + · · · + dm−1 and the upper part containing the most signiﬁcant bits of d: d(H)(x) =
dm+dm−1+ · · ·+d2m−2. Then representing both parts of d as vectors and using an (m×m−1)
matrix R, reduction is performed as follows:
c = d(L) +Rd(H). (3.9)
Reduction matrix R is deﬁned in terms of irreducible polynomial f(x), generating the ﬁeld.
Let fi and ri,j denote coeﬃcients of f(x) and entries of reduction matrix R respectively. Let
rj = [r0,j , r1,j , ..., rm−1,j ]
T denote the j-th column of matrix R; f = [1, f1, ..., fm−1]T denotes
vector representing irreducible polynomial generating the ﬁeld and let ↓ denote shift right (shift
down) of any vector. Then,
rj =


f for j = 0
rj−1[↓ 1] + rm−1,j−1f for j = 1, ..., (m− 2)
(3.10)
Thus we have :
c = d(L) +Rd(H) =

d
(L)
0
d
(L)
1
...
d
(L)
m−2
d
(L)
m−1


+


r0,0 r0,1 r0,2 . . . r0,m−3 r0,m−2
r1,0 r1,1 r1,2 . . . r1,m−3 r1,m−2
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
rm−2,0 rm−2,1 rm−2,2 . . . rm−2,m−3 rm−2,m−2
rm−1,0 rm−1,1 rm−1,2 . . . rm−1,m−3 rm−1,m−2




d
(H)
m
d
(H)
m+1
...
d
(H)
2m−3
d
(H)
2m−2


(3.11)
53
Matrix approach to reduction yields very good results in terms of hardware design. Many
researchers ﬁnd it even advisable to perform multiplication in any way, using any method, and
then to reduce the result using reduction matrix R.
Reduction step - hardware realisation. We have started with analysis of classic not optimised
to irreducible polynomial reduction method. However knowing that it is not very eﬃcient we
have created just one version of such reduction unit, just to be assured that its eﬃciency makes
it unworthy considering. Created solution (see ﬁrst solution in Table 3.12 at the end of the
paragraph) is rather big and time ineﬃcient. We ﬁnd that it can be improved, especially in
terms of area. According to us also the number of clocks could be reduced but we presume that
the smallest number of clocks, which is possible to achieve is m.
Next we have started to optimise classic algorithm reducing product d(x) regarding irreducible
polynomials recommended for NIST’s ﬁelds. Usually for those ﬁelds there are deﬁned gener-
ators with special properties, e.g. trinomials, pentanomials. Trinomials have only three and
pentanomials ﬁve coeﬃcients equal to 1, which is very advantageous.
Our version of reduction algorithm for elements of ﬁeld of size m = 233, optimised for trino-
mial f(x) = x233 + x74 + 1 (recommended in [32]), is as follows:
Algorithm 7 Reduction algorithm (optimised version for m = 233))
Input: d(x), f(x)
Output: c(x) = d(x) mod f(x)
1: e = d[2m− 2, ...,m] // assign part of vector d to e //
2: e1 = e× f
3: d1 = d XOR e1 // ﬁrst reduction step //
4: e = d1[74 + (m− 1), ...,m] // assign part of new vector d to e //
5: e2 = e× f
6: c = d1 XOR e2 // second reduction step //
7: return c
Similar reduction algorithms optimised for trinomials can be found in [36].
It may seem that Algorithm 7 requires additional multiplications (line 2 and 5), however if one
of the operands is known in advance and number of its bits equal to 1 is very low, multiplication
is very simple. It can be substituted with few XOR operations. Moreover we do not need to reduce
those products. So instead of performing costly modular multiplication we perform simple set
of XOR operations.
Last implemented reduction unit was the one employing reduction matrix R. We propose two
types of such solution, sequential (synchronised) and combinational one. Results obtained for
all discussed types of reduction units, for ﬁeld of size m = 233, are presented in Table 3.12.
As we can observe the non-optimised classical unit is the biggest and needs the greatest
number of clock cycles to perform reduction operation. Quite promising seems the solution
of optimised version of classical unit, especially in terms of speed. As mentioned, number of
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operations necessary to be performed depends strongly on the form of irreducible polynomial
f(x). For m = 409 number of operations performed by this type of reduction unit remains the
same, for m = 233 and 409 it is possible to have trinomials. However for m = 163, 283, 571
number of operations performed increases to 14 (which is still small) due to the fact that for
those ﬁelds NIST deﬁnes pentanomials (there are no trinomials for those ﬁelds). Concluding, one
may say that optimisations regarding irreducible polynomials are highly recommended because
they improve much the overall eﬃciency of reduction unit.
Table 3.12.: Comparison of diﬀerent types of reduction units for 233-bit multiplier (Virtex-6)
Reduction unit
Area Max.freq.(#clks)
AT
[LUT] [MHz]
Classical not optimised 3528 209 MHz (600 clks) 10128.2
Classical optimised 1165 571 MHz (8 clks) 16.3
Reduction matrix
466 1264 MHz∗ (2 clks) 0.74
(sequential)
Reduction matrix
233 1.13 ns 0.26
(combinational)
*the results are the one given by Xilinx ISE, in this case we presume that combining such unit with
other will not have impact on the speed
The most eﬃcient seem to be solutions employing reduction matrix R. In fact that reduction
method is very simple. The reduction matrices for trinomials and pentanomials contain a lot of
zeroes (see exemplary matrix on Figure 3.6 for trinomial deﬁned for m = 233). Thus the whole
complicated reduction operations are in fact a set of simple XOR operations. The more bits equal
to 1 the irreducible polynomial has the more XOR operations we have to perform. The proposed
reduction circuits integrate additional mechanisms serving data exchange and communication
with multiplier units.
When we use ﬁnite ﬁeld operators for cryptographic purposes we are provided with secure
ﬁeld sizes and irreducible polynomials (NIST) thus it is easier to optimise the reduction process.
What is more the recommended ﬁeld generators are usually trinomials or pentanomials (they
contain either only three or ﬁve bits equal to 1) whose properties may really simplify reduction
process of large numbers.
Two-step finite field multipliers - proposed solutions, summary and comparison The anal-
ysis of multiplication and reduction allowed us to create the hardware solutions for complete
two-step GF (m) multipliers. Basing on the obtained results to create a complete GF (2m)
multipliers we have decided to use:
- as a multiplier unit: matrix-vector multiplier utilising three sub-multipliers of half the
original input size (m/2), employing Karatsuba-Ofman trick,
- as a reduction unit: classical optimised to irreducible polynomial reduction unit or the
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one utilising reduction matrix R.
We present as exemplary the implementation results for our GF (2m) multipliers where m =
233. The results are presented in Table 3.13.
Table 3.13.: Complete classic GF (2233) multipliers (Virtex-6)
Multiplier Area Max.freq. # of clock AT
m=233 [LUT] [MHz] cycles normalised
multiplier block with classical reduction 3638 302 MHz 264 3.18× 103
multiplier block with matrix reduction 2862 302 MHz 238 2.25× 103
3.2.2. Interleaved algorithms
Another group of ﬁnite ﬁeld multiplication algorithms comprises interleaved algorithms. In this
type of algorithms instead of performing separately multiplication and reduction we interleave
or combine the two operations. Classic interleaved method is based on the following idea:
c(x) = a(x)b(x) mod f(x) = a(x)
(m−1∑
i=0
bix
i
)
mod f(x) =
(m−1∑
i=0
bia(x)x
i
)
mod f(x)
= b0a(x) mod f(x) + b1a(x)x mod f(x) + · · ·+ b(m−1)a(x)x
(m−1) mod f(x)
(3.12)
As in previous two step methods we multiply a(x) by each coeﬃcient of b(x), i.e. we shift a(x),
but here before accumulating the partial result we perform its reduction. We shift, reduce and
then accumulate each partial result. Thus ﬁnally we obtain a result, which is already reduced.
After theoretical analysis of the algorithm it was concluded that its complexity (number of
the operations we have to perform) is comparable with a complexity of shift-and-add method
combined with standard reduction. The only diﬀerence is that here we interleave shifting with
reduction. Additionally in previous case maximal number of reductions (divisions/XOR) we have
to perform is m/2− 1 here even regarding the fact that only half of the partial results have to
be reduced it may occur that the number of reduction operations will increase.
Apart this standard formulation of the interleaved multiplication there exist few popular algo-
rithms, which combine multiplication and reduction and by exploiting certain arithmetic prop-
erties they speed up a bit process of multiplication in GF (2m) ﬁeld. The most worth analysing
methods according to us are multiplication with use of Mastrovito matrix and Montgomery
multiplication algorithm.
Mastrovito matrix approach. Mastrovito matrix method [62] is an extension of basic
matrix-vector approach (see previous section) where c(x) and b(x) are represented in form of
m size vectors and a(x) is transformed into (2m − 2) ×m matrix. In standard matrix-vector
approach we perform two steps:
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1. Multiplication
d = Ab =


d0
d1
...
dm−1
dm
dm+1
...
d2m−3
d2m−2


=


a0 0 0 . . . 0 0
a1 a0 0 . . . 0 0
...
...
. . . . . .
. . .
...
am−2 am−3 am−4 . . . a0 0
am−1 am−2 am−3 . . . a1 a0
0 am−1 am−2 . . . a2 a1
0 0 am−1 . . . a3 a2
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 0 . . . am−1 am−2
0 0 0 . . . 0 am−1




b0
b1
b2
...
bm−3
bm−2
bm−1


2. Reduction
d =


d0
d1
...
dm−1
dm
dm+1
...
d2m−3
d2m−2


⇒


d(L)
d(H)


⇒


a0 0 0 . . . 0 0
a1 a0 0 . . . 0 0
...
...
. . . . . .
. . .
...
am−2 am−3 am−4 . . . a0 0
am−1 am−2 am−3 . . . a1 a0
0 am−1 am−2 . . . a2 a1
0 0 am−1 . . . a3 a2
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 0 . . . am−1 am−2
0 0 0 . . . 0 am−1




b0
b1
b2
...
bm−3
bm−2
bm−1


⇒


AL
AH




b


⇒ c = d(L) + d(H)R = ALb+AHRb (3.13)
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In Mastrovito matrix method we perform only one step:
c =Mb, (3.14)
where M is so called Mastrovito matrix. Comparing Equation 3.13 and Equation 3.14 we can
see that Mastrovito matrix M is a combination of AL, AH and R matrices [25], that is:
c =Mb = (AL +AHR)b (3.15)
Matrix M construction and storage is very problematic. As it will be presented it strongly
aﬀects area and speed of elaborated hardware solution.
There exist many approaches to handling matrixM . For example one may store whole matrix
M , however as we have pointed in previous section, such approach requires a lot of resources.
The smallest matrix used in ECC is matrix of size 163× 163 bits, which is 26569 bits, which is
rather big amount of data to store. Moreover matrixM entries depend on variable a value. Thus
we would have to create matrix M before each multiplication, which will add time overhead.
Another idea of handling M matrix is the one used to create the two-step GF (2m) multi-
plier multiplication unit. That is to work with vectors/registers of size (2m − 2) representing
columns of required matrix. In our case we have used two registers, one ﬁlled with contents of
consecutive columns of the matrix A (we have processed columns from left to right) and the
other accumulated partial results of multiplication. Varying number of vectors (columns) used,
the design behaviour and parameters can be easily changed.
Our new idea for handling matrixM is to partition it, i.e. matrices of which it constitutes, into
sub-matrices, to save area and ease optimisation and synchronisation of circuits. The entries of
sub-matrices of matrix M are supposed to be calculated on-the-ﬂy during multiplication, from
parts of matrices AL, AH and R, i.e. from vectors a and f . Our approach may be regarded
as a variation of divide-and-conquer technique because we partition large problem of operating
on large matrices into a set of problems operating on much smaller matrices. We presume that
such manner of division may increase overall eﬃciency of elaborated circuits and may make the
designs ﬂexible, easily adaptable to new tasks.
The chosen size of sub-matrices is 16×16 bits. It was chosen regarding the analysis performed
for two-step multipliers (see previous section). For sizes over 500 bits however, it may be wiser
to work with 32× 32 sub-matrices blocks.
As mentioned one of the advantages of block structure is its ﬂexibility. In our interpretation
of Mastrovito proposition to perform multiplication we use 16-bit sub-multiplier units and we
control their work with use of ﬁnite state machine (FSM). The FSM controls reseting, start-
ing and switching-oﬀ the units. It also controls the order of sub-multiplications. Results of
sub-multiplications are independent of each other and can be calculated in arbitrary order. We
can group sub-matrices multipliers in diﬀerent manners and that way easily change computing
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time (number of clocks needed to perform the multiplication) or somehow the area occupied by
the design. We can group sub-matrices in rows spanning several rows of matrix M , we may
try to utilise sub-block multipliers as eﬃciently as possible, we may change the order of sub-
multiplications to adapt the circuit to our needs.
Partitioning into sub-blocks allows to simplify the multiplication operation. Observing the
structure and placement of vital entries (entries equal to 1) in matrices AL, AH and R we
may decrease number of operations, which have to be performed to obtain ﬁnal solution. We
may omit in multiplication process operations on those sub-blocks whose multiplication result
by part of vector b will be always equal to zero. In fact we omit processing of sub-matrices,
which entries are all equal to zero. If we look closely at partitioned AL, AH and R matrices
(Figures: 3.4, 3.5, 3.6) we can see that there are a lot of zero blocks, blocks in which all entries
are equal to zero. Thus we will consider in processing only those sub-matrices, which may in-
ﬂuence the ﬁnal result (those which contain at least one non-zero elements). In fact AL and
AH matrices are triangular, they are almost half-ﬁlled with zeroes. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show
illustrations of matrices partitioning for ﬁeld of sizes m = 233, for other NIST sizes, matrices
AH and AL look similarly (they diﬀer in number of sub-blocks). The R matrix is diﬀerent for
each ﬁeld due to the fact that its contents are derived from irreducible polynomial generating
the ﬁeld. However matrices R for NIST ﬁelds are similar in number of non-zero blocks and their
placement. On Figures 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 all zero blocks are marked in gray. Getting rid of those
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Figure 3.4.: Illustration of AL matrix partitioning for m = 233
blocks and operations performed on them allows us to save some clock cycles and area.
Proceeding in analysis we also observe that our proposed partitioning into 16×16 sub-matrices
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Figure 3.5.: Illustration of AH matrix partitioning for m = 233
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Figure 3.6.: Illustration of R partitioning matrix for m = 233
makes not only easier to spot zero blocks but also repeating blocks (marked with the same indices
on the ﬁgures) and thus to optimise the solution. By repeating we mean the ones with same
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positioning of vital (depending on values of a, f) entries. Such observation minimises number of
diﬀerent sub-multipliers we have to propose for calculation of each sub-product.
Unfortunately for most m’s (also for sizes recommended by NIST) the matrices will always
contain an “irregular” row and column. Irregular means that it is impossible to partition it
into 16× 16-bit blocks. That fact increases slightly area and decreases speed of design. But as
recommended ﬁeld sizes are usually primes it is not possible to ﬁnd such a partitioning, in which
all sub-matrices will have equal size.
Our basic algorithm for computing the result of a(x)b(x) mod f(x) works as follows: the
16× 16-bit sub-matrices are grouped into 16-bit wide rows spanning sixteen rows of matrix M
and for each such row 16-bit part of ab product is calculated. In order to save some space, sub-
matrices are not stored in the unit, they are calculated on-the-ﬂy during computations basing
on parts of incoming a and b operands.
In order to provide the best solution we have analysed few variations of the unit. Initially we
have implemented equation c = ALb+AHRb. That is, the solution calculated separately results
for ALb and AHRb and eventually the two partial solutions were XORed to obtain ﬁnal result
c. Resulting hardware unit is very eﬃcient however it seems to be rather big. Thus to improve
overall eﬃciency of the solution we have implemented equation c = Mb. Instead of calculating
on-the-ﬂy contents of sub-matrices AL and AHR we are providing on-the-ﬂy contents ofM ’s sub-
matrices to sub-multipliers. Such approach has visibly improved area of the solution. Results
for both solutions are presented in Table 3.14. It is possible in both cases to modify number
of clock cycles needed to perform the operation. Number of clock cycles can be modiﬁed by
varying the order and way, in which sub-multiplier units are utilised. Initially we have grouped
them into rows spanning sixteen rows of M (AL and AHR) consisting up to ﬁfteen sub-blocks,
but the sub-matrices may be grouped into longer or shorter chains.
Table 3.14.: Mastrovito matrix approach solution
Virtex-6
(AL +AHR)b Mb
XC6VLX240T
area(A)[LUT] 5014 3760
max.frequency 297 MHz 276 MHz
time of execution
65 75
(T)[clock cycles]
efficiency AT 1097 1021
Computations of multiplication results of each sub-matrix are controlled by means of ﬁnite
state machine. At ﬁrst the FSM had 15 states (for m = 233, there are 15 blocks in a matrix M
row) and we have used separate sub-units for calculation of each 16-bit of ﬁnal result. Each 16-bit
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part of ﬁnal result is calculated in separate clock cycle, according to the following equations:
c0 = (A
HR(0,0) +A
L
(0,0))b0 + (A
HR(0,1) +A
L
(0,1))b1+
· · · + (AHR(0,m/16) +A
L
(0,m/16))bm/16
c1 = (A
HR(1,0) +A
L
(1,0))b0 + (A
HR(1,1) +A
L
(1,1))b1+
· · · + (AHR(1,m/16) +A
L
(1,m/16))bm/16
...
cm/16 = (A
HR(m/16,0) +A
L
(m/16,0))b0 + (A
HR(m/16,1) +A
L
(m/16,1))b1+
· · · + (AHR(m/16,m/16) +A
L
(m/16,m/16))bm/16,
(3.16)
where ci denotes 16-bit chunk of ﬁnal result c(x). Additionally we have to compute partial
results for “irregular row and column” and combine it with previously obtained values. Last row
equation:
cm/16+1 = (A
HR(m/16+1,0) +A
L
(m/16+1,0))b0 + (A
HR(m/16+1,1) +A
L
(m/16+1,1))b1+
· · · + (AHR(m/16+1,m/16+1) +A
L
(m/16+1,m/16+1))bm/16+1.
(3.17)
Last column parts:
cm/16+10 = (A
HR(0,m/16+1))bm/16+1
cm/16+11 = (A
HR(1,m/16+1))bm/16+1
...
cm/16+1m/16 = (A
HR(m/16,m/16+1))bm/16+1,
(3.18)
The second version of our Mastrovito multiplier was optimised according to the fact that some
16 × 16-bit sub-blocks structures are similar. Thus we have used only one of each type of
sub-multiplier. We have decreased that way the number of instantiations of sub-units but
increased the number of states of the controlling FSM. Figure 3.7 shows matrix M partitioning
for m = 233. There are marked blocks requiring same sub-multiplier unit. In total in our new
solution, for m = 233, we need seven diﬀerent simple sub-multipliers, before we have utilised
eleven sub-multipliers.
On the Figure 3.7 we may observe, which blocks may be multiplied with use of the same
sub-multiplier unit (one with corresponding names).
It is easy to observe that there exist many variations of the order of sub-multiplications,
which may be very useful for physical security purposes, see Chapter 4. We can create longer
multiplication controllers (ﬁnite state machines), increase or decrease number of instantiation of
sub-multipliers or change the order of multiplications.
We have performed small analysis of variations of our solution and in terms of eﬃciency we
found that solution containing longer ﬁnite state machines but single instances of each sub-
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Figure 3.7.: Illustration of Mastrovito matrix partitioning for m = 233
multiplier gives the best results, especially in terms of area. However we have not tried even half
of possible combinations of sub-units thus there may exist more eﬃcient versions of our design.
The most eﬃcient solution, obtained after few experiments, takes 3760 LUTs and can work with
frequencies up to 276 MHz, number of clocks needed to perform the operation is 75.
Montgomery multiplication algorithm. The second most popular interleaved multiplica-
tion method is Montgomery method [71]. The algorithm is constructed in a speciﬁc way in order
to avoid most costly operations. Instead of performing c(x) = a(x)b(x) mod f(x) it performs
c(x) = a(x)b(x)r−1(x) mod f(x). (3.19)
The Montgomery method assumes operating on Montgomery versions of the operands through-
out the chain of operations and recovering original (proper) value at the end of computation.
For fair comparison with other multiplication solution we present the complete multiplication
process needed to obtain proper product.
To obtain the complete result of modular multiplication a(x)b(x) mod f(x) we must run the
Montgomery algorithm (see Algorithm 8), twice, at ﬁrst for a(x)b(x) and then for the obtained
result d(x) and ﬁxed value r2(x) mod f(x). Thus operation c(x) = a(x)b(x) mod f(x) comprises
in fact two steps:
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1. d =MontMult(a, b)
2. c =MontMult(d, r2 mod f)
Utilising Montgomery method for chain of computations to perform multiplication we run
MontMult(a, b) once (we perform just ﬁrst step). At the end of computations we perform
second step to recover from Montgomery representation. The algorithm for Montgomery multi-
plication (MontMult(a, b)) is presented below.
Algorithm 8 Montgomery multiplication algorithm (MontMult(a, b)) [50]
Input: a(x), b(x), r(x), f(x), f ′(x)
Output: c(x) = a(x)b(x)r−1(x) mod f(x)
1: t(x) = a(x)b(x)
2: u(x) = t(x)f ′(x) mod r(x)
3: c(x) = [t(x) XOR u(x)f(x)]/r(x)
4: return c
To utilise the algorithm we need three additional values, which depend on the value of the
irreducible polynomial. We need polynomials r(x), r2(x) mod f(x), f ′(x). Element r(x) is a
ﬁxed element. Requirements for element r(x), given by Montgomery, are as follows:
• it should be an element of the ﬁeld,
• it should be relatively prime and gcd(r(x), f(x)) = 1.
According to [50] for best results for ﬁeld GF (2m) it is chosen to be a simple polynomial xm. To
ﬁnd polynomials r−1(x) and f ′(x) we use Bezout’s identity: since r(x) and f(x) are relatively
prime there exist also polynomials r−1(x) and f ′(x) such that r(x)r−1(x) + f(x)f ′(x) = 1. For
cryptographic application irreducible polynomials are deﬁned in standards. Thus for given m
we calculate r(x), r2(x) mod f(x), f ′(x) and store them, we do not need to precalculate those
vectors before each multiplication.
The most complicated in the Algorithm 8 is ﬁrst operation where we need to perform multipli-
cation of two large binary vectors. In the second line we also need to perform multiplication but
this time we may substitute it with few XOR operations because we know f ′(x) in advance. What
is more it has, for irreducible polynomials recommended by NIST, low number of coeﬃcients
equal to 1, thus the operation gets really simple. In the modulo operation in this line we just
cut out all elements of order higher or equal to m due to the fact that r(x) = xm. In third line
we can again substitute multiplication with a chain of simple additions. The division operation
in this line is a simple shift right by m positions.
Summing up we may say that the algorithm combines multiplication and reduction steps.
However it is not easy to distinguish standard reduction and standard multiplication processes
and it is impossible to separate them. Although looking at the complete algorithm for ﬁnite
ﬁeld multiplication (see Algorithm 9) one can observe that in fact in its ﬁrst line we perform
multiplication and all the remaining operations are responsible for reduction.
It is easy to observe that if the irreducible polynomial is unknown/variable we need to add
to our solution units, which will precalculate additional values needed. In fact that operations
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maybe much more complicated than multiplier itself. Knowing irreducible polynomial, which is
the case for typical cryptographic applications, we may perform optimisations and forget about
additional precomputations. That way we gain a lot on eﬃciency. The Montgomery method
based algorithm calculating the modular product c(x) is given in Algorithm 9.
Algorithm 9 Modular multiplication algorithm based on Montgomery method [50]
Input: a(x), b(x), r(x), f(x), f ′(x), r2(x) mod f(x)
Output: c(x) = a(x)b(x) mod f(x)
1: // MontMult(a, b) //
2: t(x) = a(x)b(x)
3: u(x) = t(x)f ′(x) mod r(x)
4: d(x) = [t(x) XOR u(x)f(x)]/r(x)
5: // MontMult(d, r2 mod f) //
6: t(x) = d(x)(r2(x) mod f(x))
7: u(x) = t(x)f ′(x) mod r(x)
8: c(x) = [t(x) XOR u(x)f(x)]/r(x)
9: return c
To perform multiplication in second line of Algorithm 9 we have used multiplier based on
shift-and-add method but diﬀerent from the one proposed previous section. For m = 233 we
partition vector b into 16-bit words (we add bits equal to 0 on MSB positions if necessary),
multiply sequentially a by all parts of vector b (we need to perform 15 multiplications) and
sequentially cumulate partial results. In Table 3.15 we compare the performance of Montgomery
solution utilising such multiplier and utilising multiplier based on matrix-vector approach (see
Section 3.2.1). To construct full ﬁnite ﬁeld multiplier based on Montgomery method we may use
diﬀerent types of multipliers but we have to remember that they strongly inﬂuence the solution.
In fact large binary vector multipliers perform half of the calculations (or even more) required
by the complete Montgomery ﬁnite-ﬁeld multiplier.
Table 3.15.: Montgomery ﬁnite ﬁeld multipliers (m = 233)
Virtex-6 area max.freq # of clock
multiplier used
AT
XC6VLX240T [LUT] [MHz] cycles normalised
Solution 1 3197 338 270
Shift-and-add multiplier
2554combining 233x16-bit multipliers
area: 2308 LUT, max.freq: 323MHz
Solution 2 3730 302 244
Matrix-vector multiplier
3014built of three 117-bit multipliers
area: 2625 LUT, max.freq: 302MHz
All other multiplications needed to perform the algorithm, multiplication by r(x), r2(x) mod
f(x), f ′(x), f(x) are simpler due to the fact that we know the values of those operands. Thus we
may substitute those multiplications with short chains of XOR operations as already mentioned.
Summing up, knowing the irreducible polynomial generating the ﬁeld we may say that the
65
algorithm comprises a set of very simple operation. The only diﬃculty here is that we operate
on large numbers, thus we have to manage large binary vectors.
3.2.3. Summary, conclusions and comparison
Comparing our solution with already existing ones is not easy. Available literature does not
always contain all necessary data. The designs are usually not fully described. Many references
does not contain practical results but theoretical description, i.e. evaluation of predicted number
of gates used and probable delay. As the solution depends not only on the algorithm used but also
on the way it is described in HDL it is not easy to say, which solutions are the best. Even if we
would try to implement other described just theoretically algorithms we may get diﬀerent results
than predicted and probably achieved by the inventors. In Table 3.16 we present our exemplary
solutions. In Table 3.17 we present the solutions found in accessible literature. Looking on both
tables we may conclude that our units are rather fast and small.
Table 3.16.: Our exemplary solutions
Algorithms
area freq. clock
AT
[LUT] [MHz] cycles
Classical 1 3638 302 264 3.18
Classical 2 2862 302 238 2.25
Mastrovito 3760 297 75 0.95
Montgomery (full) 3197 338 270 2.55
We present in Table 3.16 implementation results for Virtex-6 device of ﬁrst versions of our
ﬁnite ﬁeld multipliers. We present all the solutions for exemplary ﬁeld size m = 233. To ease the
comparison of our solutions we have calculated the AT factors. It seems that the best in terms
of eﬃciency is Mastrovito multiplier. The Mastrovito multiplier outperforms the rest mainly
due to the fact that it needs only 75 clock cycles to perform the multiplication.
In Table 3.17 there are presented results for other existing solutions we have found described
in literature. Unfortunately it is diﬃcult to calculate the AT factor for them. Mainly due to
the fact that we have insuﬃcient data. The other reason is that area is interpreted (not in all
cases) diﬀerently than in our work thus comparison of such AT factors maybe inadequate.
The second goal of our research is to secure the elaborated eﬃcient arithmetic operators.
That is why their versions presented here are not fully optimised. We have left some space
(some “gaps”) for the countermeasures. What is more we have structured our designs in such a
way that would be possible to secure our operators. Some of those additional mechanisms may
occur to be useless however at this stage we will not suppress them. The ﬁnal fully optimised and
secured operators will be described in consecutive chapters. Results presented in this chapter
have been published at conferences and in journal [82, 81, 83].
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Table 3.17.: Existing solutions
Solution
Field size
Device Area
Max.freq. Execution time
m /delay /throughput
[21]
256 Virtex II
5267 LUT 44.91 MHz
5.75 us
1033 2000-6 23.07 us
[110] 1024
XCV2000E-6 4355 CLB 100.4 MHz -
XC40150XV-7 8339 CLB 44.4 MHz -
XC4VFX100-10 2793 CLB 150.5 MHz -
[27] 233 XC2V-6000-4 415 slices - 2.42 us
[75]
233 Stratix 3728 LE 4.04 ns 12 cycles
283 EP1S40F780C5 3396 LE 3.66 ns 20 cycles
[114] 233 Stratix 3353 LE 6.91 ns 16 clock cycles
by [75] 283 EP1S40F780C5 3118 LE 6.95 ns 20 clock cycles
[34] 233
37296 LUT 77 MHz -
XC2V-6000 11746 LUT 90.33 MHz -
FF1517-4 36857 LUT 62.85 MHz -
45435 LUT 93.20 MHz -
[95] 191 XCV2600E 8721 CLB slices - 82.4 us
[18] 88 Altera EP2S60 6644 ALUTS -
[30] 163
201,989 LUTs 241 -
Virtex 214,703 DFFs MHz
XCVL330 1471 LUTs 241 -
982 DFFs MHz -
[57]
283
1781 CLB 246.670 -
Virtex 4 2156 FF 3367 LUT MHz -
1132
XC4VFX140 25,955 CLB 248.447 -
32,578 FF 48,591 LUT MHz -
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4. Physical security of ECC cryptosystems
Modern cryptographic devices suﬀer from more threats than their predecessors. The mathe-
matical cryptographic systems are now very secure. As claimed in [68], there exist a mathe-
matical/theoretical impassive barrier. Organisations such as NIST or SECG develop and issue
standards for cryptographic systems. Those organisations verify the security level of crypto-
graphic systems very often in order to provide up-to-date parameters of cryptosystems ensuring
certain level of security and maintaining the mathematical barrier.
In todays world mathematical cryptographic system needs to be implemented on some device
in order to be useful. The most popular devices used for cryptographic purposes are micropro-
cessors, VLSI circuits (FPGA, ASIC) or smart cards. Until very recently (beginning of 90’s), if
such device contained secure, according to standards, cryptographic system, it was considered
as unbreakable (i.e. safe). Nowadays the security of whole system relies not only on the security
of algorithms and protocols, but also on the security of their implementation [80]. It was found
that cryptographic devices leak information during their activity, i.e. they need certain time
to perform the operation, they consume speciﬁc amount of power and they emit electromag-
netic radiations. The leaking information was always considered as useless noise. Unfortunately
cryptanalysts observing work of implemented cryptographic systems noticed that the leaking
information maybe useful for discovering secret data/keys on which the cryptographic device
operates. It was presented that the information depends on the manipulated operands values.
The observation process is called side-channel analysis and is now a serious threat for modern
cryptosystems. Its main advantage is that it is rather cheap and in many cases does not require
direct access to the device [61, 76].
Side-channel attacks - an introduction Eavesdropping of devices is not a recent idea. For
years people have been eavesdropping mechanical devices such as safe locks. It is for example
possible to open mechanical lock through analysis of sound of the lock’s wheels dialed in a certain
manner. To do that the burglar must possess deep knowledge about lock being manipulated,
nevertheless then it is possible to open the lock without leaving a trace. Fortunately the digital
devices can counteract such attacks and if the developer of the device is aware of those threats
he will surely try to secure the device developed.
The notion of side-channel and the idea to eavesdrop information leaking from electric material
was proposed in 1918 by H.Yardley and his team [89, 108]. Later in mid-thirties IBM typewriter
was studied and the study indicated that the information leakage resulting from the device ac-
tivity cannot be neglected and constitutes a serious threat [89]. Afterwards in 70’s in USA, a
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TEMPEST program [77] was initiated to counteract threats resulting from leaking information,
it concerned information leaking through the electromagnetic radiations. The early research was
concerned on the electromagnetic radiations mainly due to the fact that intercepting electro-
magnetic radiations did not require direct access to the spied device.
The idea of analysis of side-channel information leakage started to be attractive to crypt-
analysts of modern cryptosystems in the 90’s. Around this time most cryptographic systems
were standardised and it was even deﬁned when there will be available enough computing power
to break the system working on certain size of keys. Around that time the mathematical se-
curity barrier was also set thus the cryptanalysts started to look for new ways of retrieving
secrets. Their interest turn to observation of implementations of cryptographic algorithms and
the side-channel information leakages.
According to [80] a side-channel can be explained as follows: A device can have different types
of outputs. If such outputs unintentionally deliver information (about the secret key), then the
outputs deliver side-channel information and are called side-channel outputs (or side-channels).
The analysis of side-channels information occurred to be a very eﬃcient and in the same way
cheap manner of stealing the secrets thus it gained a lot of interest.
The most popular types of developed side-channel attacks are:
• timing attack - analyses the device running time [51],
• electromagnetic attack - analyses electromagnetic ﬁeld emitted by the device during its
work [89],
• power analysis attacks - analyses power consumption of the device during its work [61, 52],
In our researches we focus on securing our arithmetic units against some power analysis at-
tacks, which seem to gain a lot of attention nowadays [61]. We ﬁnd that our ideas for protections
against power analysis may be extended to protections against electromagnetic ﬁeld analysis.
Power Analysis Attacks All the details presented here on power analysis attacks are based
on [61, 80, 52] and some recent summaries of those type of attacks, such as [26, 86].
The power analysis attacks and their eﬀectiveness were introduced in 1998 by Kocher et al.,
in [52]. Below we present the idea of such attacks.
Power Analysis Attacks [61]
The attacks rely on the fact that instantaneous power consumption of a cryptographic
device is correlated with data being processed and operation being performed
Types of power analysis attacks (according to [53, 26]):
• Simple Power Analysis (SPA) [52], goal: reveal the secret using few power traces; attacks
exploit key-dependent diﬀerences (patterns) within a trace; “In SPA attacks, a device’s
power consumption is analysed mainly along the time axis. The attacker tries to find
patterns in a single trace.” [39]
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• Diﬀerential Power Analysis (DPA) [52], requires many power traces, it is usually necessary
to physically possess a device to be able to obtain large set of traces; “In DPA attacks, the
shape of the traces along the time axis is not as important. DPA attacks analyse how the
power consumption at fixed moments of time depends on the processed data.” [39]
• Correlation attack [11], improved DPA attack; the measurements allow to predict at once
more than one bit (e.g. 4 bits); more optimised DPA,
• Template attack [16], requires to physically possess cryptographic device; attacker con-
structs a model of the wanted signal source including the characterisation of noise then he
compares it with measurement values; improved DPA,
• Reﬁned Power Analysis (RPA) [33], improved DPA
• Carry-based attack [29]
• others
Main principles of the power analysis attacks [86]:
In order to perform power analysis attacks, the attacker analyses the attacked device’s power
traces. In SPA the adversary tries to deduce secret information by observation of variations and
repetitive patterns in the obtained power traces (usually a single power trace). In DPA and more
complex attacks the adversary requires a model of cryptographic device to be attacked. The
better the model, e.g. low-level descriptions (netlists), the more advantageous for the attacker.
The device model is used to predict certain intermediate values, depending on inputs, outputs
and secret key, which are assumed to appear during computation. The dependency of those
intermediate values on the secret key implies that it is possible to guess at least a part of the
key. Those intermediate values allow for creating a hypothetical power consumption model of
the attacked device. To reveal the part of the secret key depending on chosen intermediate
values the attacker compares hypothetical model with the measured one, for illustration of the
DPA attack idea see Figure 4.1. To perform DPA the adversary needs many power traces.
Statistical Analysis
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Side-Channel 
Output
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Side-Channel 
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DEVICEKEY
Figure 4.1.: Diﬀerential power analysis principle [80]
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Summing up, according to [80], the simple side-channel analysis exploits the relationship
between the executed instructions and the side-channel output. Diﬀerential side-channel analysis
exploits the relationship between the processed data and the side-channel output.
Popular ECC curve operation level countermeasures The ECC systems and their main pro-
tocols are described in Chapter 2, there we have also mentioned which is the most vulnerable
to SCAs operation in ECC systems. The operation is a scalar point multiplication [k]P , mul-
tiplication of the point on the curve P by a large scalar k. Scalar k is usually the private key
or an ephemeral (secret) key. It has been shown that the scalar multiplication of a secret value
with a known elliptic curve point is vulnerable to simple and diﬀerential side-channel analysis.
A successful attack on this operation results in revealing scalar k (secret key) thus in breaking
the cryptographic system.
In order to perform [k]P operation one needs to perform a set of point addition (P +Q) and
point doubling (2P ) operations. The simplest algorithm for performing scalar multiplication
[k]P is double-and-add algorithm, see Algorithm 10.
Algorithm 10 Double-and-add algorithm (right-to-left binary algorithm) [36]
Input: k = (kt−1, ..., k1, k0)2, P ∈ E(Fq)
Output: [k]P
1: Q←∞
2: for i = 0 to t− 1 do
3: if ki = 1 then
4: Q← Q+ P
5: end if
6: P ← 2P
7: end for
8: return Q
Looking at the algorithm it appears obvious that straightforward implementation of double-
and-add is a very vulnerable algorithm. The type of operation performed in the algorithm
during each step depends on the value of k. Depending on the value of bit of secret k the
algorithm performs either point addition and point doubling or only point doubling. If those
operations have diﬀerent power traces, which is usually the case, then the adversary analysing
power consumption of the device implementing such algorithm is able to deduce the secret key
easily. Seeing the sequence of performed doublings and additions the adversary is able to derive
the secret key.
For us the countermeasures for ECC systems against side-channel analysis have generally two
goals. One is to mask/hide sequences of doubling and addition operations, to make impossible
to deduce from power traces the operations performed. The second is to remove as much as
possible the dependency of manipulated operands values on the power consumption. There exist
and are still developed many countermeasures. There are hardware countermeasures and algo-
rithmic countermeasures. To protect against SPA there exist the following types of algorithmic
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countermeasures [39]:
• uniﬁcation of the addition formula [13, 12] or alternative parameterizations [40, 104, 9];
• insertion of dummy instructions or operations [19, 17];
• utilisation of “regularly” behaving algorithms (so called “atomicity”) [104, 79, 70, 13, 38, 28].
To protect further the device against DPA it is suggested to [39, 19, 41, 15]:
• randomise base-point P ,
• randomise/recode secret scalar k
All those countermeasures aim at goals described above. For example uniﬁcation of addition
formula aims to unify addition and doubling in terms of number, order and type of ﬁnite-ﬁeld
operations needed to perform 2P or P + Q. Other countermeasures manipulate the order of
sequence of 2P and P +Q operations needed to perform [k]P . For example, algorithm double-
and-add, see Algorithm 10, is modiﬁed to perform additional, dummy point addition each time
it is executed, see Algorithm 11: double-and-add always.
Algorithm 11 Double-and-add always algorithm [19]
Input: k = (kt−1, ..., k1, k0)2, P ∈ E(Fq)
Output: [k]P
1: Q0 ← P ; Q1 ←∞
2: for i = t− 1 to 0 do
3: Q0 ← 2Q0
4: Q1 ← Q0 + P
5: Q0 ← Qki
6: end for
7: return Q0
The DPA countermeasures “mask” the chain of 2P and P + Q operations by randomising
the base-point P or scalar k. There are either speciﬁc values added to P , k, which maybe
easily subtracted at the end, or there exist various methods for k recoding (NAF, DBNS). By
recoding the key the sequence of doublings and additions is randomised. With DBNS for exam-
ple it is possible to have lot of distinct chains of additions and doublings using the same key [15].
According to [39] preventing side-channel power analysis is a two step process. At ﬁrst the
device needs to be secured against SPA and then against DPA. That way it should be impossible
to mount a successful power analysis attack on the device. For ECC many SCAs and various
countermeasures or protections against them (see [39]) have been proposed. For instance, ad-
dition chains allow performing only one type of curve-level operation (point addition) during
scalar multiplications [14]. In [15] randomized and very redundant representations of the scalar
k are used. All yet proposed protections are at the curve-level not the ﬁnite-ﬁeld one.
Eﬃcient and secure computation units for ﬁnite-ﬁeld arithmetic are important elements of ECC
processors. It was already mentioned few years ago in [39] that “each elliptic curve operation
itself consists of a sequence of field operations. In most implementations, the standard sequence
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of field operations in point addition differs from that in point doubling. Every field operation
has its unique side-channel trace. Hence, the sequence of field operations of point addition has
a different side-channel pattern than that of point doubling”. However nobody yet, according to
known references, tried to secure ﬁnite-ﬁeld arithmetic operations against information leakage.
All the eﬀorts were put to randomise or unify the sequences of those operations and curve-level
operations.
We ﬁnd that securing ﬁnite-ﬁeld arithmetic operations should increase the security of the ECC
system. It may even occur that some countermeasures of higher layers of cryptosystem (see
Chapter 2) will yield better results when mounted on secured arithmetic operators.
Our goal is to secure the operators in such a way that ﬁnally the sequence of ﬁnite ﬁeld
operations needed to compute 2P or P +Q will yield either uniﬁed or random power traces. We
want that observing the sequence of e.g. ﬁnite-ﬁeld multiplications it is impossible to distinguish
the beginning and end of a single multiplication thus to identify point addition or point doubling.
We ﬁnd that it is possible to ﬂatten/unify power consumption of ﬁnite-ﬁeld arithmetic operations
and that it is also possible, in case of some algorithms, to randomise the current signature of
ﬁnite-ﬁeld operation, i.e. each time a single operation is executed it will have diﬀerent current
trace.
4.1. Physical security of hardware GF (2m) arithmetic operators
In this chapter, we investigate protections against some power analysis attacks at the ﬁeld level in
GF (2m) multiplication algorithms and their architectures dedicated for ECC systems. All other
GF (2m) arithmetic operations needed to multiply points of elliptic curves, such as squaring or
inversion, can be performed with use of multiplication and addition in the ﬁeld [96]. According
to this and the claim that ﬁnite-ﬁeld arithmetic operators are crucial for ECC system, see Chap-
ter 2, it follows that ﬁnite-ﬁeld multiplication operators are signiﬁcant units of ECC system. The
ﬁnite-ﬁeld addition operation is very simple and when implemented on reconﬁgurable circuits
it can be performed parallely to all other ﬁnite-ﬁeld elements operations. Due to the fact that
the multiplication operation is very costly in terms of time and area and have to be performed
many time during scalar multiplication operation, we presume that it has a huge impact on the
operations performed in ECC system not only in terms of eﬃciency but also in terms of security.
In previous chapters we have proposed very eﬃcient multipliers for GF (2m), in this chapter
we analyse the security of elaborated operators and propose protections and countermeasures
against some power analysis attacks. Those protections can be easily extended to protections
against electromagnetic attacks. The proposed security modiﬁcations are not autonomous coun-
termeasures for ECC systems but an additional protection element, which should enhance higher-
level (curve-level) countermeasures. Results presented in this chapter have been published at
WAIFI 2012 conference [84].
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The cryptanalysts concern two types of power consumption leakage [80]:
• transition count leakage - related to the number of bits that change their state at a time.
• the Hamming weight (HW ) leakage - related to the number of 1-bits, being processed at
a time.
Here we concern transition count leakage (Hamming distance = HW (t+1)−HW (t)) due to
the fact that in VLSI circuits instantaneous power is linked with the number of useful transitions
in the operator. Useful transitions are the theoretical changes of bit state during the operation
(from one clock cycle to the next one). This is also called useful circuit activity. To estimate
information leakage in typical GF (2m) multipliers, we have accurately measured their useful
activity [84].
Power analysis based SCAs use possible correlations between internal secret values (e.g. keys)
and information leakage related to instantaneous power of the executed operations (see [61] for
details).
Definition 4.1.1. Instantaneous power at time t is PDD(t) = iDD(t) × VDD, where iDD(t)
is the instantaneous current and VDD is the power supply. Power consumption components are:
static power and dynamic power. See [112, Sec.4.4] for circuit-level details in CMOS circuits.
Static power does not depend on circuit activity and is not used in this work. Dynamic
power appears due to circuit activity: charging and discharging load/parasitic capacitances and
short-circuit currents. It strongly depends on the executed operations and data values. Dynamic
power variations are used as a source of information leakage for power attacks.
Dynamic power components are: useful activity and parasitic activity as illustrated on Fig-
ure 4.2. Useful (or theoretical) activity is due to complete and stable transitions required by
computations from one clock cycle to the next one (i.e. 0→ 1 and 1→ 0 for each bit). Parasitic
(or glitching) activity is due to non-useful transitions. For instance, in case of non-equal arrival
times for a gate inputs, the output may have multiple transitions before reaching a steady state.
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Figure 4.2.: Useful (left) and parasitic (right) transitions.
Parasitic activity in GF (2m) multipliers is small. This is not the case for all arithmetic
operators (e.g. operators in high-performance CPUs [106]). In GF (2m) arithmetic units, the
logical depth is small. Power consumption of memory elements (e.g. ﬂip-ﬂops) used in GF (2m)
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multipliers is important compared to power consumption in logic gates. In this work, we only
focus on useful activity as a large contribution to iDD(t).
Several methods can be used to evaluate useful activity: cycle-accurate and bit-accurate
(CABA) simulation [31] of a low-level architecture description, electrical simulation or FPGA
emulation. Fast high-level behavioral simulation is not suﬃcient to catch cycle-accurate and
bit-level coding aspects. As the target operators have large operands (e.g. 160 to 600 bits for
ECC) and long computations, CABA simulation would be too slow. This is even more critical
with electrical simulation. Thus we use FPGA emulation for evaluating useful activity.
An activity counter was attached to each monitored signal [107] which counts the number
of useful transitions as illustrated on Figure 4.3. The D ﬂip-ﬂop and the XOR gate produce 1
for each useful transition between s(t+ 1) and s(t). The k-bit counter accumulates transitions
counts (k depends on test vector length).
s(t)
D
counter
block
clk
monitored signal
transition s(t+1)  vs. s(t)
k total number
of transitions
Figure 4.3.: Activity counter architecture for a 1-bit signal s(t) (control not represented).
Comparisons with electrical simulations in [107] show that this is reasonable assumption for
small parasitic activity. At the end of this chapter we compare FPGA emulations result with
current measurements to show that the assumption holds. We insert activity counters at the
output of each internal register and for each signal of the multiplier. Outputs of all XOR gates
(radix-1 representation of transitions number) are compressed into a binary value as the total
transitions count for cycle t. This value is monitored using ChipScope Pro tool from Xilinx.
ChipScope Pro enables observation of internal signals of FPGA device during its work. It is
possible to record the monitored value changes and analyse it later with other tools.
One of our goals was to design eﬃcient ﬁnite-ﬁeld multipliers in such a way that their ar-
chitectures can be easily modiﬁed to add protection against SCAs. We have analysed many
algorithms, with diﬀerent variants, to be able to take and combine those parts, which will allow
us to create the most eﬃcient algorithm fulﬁlling assumed requirements. The analysis and ﬁnal
solutions are presented in Chapter 3. As a result of our study, we have prepared three eﬃcient
GF (2m) multipliers based on three diﬀerent algorithms: classical two-step, Montgomery and
Mastrovito algorithm. In this chapter we analyse the security and possibility of inserting vari-
ous countermeasures for each of those solutions. Using FPGA emulation, it is possible to quickly
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and accurately evaluate useful activity in GF (2m) ﬁnite-ﬁeld multipliers for large and relevant
test vectors (this cannot be done using “slow” software simulations). Activity counters do not
change the multiplier mathematical behavior. Moreover insertion of activity counters allowed
us to optimise some multipliers. For example in multiplier based on Montgomery algorithm we
were able to reduce the total number of registers used. Initially we had put in this architecture
some auxiliary registers and assumed that the synthesis tool will optimise the solution. However
it was not the case. After optimisation done by hand, the Montgomery multiplier unit is much
smaller than the one presented in Section 3.2.2.
Corresponding implementation results without and with activity counters are reported in
Table 4.1. The table reports huge area overhead and about a ÷3 frequency decrease due to
activity counters inserted. These overheads are very important, but they only appear during
evaluation not in ﬁnal circuit. FPGA emulation leads to activity evaluation running at more
than 100MHz (see Table 4.1) which would not be possible using software simulations.
Table 4.1.: FPGA implementation results of GF (2m) multipliers without (original operators)
and with (monitored operators) activity counters.
without activity counters with activity counters
Algorithms area freq. clock area freq. clock
LUT MHz cycles LUT MHz cycles
Classical 3638 302 264 11383 133 264
Montgomery (full) 2178 323 270 6100 121 270
Mastrovito 3760 297 75 5956 110 75
4.1.1. Security level verification, problem identification
For all experiments, random operands have been used with uniform and equiprobable distri-
bution for all bits. We have performed numerous experiments (corresponding to hundreds of
thousands clock cycles for each tested solution). The traces presented correspond to typical
traces. We ﬁnd that even though it occurred that overall traces shape dependency on operand
random values is relatively small, using average trace is not possible since this may ﬂatten the
activity variations and mask information leakage. Thus we have been evaluating our modiﬁ-
cations by running modiﬁed multipliers for several various sets of experimental data. Here we
present representative traces.
All proposed hardware solutions are analysed for one of ﬁeld sizes m = 233 recommended in
ECC standards (similar results are obtained for other ﬁeld extension sizes).
The ﬁrst analysed unit is the one based on classical algorithm. In Chapter 3 we have proposed
two classical multipliers, one with standard, optimised to irreducible polynomial reduction and
the other utilising matrix reduction. After collecting and analysing activity traces of those two
types of classic multipliers we have concluded that the reduction does not impact activity traces
very much. In fact the activity traces for both solutions are very similar, almost alike. Thus
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we have decided to focus on only one classical multiplier, the one using standard, optimised to
irreducible polynomial reduction. We presume that this unit architecture can be more advanta-
geous for inserting countermeasures mainly due to the fact that the standard reduction requires
few steps. Figure 4.4 (left) presents useful activity measurement results for a typical sequence
of GF (2m) multiplications of random operands using classical algorithm.
One may observe that there is a high peak at the beginning of each multiplication. The peak
occurs due to the initialisation phase and loading of new operands values. Figure 4.4 (right)
presents an extract for a single representative multiplication (all random operands lead to the
similar overall shape). We have noticed that dependency of the shape of activity variation curves
on input data is rather low.
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Figure 4.4.: Useful activity measurement results for random GF (2m) multiplications with clas-
sical algorithm (left). Extract for a single representative multiplication (right).
Measurement results for a sequence of random GF (2m) multiplications using Montgomery
algorithm form are presented in Figure 4.5 (left) with an extract of a single representative
multiplication (right). The reported measurements are shown for complete multiplications with
ﬁnal reduction (for conversion from Montgomery “representation”). We have provided comments
on that point in Chapter 3. One can observe that there is a large activity drop at the end of each
multiplication. We presume that it occurs due to the reduction step (recovery from Montgomery
representation) and multiplier control.
Figure 4.6 (left) presents useful activity measurement results for a typical sequence of random
GF (2m) multiplications using Mastrovito algorithm form with an extract for a single represen-
tative multiplication (right). The variations of the useful activity during a multiplication have
a very speciﬁc decreasing “step-wave” shape.
Measurements for all three multiplication algorithms show very speciﬁc shapes for useful
activity variations, which may lead to some information leakage. Those speciﬁc shapes provide
the attacker with strong temporal references of the operations time location. Based on these
references about ﬁeld-level operations, higher-level operations (e.g. point addition and doubling)
can be guessed.
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Figure 4.5.: Useful activity measurement results for random GF (2m) multiplications with Mont-
gomery algorithm (left). Extract for a single representative multiplication (right).
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Figure 4.6.: Useful activity measurement results for random GF (2m) multiplications with Mas-
trovito algorithm (left). Extract for a single representative multiplication (right).
The analysis of the obtained activity variation traces and the architectures of our solutions
allowed us to came up with the following conclusions.
Peaks due to the initialisation phase at the beginning of operations in Figure 4.4 are not
related to the selected algorithm but to the implemented architecture and especially its control.
Resetting all internal registers generates a lot of activity and can give information about the
time borders of the operation. Then this speciﬁc diﬀerent shape for the initialisation phase may
occur for other algorithms and architectures.
Activity drops at the end of operations in Figure 4.5 are due to low-complexity reduction step
for the considered irreducible polynomial compared to multiplication iterations complexity. We
reported measurements for complete multiplication (with ﬁnal reduction) for fair comparison
with other algorithms. In practice, those drops should not appear since reduction is only used
at the end of a sequence of operations (with operands in Montgomery domain). However uni-
formising reduction step activity variations leads to uniformisation of activity variations of all
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ﬁnite ﬁeld operations, which is our goal.
The most problematic shape is the one for Mastrovito algorithm in Figure 4.6. The decreasing
“step-wave” shape is due to variation of the computations quantity in the algorithm. In next
section, we will present modiﬁcations of this multiplier at algorithmic and arithmetic levels to
reduce information leakage.
4.1.2. Proposed countermeasures, circuit modifications
Analysing the obtained activity variations curves, we can deﬁne modiﬁcation objectives. First,
we have to suppress the peaks at the initialization phase. This is an architecture issue (i.e.
modiﬁcation of the operator control). All multiplication algorithms may beneﬁt from this type
of modiﬁcation. Second, we have to take care of the activity drops during the reduction phase
of Montgomery algorithm. But as stated in previous section, this phase is only used at the
end of long sequence of operations in real ECC applications. Last, we have to make the “step-
wave” shape of useful activity variations of Mastrovito algorithm less distinguishable. All this
modiﬁcations aim at masking the multiplication operations. Aim at making impossible to localise
the operation in time. Below, we describe our modiﬁcations for each algorithm.
Classical two-step multiplication: The analysis shows that peaks at the beginning of each
multiplication occur due to circuit initialisation. To suppress them, we have modiﬁed multiplier
control and initialisation method. Initially to ensure the correct work of our circuit we have
been resetting all registers before the start of computation. We have been resetting all registers
also those not used at the beginning of multiplication process. Now we do not reset all registers
in the ﬁrst cycle but we have spread the reset activity over several cycles. We reintialise/reset
register before it is used, if it is possible. What is more we have observed that not all registers
need to be reinitialised. Thus we have skipped their initialisation/resetting.
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Figure 4.7.: Useful activity measurement results for random GF (2m) multiplications with mod-
iﬁed classical algorithm.
Figure 4.7 shows useful activity measurements for a sequence of random multiplications using
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the modiﬁed multiplier. To reduce activity variations, we have also optimised the reduction step
by reducing number of registers involved in reduction and merging all the steps of algorithm
presented in Algorithm 7 into a chain of XOR operations. In the modiﬁed multiplier the average
activity varies between 100 and 120 transitions (see Figure 4.7) while it was about 150 transitions
in the original one (see Figure 4.4). Our modiﬁcations reduce the number of active registers in
the operator thus they reduce also a little the power consumption of the operator. Comparing the
original operator’s useful activity variations (Figure 4.4) with variations of modiﬁed multiplier
(Figure 4.7), we can notice the absence of high initialisation peaks. For instance, between cycles
1500 and 2400 it is diﬃcult to detect the executed operations boundaries.
Montgomery multiplication: If we do not consider the reduction step, we may say that the
activity variations of Montgomery multiplier are more or less uniform (see Figure 4.5). The
only thing, which may still give some information to the attacker is the initialisation phase.
Activity drops at this phase occur due to a speciﬁc way, in which the input data are fetched.
Like for classical algorithm, a modiﬁcation of the initialisation control removes these drops.
Figure 4.8 shows Montgomery activity variations with improved control (bottom curve) and
without reduction (top curve).
Figure 4.8.: Useful activity measurement results for random GF (2m) multiplications with Mont-
gomery algorithm.
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Mastrovito multiplication: The “step-wave” shape of useful activity variations of Mastrovito
multiplier in Figure 4.6 is speciﬁc and can provide the attacker with a lot of information. Our
objective is to modify the algorithm and the architecture in such a way that single multiplications
cannot be too easily distinguished.
It is clear that the “step-wave” shape occurs mainly due to unequal number of registers switch-
ing in one clock cycle. Thus we have investigated two types of modiﬁcations for Mastrovito
multiplier: “uniformisation” of the number of sub-multipliers’ registers used in each clock cycle
and “randomisation” of the starting times of the operator sub-multipliers. “Uniformisation” aims
at making approximately the same number of bits switch in one clock cycle and “randomisation”
at randomising number of bits switching in one clock cycle. We have derived many versions of
those two types of modiﬁcations.
In order to explain modiﬁcations we have performed to the initial solution we recall some
details of Mastrovito multiplier solution. Figure 4.9 presents the way we have divided matrix
M into sub-matrices (see Section 3.2.2). The boxes with same indices Mi denote blocks, which
can be multiplied by parts of vector b, using the same sub-multiplier unit.
M0M0 M0 M0 M0 M0 M0 MCM3M2M2M2M2M2
MRMR MR MRMR MR MR MRMRMRMRMRMRMRMR
M0
M0M0 M0 M0 M0 M0 M0 MCM3M3M2M2M2M2M2
M0M0 M0 M0 M0 M0 M2 MCM3M3M3M2M2M2M2
M0M0 M0 M0 M0 M2 M2 MCM3M3M3M3M2M2M2
M0M0 M0 M0 M2 M2 M2 MCM3M3M3M3M3M2M2
M0M0 M0 M2 M2 M2 M2 MCM4M4M4M4M4M4M2
M0M0 M2 M2 M2 M2 M2 MCM4M4M4M4M4M4M4
M0M2 M2 M2 M2 M2 M4 MCM4M4M4M4M4M4M4
M2M2 M2 M2 M2 M4 M4 MCM4M4M4M4M4M4M4
M2M2 M2 M2 M4 M4 M4 MCM4M4M4M4M4M4M4
M0M0 M0 M0 M0 M0 M0 MCM1M0M0M0M0M0M0
M0M0 M0 M0 M0 M0 M0 MCM1M1M0M0M0M0M0
M0M0 M0 M0 M0 M0 M0 MCM1M1M1M0M0M0M0
M0M0 M0 M0 M0 M0 M0 MCM1M1M1M1M0M0M0
M 0
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
0
0
Figure 4.9.: Illustration of Mastrovito matrix partitioning for m = 233
It can be observed that some sub-multipliers are used more than the others. In initial solution
we utilise one instance of each sub-multiplier (compare for example occurence of M0 andM3 on
Figure 4.9), thus if we start them all at the same time, the activity is higher at the beginning of
the operation (where all sub-multipliers are used) and lower at the end (almost all sub-multipliers
are already switched oﬀ).
Our ﬁrst proposition for “uniformisation” is to make the utilisation, in one clock cycle, of the
number of sub-multipliers more uniform. We have tried not to change the total computation
time of original multiplier, i.e. the number of states of FSM controlling the sub-multipliers work.
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The best obtained for this type of modiﬁcation activity variation curve is shown on Figure 4.10,
see curve V1.
Figure 4.10.: Useful activity measurement results for random GF (2m)multiplications with 4 ver-
sions of modiﬁed Mastrovito algorithm.
Further, due to the fact that sub-multipliers use diﬀerent number of diﬀerent size registers,
we have tried to uniform number of registers used in one clock cycle. Finally we have tried to
consider not only number of registers used but also their sizes, thus the number of bits which
possibly switch in each clock cycle. We have performed various attempts and tests. Then due
to many dependencies between data we have decided to change number of states of control FSM
and increase number of sub-multipliers used. The results obtained were very promising however
we have found another problem. The other problem was the control of the circuit. We ﬁnd that
it causes drops to 0 in certain points. We have tried to modify the control algorithm and the
idle, transient state (moment between the end of computation and the start of the new one) of
the multiplier in order to avoid those sudden drops to zero, which may give information about
operation time location. After uniﬁcation of number of bits switching in one clock cycle and
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modiﬁcation of circuit control we have obtained activity variation curve V0, see Figure 4.10.
Our next objective was to randomise the starting moment of each sub-multiplier. This should
“spread more” the activity over the whole computation. In order to randomise the beginning
of sub-multiplications, we have used 8-bit LFSR (Mastrovito V2) and pseudo-random start
sequence generator based on 4-bit LFSR (Mastrovito V3), which initialisation values depend
on some bits of a and b operands. In order to avoid blocking the multiplier we exchange the
initialisation values (seed) many times at random moments throughout multiplication operation.
We have also tried other methods but the best, according to us, results so far were achieved
with use of our random start sequence generator based on 4-bit LFSRs, see Figure 4.11.
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7 7
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Figure 4.11.: Random start sequence generator based on 4-bit LFSR.
Due to the randomisation, the time needed to perform the complete multiplication, depending
on which sub-multiplier is started ﬁrst, will either decrease or increase randomly. The average
number of clock cycles for Mastrovito V2 is 116 (minimal value: 98, maximal value: 126),
whereas for Mastrovito V3 average number of clock cycles needed is 80 (minimal value: 64,
maximal value: 108). Useful activity measurements for V2 (middle curve) and V3 (bottom
curve) modiﬁcations are presented in Figure 4.10. As one can observe on Figure 4.10, the
shapes of useful activity variations are more irregular and not easily predictable compared to
the curve for the initial version in Figure 4.6.
The presented analysis and modiﬁcations aimed at masking the characteristic shapes of ﬁnite
ﬁeld multipliers activity variations curve. Additionally we have investigated the dependency on
values of operands on the activity variations shape. In Figure 4.12 we present how the change
of 1-bit and 16-bit in both operands aﬀects the activity variation curves. As it can be observed
it is diﬃcult to predict where the curve changes and the variations of shapes are very low.
Implementation results for the modified multipliers: All modiﬁed multiplication algorithms
have been implemented in FPGA. The corresponding results are reported in Table 4.2. Three
optimisation targets were used for the synthesis tool: balanced area/speed, area and speed
optimisations. In order to compare the modiﬁed multipliers to the original ones (see Table 4.1),
we report a comparison factor α such as modified = α×original both for area and frequency.
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Data dependency - Mastrovito multiplier
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Figure 4.12.: Data dependency on activity variations curves for Mastrovito multiplier
Table 4.2.: Implementation results of GF (2m) multipliers with reduced activity variations.
balanced area speed #
Algorithms area freq. area freq. area freq. clock
LUT MHz LUT MHz LUT MHz cycles
Classical 2868 270 2778 228 3444 420 260
×α factor ×0.79 ×0.89 ×0.76 ×0.75 ×0.95 ×1.39 ×0.98
Montgomery 2099 323 2093 338 2099 423 264
×α factor ×0.96 ×1.00 ×0.96 ×1.05 ×0.96 ×1.31 ×0.98
Mastrovito v0 3889 225 3894 197 3933 308 48
×α factor ×1.04 ×0.75 ×0.97 ×0.66 ×1.05 ×1.04 ×0.64
Mastrovito v1 3463 414 3439 343 3489 384 75
×α factor ×1.09 ×1.39 ×1.09 ×1.15 ×0.93 ×1.29 ×1.00
Mastrovito v2 3700 306 3667 253 3717 388 avg. 116
×α factor ×1.02 ×1.03 ×0.98 ×0.85 ×0.99 ×1.3 ×1.55
Mastrovito v3 3903 319 3837 250 4335 375 avg. 80
×α factor ×1.03 ×1.07 ×1.02 ×0.84 ×1.15 ×1.26 ×1.07
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Evaluation of activity variation reduction To evaluate our modiﬁcations we have used signal
processing tools. To do this the measured activity traces were transformed from time domain
to frequency domain using Fast Fourier Transform (FFT), see [87]. Figure 4.13 presents those
results for unprotected and protected versions of some of our multipliers. It represents the
mathematical power for each frequency bin. The same logarithmic scale is used for all versions.
One can observe an important reduction in the potential information leakage for all frequencies.
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Figure 4.13.: FFT analysis results for unprotected and protected versions of multipliers (top:
classic algorithm, middle and bottom: Mastrovito algorithm for various versions).
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In order to numerically compare solutions, we have computed the spectral ﬂatness measure
(SFM) [87]:
SFM =
n
√∏n
i=1 p(i)
1
n
∑n
i=1 p(i)
∈ [0, 1]
SFM is the ratio of the geometric mean to the arithmetic mean for a collection of n frequency
bins p(i) (power for frequency bin i). A SFM close to 1 indicates a spectrum with power well
distributed in all frequency bins (ﬂat curve) while a SFM close to 0 indicates that power is
concentrated into a few bins (curve with peaks). SFM values are reported on Figure 4.13.
Improvement is limited for classic algorithm, but for Mastrovito, our modiﬁcations lead to
signiﬁcant improvement (from 0.31 for unprotected version to 0.58 for the best protected version).
The obtained results are rather satisfying. We can see that there is a way to reduce information
leakage.
Lastly we have tried to implement point doubling operation, using Lopez-Dahab projective
coordinates for elliptic curve point representation, (for algorithm see [36] section 3.2.3) with our
basic ﬁnite-ﬁeld operators to see if it is easy to distinguish the sequence of operations performed.
Figure 4.14 presents activity traces for calculation of double of elliptic curve point (2P ) performed
by our protected and unprotected Mastrovito multiplier. Looking at the activity traces of
unprotected multiplier (upper trace) it is easy to notice each multiplication performed. This
information may allow distinguishing between point addition (P + Q) operation and doubling
(2P ) operation, thus recovering the sequence of those operations and eventually retrieving the
secret key.
 100
 200
 300
 400
 0  50  100  150  200  250  300  350  400  450
cycles
Point doubling − Mastrovito protected
 0
 100
 200
 300
 0  100  200  300  400  500  600
n
u
m
be
r o
f t
ra
ns
itio
ns Point doubling − Mastrovito unprotected
Figure 4.14.: Useful activity measurement results for 2P operation for unprotected (top ﬁgure)
and protected (bottom ﬁgure) GF (2m) operators.
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Comparison of obtained activity traces with current measurements In order to ﬁnally eval-
uate obtained protection results the instantaneous current consumed by the device performing
ﬁnite-ﬁeld operations was measured. We have measured current supplied to the Virtex-II Pro
device mounted on SASEBO-G side-channel attack standard evaluation board which allows for
taking such speciﬁc measurements with use of Lecroy Waverunner 104Xi-a oscilloscope and Tek-
tronix CT1 current probe. The measurement station is controlled by HP Z800 computing server.
To ease the measurements the FPGA board is supplied from low noise HP E3610A power supply.
Figure 4.15 shows comparison of multiplication activity traces obtained using activity counters
and the ones obtained by current probe measurement.
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Figure 4.15.: Comparison of activity traces and current measurements for:
Mastrovito multiplier unprotected version – 5 multiplications in a row and pro-
tected version (uniformised) – 3 multiplications in a row
Analysing measurements results we can see that the activity traces obtained by observation
of internal switching are rather accurate. The evaluation of activity of multipliers done with
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activity monitors and ChipScope seems to reﬂect the real activity of multipliers. Figure 4.15
presents activity traces for protected unprotected multiplier (top curves) and (bottom ﬁgures).
It is easy to observe that our modiﬁcations yielded desired results. Observing traces obtained
for protected multiplier it is hard to distinguish single multiplications.
4.1.3. Conclusions
Activity measurements analysis revealed that the implemented multiplication algorithms (clas-
sical, Montgomery and Mastrovito) lead to speciﬁc shapes for the curve of activity variations
which may be used as a small source of information leakage for some side channel attacks.
We have proposed modiﬁcations of selected GF (2m) multipliers to reduce this information
leakage source at two levels: architecture level by removing activity peaks due to control (e.g.
reset at initialisation) and algorithmic level by modifying the shape of the activity variations
curve. Due to optimisatons performed at a very low-level of a circut there is no signiﬁcant area
and delay overhead.
Analysing activity traces obtained for protected multipliers we may conclude that proposed
modiﬁcations lead to masking the trace of multiplication operation.
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5. Summary and Conclusions
In this work GF (2m) arithmetic operators dedicated to elliptic curve cryptography applications
have been studied. Conducted researches aimed at providing eﬃcient and secure against some
side-channel power analysis attacks GF(2m) hardware arithmetic operators which can be
integrated in ECC processor.
The ﬁrst goal was to provide eﬃcient hardware arithmetic operators units. To do this we have
performed vast research on existing algorithms and their improvements/optimisations/variations.
The ﬁrst requirement for the operators was that they should be dedicated to reconﬁgurable
hardware. Thus during the analysis we have implemented many of described ﬁnite ﬁeld arith-
metic operations algorithms in order to notice their features which may be eﬃciently utilised in
hardware (such as: decomposition schemes, computation order, internal coding, operands repre-
senation, etc.). The second requirement was that they should serve ECC applications thus they
should operate on 150–600 bit numbers (i.e. large numbers) and should be eﬃcient in terms of
speed, area and energy. The analysis allowed us to ﬁnd and combine such features thus leading
to design of our own GF (2m) hardware arithmetic operators based on known algorithms and
dedicated to FPGA circuits (see Chapter 3).
Second goal was to evaluate the eﬃciency and overall cost of designed operators. The evalu-
ation aimed at providing ﬁnal speed and area eﬃcient GF (2m) arithmetic operators solutions.
The GF (2m) operators are vital part of cryptographic systems and their eﬀectiveness strongly
impacts the eﬀectiveness of the whole system. The designed operators should work as a part
of ECC system thus in order to do not degrade its performance they should be small and fast.
Comparing our hardware arithmetic operators to other solutions found in literature we may
conclude that we have succeeded in providing eﬃcient and low cost operators which will not
degrade performance of the cryptographic system they will be part of (see Chapter 3).
The ﬁnal goal of was to secure elaborated GF (2m) arithmetic units against some of popular
passive attacks: side-channel attacks. According to known sources no one yet attempted to
secure the lowest level operations of elliptic curve cryptographic systems that is the ﬁnite-ﬁeld
operations. However there were developed many countermeasures against side-channel attacks
for protecting curve- and protocol-level operations neglecting information leakage existing at the
lowest level of ECC operations. We have chosen to secure the operators against some of power
analysis attacks which by observation of power consumed by the device performing cryptographic
operations aim at revealing the secret. However we presume that our countermeasures may
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be extended to countermeasures against electromagnetic attacks. Before providing protections
we had to evaluate the security of previously elaborated eﬃcient operators in order to identify
information leakage sources. The operators security was evaluated in two manners: using FPGA
emulation with activity counters on standard Xilinx FPGA board and monitoring of internal
signals using Chipscope; and by measurement with use of very fast LeCroy WaveRunner 104Xi-A
oscilloscope and high frequency Tektronix CT1 current probe of instantaneous current supplied
to the FPGA performing ﬁnite ﬁeld operations mounted on SASEBO-G side-channel attack
standard evaluation board. The evaluation of security of the unprotected operators showed
speciﬁc activity trace shapes which may be used as a small source of information leakage. The
shapes may enable the attacker to localise operations time boundaries or identify the point
doubling (2P ) or point addition (P + Q) operation and thus to reveal the secret. To avoid
information leakage in GF (2m) operators we have performed their algorithmic and architectural
modiﬁcations. In Chapter 4 we have presented and illustrated that inserted countermeasures
diminish signiﬁcantly observed sources of information leakage in the operators. Both methods of
evaluation conﬁrmed that after inserting the countermeasures it is diﬃcult to distinguish speciﬁc
shapes of operations and what is more to localise their time boundaries.
Summarising, as a result of conducted researches the following original results were obtained:
• eﬃcient in terms of speed and area GF (2m) hardware arithmetic operators dedicated
to ECC applications were proposed;
• successful protections against some power analysis side channel attacks for GF (2m)
hardware arithemtic operators were developed;
• the tradeoff between eﬃciency and security of GF (2m) hardware arithmetic operators
was found.
Concluding it can be claimed that we have succeeded in providing speed, area and energy
eﬃcient GF (2m) hardware arithmetic operators dedicated to FPGA circuits and ECC appli-
cations. We have detected sources of information leakage in the operators and have modiﬁed
the operators to reduce the information leakage. Thus we claim that it is possible to create
not only efficient but also secure against some side channel power analysis attacks
elaborated GF (2m) arithmetic operators.
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Résumé
1. Introduction
De nos jours, les systèmes numériques et l’Internet sont présents dans presque tous les do-
maines de notre vie. Ils sont responsables de communication entre les personnes, les institutions
et entre les gouvernements. Ils sont utilisés pour surveiller des systèmes de contrôle du trafic aé-
rien, du transport, des systèmes médicaux, bancaires, des marchés financier, militaires, etc. Nous
sommes inondés de données numériques, qui ne sont pas toujours faciles à identifier, autoriser,
sécuriser ou stocker. La plupart des utilisateurs réguliers de systèmes numériques ne connaissent
pas bien les effets de mauvaises manipulations de leurs données numériques ou de l’usurpation
de leur identité numérique.
L’identité numérique n’est pas traitée par la plupart des utilisateurs de systèmes à égalité
avec l’identité “réelle” représentée par une carte d’identité ou un passeport. Les effets de prise de
contrôle ou de la perte des deux identités sont presque identiques, mais la mauvaise utilisation
d’identité numérique peut avoir de conséquences encore plus sérieuses [21].
Heureusement, la conscience de la nécessité de protéger et de sécuriser les identités numériques
et les données augmente avec le nombre de services disponibles dans le réseau mondial (Inter-
net). Tout le monde veut faire des achats électroniques en toute sécurité sur Internet, gérer des
ressources bancaires sans crainte de détournement de fonds, signer des documents numériques
d’une manière propre à prévenir la falsification ou l’usurpation d’identité.
Les utilisateurs commencent à comprendre la nécessité de protection des données numériques
telles que les dossiers médicaux, fiscaux, financiers, des données personnelles, etc. À l’heure
actuelle, où la plupart des services et des tâches peuvent être réalisés sans quitter la maison en
utilisant des solutions numériques, la nécessité de sécuriser la transmission et le stockage des
données croît.
Un autre problème associé à la sécurisation des données est l’influence de mécanismes de sécu-
risation sur le fonctionnement du système, le transfert ou l’échange de données. Les mécanismes
de sécurisation de données (systèmes cryptographiques), qui ralentissent ou qui surchargent des
systèmes sont très souvent désactivés et ne sont donc pas utiles.
Pour protéger effectivement les systèmes numériques, leurs concepteurs doivent prendre en
compte non seulement l’efficacité ou robustesse des mécanismes de sécurité (contremesures), mais
aussi leur impact sur la performance du système (vitesse, besoins en mémoire et en énergie).
Malheureusement, avec l’augmentation de la sensibilisation à la sécurité des données et avec
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le développement de nouveaux mécanismes de sécurisation, le nombre de techniques de vol,
d’interception et modification ou d’espionnage de données numériques augmente aussi.
La science qui étudie la sécurité de données est la cryptographie. Cryptographie est l’une
des branches de la cryptologie. La deuxième branche de la cryptologie est la cryptanalyse. La
cryptanalyse analyse des moyens de sécurisation proposés pour la cryptographie en vue d’évaluer
leur robustesse (en particulier faisant des attaques).
Actuellement, pour sécuriser des données, les propriétés de problèmes mathématiques NP-
difficiles et les variables spéciales qui rend la solution de ces problèmes très coûteux en temps et en
ressources, sont utilisés. Avec l’augmentation de la puissance de calcul des systèmes numériques,
certains problèmes mathématiques difficiles peuvent être résolu dans un délai raisonnable et pour
un coût raisonnable (par exemple quelques années de calcul sur une machine parallèle). Pour
augmenter la difficulté des problèmes, les mathématiciens proposent d’augmenter la taille des
nombres ou d’utiliser des nombres avec des propriétés spéciales telles que les nombres premiers.
Parce que les attaques mathématiques sont de plus en plus difficiles et plus coûteuses, de nou-
velles méthodes (moins chères, plus faciles) pour violer des systèmes cryptographiques ont été
proposées. Les cryptanalystes avaient commencé à s’intéresser aux dispositifs cryptographiques.
Par analogie avec certaines techniques d’ouverture de serrures mécaniques (par exemple pour
des coffres-forts), ils avaient tenté d’écouter le dispositif cryptographique au cours de son fonc-
tionnement et d’analyser des données obtenues afin de déterminer s’il est possible de violer le
système. Malheureusement les recherches de nouvelles techniques pour découvrir ainsi des se-
crets (données confidentielles, clés de chiffrement, etc.) étaient efficaces. Les cryptanalystes sont
capables de décomposer un algorithme cryptographique ou d’en découvrir le secret par l’analyse
de la consommation d’énergie du circuit ou de rayonnement électromagnétique.
Jusqu’à récemment, les fuites d’information de dispositifs numériques, telle que la consom-
mation d’énergie instantanée ou du champ électromagnétique émis, ont été considérés comme
un bruit négligeable, dont la réduction ou le contrôle n’a pas été correctement traité. À l’heure
actuelle, les créateurs des systèmes cryptographiques sont conscients des risques de fuites d’in-
formation et ils cherchent à éviter ou contrôler ces éléments.
Les attaques qui utilisent la fuite d’information de dispositifs numériques pour violer des
systèmes sont appelées attaques par canaux cachés (side-channel attacks - SCA). Ces attaques
peuvent être divisées en catégories en fonction des fuites qu’elles exploitent. Il y a des attaques
temporelles (timing attacks) qui analysent la durée des opérations, les attaques par analyse de
la consommation d’énergie instantanée (power analysis attacks) et les attaques par analyse du
rayonnement électromagnétique (electromagnetic attacks).
Les attaques par canaux cachés qui analysent la consommation d’énergie instantanée de dis-
positifs cryptographiques sont l’un des types les plus populaires d’attaques, dont beaucoup de
variantes ont été développées. Elles sont relativement faciles à réaliser, peu coûteuses et très ef-
ficaces. Développer des contre-mesures pour des systèmes cryptographiques contre les attaques
physiques n’est pas une tâche facile. Concernant la grande complexité des algorithmes/systèmes
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cryptographiques, les dispositifs sont déjà assez complexes sans les contre-mesures ajoutées.
L’ajout de dispositifs de protection comme des éléments tels que des générateurs de bruit peut
rendre le dispositif encore plus complexe et lent, ce qui n’est pas acceptable. Additionnellement,
il existe des techniques efficaces pour filtrer des bruits. Ceci rend souvent inefficace cette contre-
mesure utilisée de façon autonome. Ce type de protection/contre-mesure peut être juste une
contre-mesure supplémentaire. Des contre-mesures ajoutés/developpés doivent être soigneuse-
ment évaluées pour qu’elles n’aient pas un impact négatif sur l’efficacité du système cryptogra-
phique (occupation des ressources et la vitesse d’opération).
Les deux systèmes cryptographiques les plus populaires sont des systèmes de cryptographie
symétrique (cryptographie à clé secrète) et systèmes de cryptographie asymétrique (cryptogra-
phie à clé publique). La sécurité de ces deux types de systèmes basés sur la sécurité de clés.
La sécurité de clés est assurée par des problèmes mathématiques d’une très grande complexité
(NP-difficiles) ne pouvant être résolus même avec une grande puissance de calcul dans un délai
raisonnable.
Dans cette étude, nous envisageons des solutions dédiées aux techniques de cryptographie à clé
publique (PKC). Dans PKC, la clé secrète (clé privée) peut être mathématiquement déterminée
par la résolution d’un problème NP-difficile, tel que :
– le problème de factorisation des grands entiers (système RSA 1) ;
– le problème du logarithme discret (DLP 2) (système ElGamal)
– le problème du logarithme discret sur une courbes elliptique (ECDLP 3) (système ECC 4 -
cryptographie sur les courbes elliptiques)
Dans ce travail, il a été décidé de se concentrer sur l’amélioration de l’efficacité et la sécurité
des systèmes ECC. Principalement car il a été prouvé qu’ECC peut être bien plus efficace que
RSA par exemple.
Les systèmes ECC sont considérés comme potentiellement plus efficaces en raison de la taille
des clés qui sont utilisées pour assurer certain niveau de sécurité. Par exemple RSA utilisant
des clés de 3072 bits fournit un niveau de sécurité équivalent à celle assurée par un système
ECC utilisant des clés de seulement 256 bits. La comparaison des tailles de clés qui assurent la
sécurité équivalente de differents systèmes cryptographiques est présentée dans la Table 1.
Les systèmes ECC utilisent des propriétés des courbes elliptiques définies sur des corps finis.
Les principales opérations des protocoles ECC sont effectuées sur des points de telles courbes.
Pour par exemple, pour pouvoir faire la somme de deux points de la courbe P +Q, il faut effec-
tuer des opérations sur les coordonnées des points P et Q. Les coordonnées de ces points sont
des éléments du corps finis sur laquelle la courbe est définie. Au vu de ces dépendances, nous
pouvons conclure que les opérations sur les courbes elliptiques dépendent fortement sur des opé-
rations sur les éléments des corps finis. Nous présumons que l’efficacité du système ECC dépend
1. Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
2. discrete logarithm problem
3. elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem
4. elliptic curve cryptography
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Table 1.: Tailles des clés de différentes systèmes cryptographiques assurant un certain niveau
de sécurite [25]
.
sécurite min. taille (bit) de clé (PKC)
(bit) DSA/DH RSA ECC
80 1024 1024 160
112 2048 2048 224
128 3072 3072 256
192 7680 7680 384
256 15360 15360 512
aussi fortement de l’efficacité des opérations arithmétiques dans les corps finis. Pour améliorer
l’efficacité des systèmes ECC numériques, nous devrons proposer des opérateurs arithmétiques
sur les corps finis rapides et avec des surfaces de circuit limitées pour des implantations en ma-
tériel. Deux types de corps finis qui sont utilisés en cryptographie sur les courbes elliptiques :
les corps premiers GF (p) et les extensions du corps fini binaire GF (2m). Dans ce travail, il a été
décidé de considerer uniquement les extensions du corps fini binaire. Ces corps sont considérés
comme les plus appropriées pour des solutions matérieles du fait que leurs éléments peuvent être
représentées efficacement par des polynômes binaires, et non pas, comme dans le cas des corps
premiers par des grands nombres. De cette façon, on évite les problèmes liés aux propagations
de retenues.
Le premier objectif de la recherche était de développer en matériel des opérateurs arithmé-
tiques sur GF (2m) performants (rapides et avec une surface de circuit limitée). La deuxième
objectif est de rendre ces opérateurs plus robustes à certains attaques par canaux cachés de type
d’analyse de consommation d’énergie.
L’opération la plus importante et la plus fréquemment attaquée dans les protocoles ECC
est la multiplication scalaire d’un point de la courbe elliptique P par un très grand entier k,
généralement secret (souvent il s’agit d’une clé privée) : [k]P . Cette opération est réalisée sous
forme de chaîne d’opérations élémentaires sur les points de la courbe (P + Q, 2P ). Le plus
simple des algorithmes pour la multiplication scalaire est un algorithme dit double-and-add, voir
l’algorithme 1.
Dans cet algorithme, l’addition de points de la courbe (ADD) est strictement dépendante de
la valeur du bit spécifique du scalaire secret k. Pour cette raison, quand il est possible de faire
la distinction entre la consommation instantanée pendant des opérations d’addition (ADD) et
de doublement (DBL), alors il est aussi possible d’une manière simple de découvrir le scalaire k
(Figure 1).
Les opérations P + Q et 2P sont effectuées sur les coordonnées des points de courbes ellip-
tiques. Les coordonnées des points des courbes elliptiques sont des éléments de corps fini, donc
nous concluons que l’activité électrique (consommation d’énergie) pendant les opérations sur les
éléments des corps finis, pourraient donner des informations à un attaquant l’aidant ainsi à faire
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Algorithm 1 Algorithme double-and-add [9]
Input: k = (kt−1, ..., k1, k0)2, P ∈ E(Fq)
Output: [k]P
1: Q←∞
2: for i = 0 to t− 1 do
3: if ki = 1 then
4: Q← Q+ P // ADD //
5: end if
6: P ← 2P // DBL //
7: end for
8: return Q
DBL DBL DBL DBLADD ADD DBL DBL
0 0 0 0 0 01 1
Figure 1.: L’exemple de SPA (analyse simple de consommation) d’algorithme 1
la distinction entre les opérations 2P et P +Q, et enfin l’aidant à decouvrir le clé secrète.
Notre tentative de sécuriser les opérateurs arithmétiques au niveau du corps fini est la pre-
mière à notre connaissance. Dans la littérature, ne sont présentées que des techniques pour
sécuriser les opérations au niveau de courbes elliptiques ou au niveau des protocoles ECC. Des
contre-mesures existantes utilisées comme contre-mesures autonomes sont généralement suffi-
santes pour protéger les dispositifs contre les attaques par l’analyse simple de consommation
(SPA), mais pour protéger ces dispositifs contre des attaques différentielles (DPA), il faut com-
biner plusieurs contre-mesures en plusieurs niveaux d’opérations. Les attaques SPA analysent
une seule signature (trace) de consommation du dispositif, alors que les attaques DPA analysent
un grand nombre de mesures (p. ex. quelques milliers) en utilisant un modèle fonctionnel du
dispositif et des méthodes statistiques. On présume que la sécurisation de tous les niveaux des
opérations de systèmes ECC devrait empêcher l’exécution fructueuse de telles attaques.
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Pour cette raison, il a été décidé d’analyser et de réduire la fuite de l’information existant
dans les opérateurs arithmétiques. Il est supposé que la réduction des fuites d’information des
opérateurs arithmétiques peut améliorer la sécurité des systèmes ECC. Le troisième objectif,
strictement connecté aux deux précédents, est de trouver un compromis entre l’efficacité et la
sécurité des opérateurs. Généralement, plus on ajoute des contre-mesures (plus robuste est le
dispositif), moins efficace est le dispositif.
En tenant compte de tous les objectifs présentés, nous pouvons formuler la thèse de nos re-
cherches :
Il est possible de développer des opérateurs arithmétiques sur le corps fini GF (2m) en maté-
riel, efficaces et robustes contre les attaques aux canaux cachés qui analysent la consommation
d’énergie.
2. Recherches réalisés, problèmes rencontrés et les solutions
développées
2.1. Opérateurs arithmétiques sur GF (2m) en matériel.
Il existe deux opérations principales définies sur GF (2m) : addition et multiplication. Toutes
les autres opérations division, inversion, etc.) peuvent être vues comme une chaîne d’additions
et de multiplications. Avant de réaliser le premier objectif (développement d’opérateurs arith-
métiques sur GF (2m) en matériel), il était nécessaire de trouver des paramètres/caractéristiques
des opérateurs qui nous permettent de développer des opérateurs efficaces.
Des paramètres vitaux pour les opérateurs arithmétiques sont : la base (représentation de
nombres), le polynôme irréductible f(x) (générateur du corps) et la taille de corps utilisé m
(taille des nombres sur lesquels les opérateurs vont opérer).
Le type de base utilisé dépend des applications des opérateurs. Les bases les plus populaires en
cryptographie sont : la base polynomiale, la base normale ou quasi-normale (Gaussienne GNB,
optimale ONB) et la base duale. Après avoir effectué une vaste analyse détaillée des propriétés
et applications de différentes bases, nous avons décidé d’utiliser la base polynômiale de forme :
{1, α, α2, . . . , αm−1}. En premier lieu, la base duale a été rejettée. Généralement, cette base est
utilisée pour des petits corps finis (m = 8, 16, 32) et dans nos recherches nous considérons des
corps avec m ∼== 150 − 600. Les bases polynomiale et normale ont des caractéristiques qui
pourront rendre nos opérateurs très efficaces. Finalement en considérant des opinions trouvés
dans la littérature (que la base polynomiale permet d’obtenir des solutions matérielles plus effi-
caces), nous avons décide d’utiliser la base polynomiale. Néanmoins nous envisageons d’analyser
l’utilisation des bases normales dans l’avenir.
Le deuxième paramètre important est la taille m du corps fini et du type de polynôme irre-
ducible f(x) utilisé. En vue d’applications ECC, il faut utiliser des tailles m et des polynômes
f(x) définis dans des standards cryptographiques comme ceux du NIST ou SEGC [7].
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Toutes les solutions proposées sont dédiées aux circuits reconfigurables, en particulier aux
circuits FPGAs. Nous avons utilisé des circuits Xilinx : Spartan-3E XC3S1200E [29] et Virtex-6
LX240T [2]. Pour des évaluations de sécurité une carte SASEBO-G [22] avec un FPGA Virtex-II
Pro XC2VP7 [28] a été utilisée.
Opérateur d’addition. L’addition sur GF (2m) est une simple opération. Cette opération peut
être vue comme un simple XOR. D’un autre côté, même une simple opération mathématique
effectuée sur des éléments très grands peut causer des problèmes de synchronisation (qui peut
ralentir d’autres fonctions) et peut occuper beaucoup de ressources. Afin de vérifier l’impact
réel de l’opération d’addition sur d’autres composants de systèmes ECC, nous avons préparé
plusieurs types d’opérateurs d’addition.
Le processeur ECC, dans lequel nos opérateurs seront integrés, transfère des données en mots
(16, 32 bits). Pour cette raison, les solutions suivantes ont été proposées :
1 : Addition des mots d’entrée, les vecteurs a, b, et stockage des résultats partiels dans le
registre c (solution 1).
2 : Addition des mots d’entrée, les vecteurs a, b, et stockage des résultats partiels dans la
mémoire (solution 2).
3 : Attente des vecteurs a, b complets et addition des vecteurs reçus (solution 3).
Dans la Table 2, les résultats obtenus sont présentés. Les paramètres de la solution 3 ne sont
pas présentés en raison du fait que la solution est très simple, on peut dire qu’il s’agit d’une
translation des entrées vers les sorties du circuit.
Table 2.: Opérateurs d’addition (Virtex-6)
taille du corps solution 1 solution 2
m [LUT] [MHz] [LUT] [MHz]
163 21 771 26 562
233 21 771 26 562
283 22 767 28 560
409 22 767 28 560
571 24 578 31 558
Les résultats obtenus montrent que l’addition est une opération simple, ayant un effet négli-
geable sur les autres composants du système. Les solutions proposées sont petites (de 20 à 30
LUT) et rapides. Avec l’augmentation de la taille des vecteurs l’utilisation de ressources est plus
un peu plus importante et la vitesse baisse légèrement.
L’addition des éléments du corps fini dans les systèmes ECC est généralement effectuée en
parallèle avec d’autres opérations en raison du faible degré de sa complexité.
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Opérateur de multiplication sur GF (2m). La multiplication dans un grand corps fini est une
opération complexe. Elle est considérée comme une opération modulaire, afin d’obtenir le pro-
duit de deux éléments du corps, il faut d’abord les multiplier, et ensuite réduire le produit
modulo le polynôme irréductible f(x). De cette façon, le résultat de la multiplication de deux
éléments du corps c(x) = a(x)b(x) mod f(x) est aussi un élément du même corps. On divise les
algorithmes de multiplication en deux groupes : les algorithmes à deux étapes et les algorithmes
entrelacés. Plusieurs d’algorithmes existent et leurs modifications ont été analysées en regar-
dant/cherchant leurs propriétés (traitement de données, représentation des données, manières
de paralléliser, etc.) qui pourront être utiles pour développer des multiplieurs matériels très ef-
ficaces/performants. Cette section résume les principaux résultats obtenus et conclusions tirées
de l’analyse des algorithmes décrits dans la littérature disponible.
Les solutions proposées ne seront pas totalement nouvelles car elles seront basées sur des
théories mathématiques bien connues. Le but de cette recherche est de modifier ou combiner
certaines des propriétés existantes dans le but de développer des algorithmes pour les opérateurs
matériels plus performants.
Algorithmes à deux étapes - des résultats les plus intéressants
Au cours de notre étude, nous avons examiné séparément des méthodes de multiplication et de
réduction.
Premier étape : multiplication. La méthode de la multiplication de polynômes la plus connue
est la méthode “shift-and-add”. Etant donnés deux polynômes a(x) et b(x) de degré (m − 1),
le produit d(x) de degré (2m − 2) est obtenu par multiplication du polynôme a(x) par chaque
coefficient du polynôme b(x). Plus simplement, on décale le polynôme a(x) et on additionne le
nouveau polynôme si le coefficient correspondant de b(x) est 1. Cette méthode est très simple et
permet de concevoir des circuits avec des structures régulières. Cependant, utilisé dans une forme
inchangée pour multiplier des très grands vecteurs, elle peut ne pas être très efficace, surtout en
termes d’utilisation de ressources matérielles. La plupart des algorithmes de multiplication de
polynômes sont généralement des variantes de cet algorithme. Les différences entre les différentes
versions s’appuient sur des méthodes de représentation des nombres, la façon de traiter les don-
nées, etc. Dans le cas de la multiplication de grands nombres, on utilise par exemple une méthode
de partitionnement des données de type “divide-and-conquer”, des représentations matricielles
des arguments, ou bien des moyens spécifiques de traitement de données. Les optimisations
les plus intéressantes semblent être : une méthode basée sur le principe “ divide-and-conquer”,
l’optimisation de Karatsuba-Ofman et la méthode matrice-vecteur.
Le principe de la méthode “divide-and-conquer” est de diviser un gros problème en petits
sous-problèmes. Dans notre cas, on divise le problème de multiplication de grands nombres en
un ensemble de plus petites multiplications, et ainsi de partitioner les vecteurs d’entrée en plus
petits vecteurs. Les produits partiels sont ensuite combinés pour obtenir le résultat final. La
variante la plus populaire et la plus utilisé est l’optimisation de Karatsuba-Ofman [10]. Elle
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réduit le nombre des opérations nécessaires à effectuer afin d’obtenir le résultat final.
Dans la méthode matrice-vecteur [4], le polynôme a(x) est représenté par une matrice A de
taille (2m−1)×m, dans laquelle chaque colonne représente un nouveau décalage vers la gauche
du vecteur a(x) (a << 2). L’élément b(x) est représenté par un vecteur de taille m et le produit
d(x) et aussi un vecteur mais de taille (2m− 1).
Les représentations des nombres influent fortement sur les architectures des solutions maté-
rielles. Certaines permettent d’accélérer le fonctionnement du système, mais augmentent la quan-
tité des ressources matérielles occupées, d’autre diminuent de manière significative le nombre
des ressources utilisées, mais diminuent aussi la vitesse de la solution. Lors de la conception
d’architectures matérielles, il faut toujours trouver un compromis entre la taille de la solution et
la vitesse de fonctionnement. Afin de concevoir des opérateurs de multiplication efficaces, il était
nécessaire d’étudier un grand nombre de solutions existantes. Malheureusement, la majorité
des optimisations d’algorithmes présentés dans la littérature sont uniquement des considéra-
tions théoriques. Souvent, des optimisations théoriques présentées ont donné des résultats plus
mauvais ou similaires à des solutions originales plus simples. Nous avons réalisé et analysé un
grand nombre de solutions afin de trouver les propriétés des algorithmes qui peuvent être béné-
fiques pour le matériel. Une analyse détaillée des solutions différentes pour les multiplieurs a été
présentée lors de conférences nationales et internationales [17, 16, 18].
Pour faciliter la comparaison des solutions présentés, nous avons introduit un coefficient
AT (produit temps surface comme coefficient de performance), défini comme suit : AT =
(ressources×temps d’opération). Les résultats indiquent que les meilleures solutions pour les
algorithmes à deux étapes peuvent être obtenues en utilisant la méthode matrice-vecteur pour
la représentation des nombres et l’optimisation de Karatsuba-Ofman (optimisation “divide-and-
conquer”). Les résultats obtenus pour les opérateurs de multiplication pour les corps de tailles
233, 283, 409, 571 sont présentés dans la Table 3.
Table 3.: opérateurs de multiplication 233, 283, 409 et 571 bits (Virtex-6)
Multiplieur
Taille Max.f(#cycles)
AT
[LUT] [MHz]
233-bit opérateur composé de
2625 520 MHz (234) 1181.3
trois sous-multiplieurs 117 bits
283-bit opérateur composé de
3381 535 MHz (284) 1794.8
trois sous-multiplieurs 142 bits
409-bit opérateur composé de
4834 535 MHz (412) 3722.6trois sous-multiplieur 206 bits
571-bit opérateur compose de
7095 522 MHz (572) 7774.6trois sous-multiplieurs 286 bits
Deuxième étape : réduction modulo f(x). Généralement, il existe deux méthodes de réduction :
classique et matrice R. La première méthode, la méthode classique, est la méthode itérative.
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La seconde deuxième utilise une matrice R de réduction [4]. Plusieurs optimisations ont été
proposées pour les deux méthodes, la plupart optimisent le nombre d’opérations nécessaires
pour calculer avec un polynôme irréductible spécifique f(x). Il existe des types particuliers de
générateurs de corps f(x) comme les trinômes, pentanômes ou par exemple des polynômes de
type ESP 5, qui permettent une simplification significative de l’algorithme de réduction. Dans
la thèse, nous proposons un moyen d’optimiser l’algorithme de réduction (en vue de polynôme
irréductible) qui réduit le nombre des opérations nécessaire à effectuer.
La deuxième méthode de réduction utilise une matrice specifique R [4]. Cette méthode peut
considérablement accélérer la réduction modulo f(x). La matrice de réduction R est définie par
le polynôme irreducible f(x). Il est généralement admis que la méthode de réduction utilisant
la matrice R est très efficace. Au cours nos recherches, la méthode était optimisée pour f(x).
Afin de comparer des méthodes de réduction, nous avons implémenté en matériel la version
classique, optimisée et la méthode utilisant la matrice R. Les résultats sont présentés dans la
Table 4. L’unité basée sur la méthode classique non-optimisée a besoin de beaucoup de cycles
Table 4.: Les résultats d’implémentation des algorithmes de réduction (m = 233) (Virtex-6)
Algorithme
Ressources Max. f(#cycles)
AT
[LUT] [MHz]
classique 3528 209 MHz (600) 10128.2
classique, optimisé 1165 571 MHz (8) 16.3
matrice R
466 1264∗ MHz (2) 0.74
(séquentiel)
matrice R
233 1.13 ns 0.26
(combinatoire)
* Les résultats présentés dans la table sont les résultats donnés par l’environnement Xilinx ISE, dans ce
cas, les résultats nous disent que les solutions après l’intégration avec d’autres circuits n’auront aucun
effet sur la vitesse du système.
pour effectuer l’opération, et occupe beaucoup de ressources. Dans le cas de l’algorithme op-
timisé, le nombre d’opérations nécessaires pour effectuer une reduction dépend de la forme du
polynôme irréductible. Pour m = 409 et m = 233, le nombre d’opérations nécessaires a effec-
tuer est le même. Pour m = 163, 283, 571, le nombre d’opérations nécessaires a effectuer croît
jusqu’à 14. En résumé, on peut dire que si le polynôme irréductible est défini, il est possible
d’optimiser la méthode de réduction.
La solution la plus efficace semble être la solution utilisant la matrice de réduction R. Pour
les polynomiaux irréductibles définis dans les standards/normes ECC, la matrice de réduction
R contient beaucoup de zéros. La solution la plus efficace semble être la solution utilisant la
matrice de réduction R. Pour cette raison, une opération compliquée et qui prend beaucoup de
5. equally spaced polynomials
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temps peut être remplacée par un chaîne d’opérations XOR. Seulement les éléments non-nuls du
polynôme irréductible nécessittent des opérations XOR.
Résumé de l’analyse des algorithmes à deux étapes. L’analyse a abouti à la conception d’opéra-
teurs de multiplication sur GF (2m). En analysant les résultats obtenus, il a été décidé que les
meilleures composants pour créer un opérateur performant sont :
- multiplieur : solution utilisant la méthode matrice-vecteur, composé de trois sous-multiplieurs
utilisant l’optimisation Kartasuba-Ofman (partition des vecteurs en deux (m/2± 1)) ;
- circuit de réduction : solution utilisant l’algorithme classique optimisé avec le polynôme
irréducible ou la solution utilisant la matrice de reduction R optimisée pour le polynôme
irréducible.
Les résultats des implémentations des opérateurs de multiplication sur GF (2233) sont présentés
dans la Table 5.
Table 5.: Opérateurs de multiplication GF (2233) (Virtex-6)
Multiplieur Ressources Max. f # cycles
AT
m=233 [LUT] [MHz] d’horloge
opérateur + réduction classique 3638 302 264 3.18× 103
opérateur utilisant matrice R 2862 302 238 2.25× 103
Algorithmes entrelacés (interleaved) - des résultats les plus intéressants
Dans ce type d’algorithmes, l’opération de multiplication est effectuée en alternance avec la
réduction. Les algorithmes les plus intéressants de ce groupe semblent être : l’algorithme utilisant
la matrice de Mastrovito et l’algorithme de Montgomery.
L’algorithme utilisant la matrice de Mastrovito. L’algorithme utilisant la matrice de Mastrovito
est une extension de la méthode matrice-vecteur. Dans cet algorithme, à la place de deux étapes
de multiplication et réduction on calcule : c = Mb, où M est la matrice de Mastrovito.
La matrice de Mastrovito est composée de la matrice A (représentant a(x)) et de la matrice
de réduction R [4]. À la suite de la recherche, une optimisation efficace de l’algorithme a été
développée. Nous avons proposé d’au lieu d’opérer sur et de stocker la matrice entière M , de
la partitionner en sous-matrices (sous-blocs) de la taille 16 × 16 bits. Un exemple de partition
de matrice M pour le corps m = 233 est présenté en Figure 2 Les sous-matrices et la partie
corespondante du vecteur b sont multipliées par des unités spécifiques de sous-multiplieurs.
Chaque type de sous-matrice (même index en Figure 2) nécessite/demande un type spécifique
de sous-multiplieur.
En plus, les coefficients des sous-matrices sont calculés pendant la multiplication. Ainsi on évite
de stocker une grande quantité de données. Le processus de multiplication de toutes les sous-
matrices est contrôlé par automate fini (FSM). Pour trouver la meilleure solution matérielle basée
sur la conception de Mastrovito, nous avons implementé et analysé des nombreuses variantes
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Figure 2.: Illustration de partition de matrice de Mastrovito pour m = 233
de ce type de solution. Nous avons modifié le nombres des états d’automate fini, le nombre de
sous-multiplieurs de différents types utilisés, etc. En raison de l’énorme quantité de variantes de
cette solution, nous n’avons pas testé toutes les modifications possibles. Pour conclure, l’analyse
a révélé que la solution la plus efficace utilise l’automate fini avec plus d’états, mais en utilisant
une seule sous-unité pour chaque type de sous-multiplieur (il est par exemple aussi possible
d’utiliser un automate fini avec moins d’états et plusieurs unités sous-multiplieurs de même
type).
Table 6.: Solutions utilisant la matrice de Mastrovito
Virtex-6
(AL +AHR)b Mb
XC6VLX240T
ressources(A)[LUT] 5014 3760
max.f 297 MHz 276 MHz
durée des opérations
65 75
(T)[nb. cycles]
AT 1097 1021
L’algorithme de Montgomery. La deuxième solution, aussi très populaire, pour les algorithmes en-
trelacés est l’algorithme de Montgomery [14]. La méthode suppose que pendant plusieurs opéra-
tions, pendant la chaîne des opérations de multiplication, on opère sur des nombres en représenta-
tion de Montgomery. Dans la représentation de Montgomery, pour effectuer la multiplication mo-
dulaire c(x) = a(x)b(x) mod f(x), nous effectuons l’opération c(x) = a(x)b(x)r−1(x) mod f(x),
où r(x) est un paramètre spécifique. Si r(x) est convenablement choisi, l’opération de multi-
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plication devient simple. Pour recevoir le “vrai” résultat de multiplication sur corps fini, il faut
effectuer la réduction de Montgomery (retrouver la représentation classique à partir de la repré-
sentation de Montgomery). Pour effectuer une seule multiplication, en utilisant cet algorithme
il faut utiliser l’algorithme deux fois (deux exécutions de cet algorithme donne le résultat de
multiplication modulaire sur le corps fini). L’algorithme complet, pour effectuer une seule mul-
tiplication dans le corps GF (2m), est présenté ci-dessous, voir l’algorithme 2.
Algorithm 2 Multiplication modulaire - méthode de Montgomery [11]
Input: a(x), b(x), r(x), f(x), f ′(x), r2(x) mod f(x)
Output: c(x) = a(x)b(x) mod f(x)
1: t(x) = a(x)b(x)
2: u(x) = t(x)f ′(x) mod r(x) // MontMult(a, b) //
3: d(x) = [t(x) XOR u(x)f(x)]/r(x)
4: t(x) = d(x)(r2(x) mod f(x))
5: u(x) = t(x)f ′(x) mod r(x) // MontMult(d, r2 mod f) //
6: c(x) = [t(x) XOR u(x)f(x)]/r(x)
7: return c
L’algorithme utilise trois coefficients additionnels : r(x), r2(x) mod f(x), f ′(x). L’élément r(x)
selon [11] pour GF (2m) est un simple monôme xm. Si le polynôme f(x) est défini auparavant,
des coefficients constants f ′(x) et r2(x) mod f(x) peuvent être calculés.
La Table 7 présente des résultats obtenus pour les implémentations de la méthode Mastrovito.
L’opération le plus complexe de cet algorithme, la multiplication de deux grands vecteurs a, b,
s’effectue en étape deux (ligne deux de l’algorithme 2. Par conséquent, la multiplication de deux
grands vecteurs a, b a un impact significatif sur la vitesse et l’occupation de ressources.
Table 7.: L’algorithme de Montgomery - solutions (Virtex-6)
ressources max.f #
multiplieur AT
[LUT] [MHz] cycles
1 3197 338 270
233-bit operateur compose de
2554233x16-bit sous-multiplieurs
ressources : 2308 LUT, max.f : 323MHz
2 3730 302 244
233-bit operateur compose de
3014trois 117-bit sous-multiplieurs
ressources : 2625 LUT, max.f : 302MHz
2.2. Résume et conclusions
La comparaison des solutions proposées avec des solutions existantes n’est pas facile. La do-
cumentation disponible ne contient pas toujours toutes les données nécessaires. Les solutions ne
sont pas toujours complètement décrites, il manque la durée des opérations, la vitesse, ou il y a
des unités differentes. Dans de nombreux articlesm des performances de dispositifs sont evaluées
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seulement théoriquement. Parce que les résultats de l’implementation dépendent non seulement
de l’algorithme utilisé, mais aussi sur la manière dont il est décrit dans le langage HDL, notre
implémentation des algorithmes trouvés dans la litterature peut donner des résultats différents
de ceux obtenus par leurs auteurs. La Table 8 présente les paramètres des solutions proposées à
la suite de nos recherches
Table 8.: Multiplieurs sur GF (2233) proposées
Algorithme
Ressources f cycles
AT
[LUT] [MHz] d’horloge
Classique 1 3638 302 264 3.18
Classique 2 2862 302 238 2.25
Mastrovito 3760 297 75 0.95
Montgomery (complet) 3197 338 270 2.55
La Table 9 présente les paramètres des solutions trouvées dans la littérature disponible. En
comparant le contenu de ces deux tables, nous pouvons conclure que les solutions proposées à la
suite de nos recherches sont assez rapides et nécessitent des quantites raisonnables de ressources.
3. Sécurisation de opérateurs arithmetiques matérielles sur
GF (2m)
Le deuxième objectif de la thèse est de protéger des opérateurs arithmétiques contre des
attaques par analyse de la consommation d’énergie. Les résultats présentés ci-dessous ont été
présentés lors de la conférence WAIFI 2012 [19]. Les attaques par analyse de la consommation
considère deux types de fuite d’information :
– la fuite résultant du nombres de transitions - nombre de bits qui changent leurs états dans
une unité de temps,
– la fuite résultant du changement de la distance Hamming HW - nombre de bits avec état
1, traités dans une unité de temps,
Parce que la consommation instantanée des circuits VLSI est liée au nombre de transitions
qui se produisent dans une unité de temps, nous avons considéré la fuite résultant du nombre de
transitions utiles qui se produisent pendant le fonctionnement de système (Hamming distance =
HW (t+1)−HW (t)). Etant des transitions utiles, nous considérons le nombre de transitions des
bits et signaux pendant les opérations arithmétiques. Nous nous focalisons sur des changements
qui se produisent entre deux cycles d’horloge. Les transitions utiles étant définies, nous allons
l’appeller l’activité utile du système. Pour identifier la source des fuites d’information qui existent
dans les unités développées, nous avons d’abord proposé des moyens d’évaluation, puis nous
avons effectué une analyse approfondie.
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Table 9.: Solutions trouvées dans la littérature
m Circuit ressources
Max.f
T
/delai
[3]
256 Virtex II
5267 LUT 44.91 MHz
5.75 us
1033 2000-6 23.07 us
[26] 1024
XCV2000E-6 4355 CLB 100.4 MHz -
XC40150XV-7 8339 CLB 44.4 MHz -
XC4VFX100-10 2793 CLB 150.5 MHz -
[5] 233 XC2V-6000-4 415 slices - 2.42 us
[15]
233 Stratix 3728 LE 4.04 ns 12 cycles
283 EP1S40F780C5 3396 LE 3.66 ns 20 cycles
[27] 233 Stratix 3353 LE 6.91 ns 16 clock
by [15] 283 EP1S40F780C5 3118 LE 6.95 ns 20 clock
[8] 233
37296 LUT 77 MHz -
XC2V-6000 11746 LUT 90.33 MHz -
FF1517-4 36857 LUT 62.85 MHz -
45435 LUT 93.20 MHz -
[23] 191 XCV2600E 8721 CLB - 82.4 us
[1] 88 Altera EP2S60 6644 ALUTS -
[6] 163
201,989 LUTs 241 -
Virtex 214,703 DFFs MHz
XCVL330 1471 LUTs 241 -
982 DFFs MHz -
[12]
283
1781 CLB 246.670
2156 FF MHZ -
Virtex 4 3367 LUT
1132
XC4VFX140 25,955 CLB 248.447
32,578 FF MHz -
48,591 LUT
Dans les attaques par analyse de la consommation, l’attaquant essaie de trouver les corrélations
qui existent entre la consommation instantanée du dispositif cryptographique et les données sur
lesquelles la dispositif exerce ses opérations [13].
Afin d’évaluer le niveau de sécurité des opérateurs (évaluation de l’activité utile) la méthode
suivante a été proposée. Il était proposé de surveiller chaque registre et signal en utilisant un
moniteur d’activité [24].
Un moniteur d’activité compte le nombre des transitions des bits de la manière suivante : la
bascule D mémorise l’état précédent du signal et la porte XOR compare l’état actuel du signal
avec l’état mémorisé. La porte XOR donne en sortie 1 si il y a eu une transition. Le nombre des
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transitions est compté par un compteur k bits. La taille de compteur k dépend du nombre des
signaux à regarder.
Compte tenu la spécificité des circuits VLSI, il s’avère que la méthode d’évaluation de l’activité
du système avec des moniteurs d’activité donne des résultats très similaires à ceux obtenus en
faisant une mesure de courant en utilisant une sonde et une oscilloscope [24]. Après avoir examiné
les sources existantes de fuites d’information et des façons de les réduire, nous présentons une
comparaison entre les données obtenues en utilisant la méthode des moniteurs et les données
obtenues par la mesure de courant instantané consommé par le dispositif.
À la suite de nos recherches, nous avons proposés trois types des opérateurs arithmétiques sur
GF (2m) : classique, Mastrovito et Montgomery. La sécurite de ces opérateurs a été évaluée et
les modifications pour augmenter la sécurite ont été proposées.
3.1. Vérification du niveau de sécurité, l’identification du problème, les
modifications proposées
Nous avons effectué un grande nombre de tests en utilisant beaucoup de d’ensembles différents
de données aléatoires avec une distribution uniforme de zéros et de uns. Les résultats présentés
ici sont des résultats typiques/représentatifs. Il est noté que la correlation entre les courbes des
activité obtenues et les données est petit. Malhereusement il était impossible de moyenner des
résultats en raison du fait que cela pourrait fausser les résultats, par exemple par l’aplatissement
ou l’unification de la courbe d’activité. La thèse présente l’analyse pour m = 233, pour les autres
tailles de corps définis dans les normes, les résultats sont similaires.
Solution avec l’algorithme classique Nous avons proposé deux solutions classiques : une
utilsant la réduction classique optimisée et la deuxième utilisant la matrice de réduction R.
Après avoir analysé des échantillons de l’activité pour les deux types de solutions, il a été
constaté que la réduction n’a pas d’impact significatif sur la forme de la courbe d’activité. Les
solutions pour les deux courbes sont presque identiques (pour les mêmes données de test). Ainsi,
il a été décidé d’analyser la solution en utilisant des méthodes de réduction classique optimisée.
La figure 3 (figure du haut) montre l’activité de l’unité non sécurisée pour une séquence de mul-
tiplications effectuées sur des arguments aléatoires. Il est facile d’observer une source potentielle
des informations utiles pour l’attaquant, une caractéristique qui peut faciliter la détermination
des limites temporelles des opérations individuelles de multiplication, ou la détermination du
nombre d’opérations de multiplication qui ont été réalisées.
Au début de chaque opération, il y a un accroissement soudain de l’activité, ce qui permet
de déterminer le début d’opération de multiplication. Cet accroissement soudain de l’activité
se produit par l’initialisation/réinitialisation du dispositif, par le manière dont les valeurs des
arguments sur lesquels opère le dispositif sont rechargés.
Pour éviter un accroissement soudain de l’activité provoqué par l’initialisation, le contrôleur
et la manière de réinitialiser l’operateur ont été modifiées. Auparavant, la réinitialisation et
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Figure 3.: L’activité utile de la solution classique
le rechargement des valeurs de tous les registres utilisés étaient faites au début de multiplica-
tion. Maintenant des registres remettent à zéro leur contenu immédiatement avant l’utilisation.
Comme cela, le processus d’initialisation est réparti sur plusieurs de cycles d’horloge ce qui
évite des changements des valeurs de tous les registres dans une unité de temps. La Figure 3,
la partie inférieure, presente l’activité des operateurs avec les modifications proposées. Lors de
nos recherches, nous avons developé plusieurs maniéres différentes pour l’initialisation. Dans le
document, nous presentons l’activité pour la meilleure modification obtenue. Les modifications
effectuées ont permis de repérer d’autres manières d’optimiser des operateurs et d’apporter des
nouvelles améliorations. Comme nous pouvons l’observer, le nombre de transitions a diminué,
maintenant elle varie de 100 à 120 transitions, dans la version non modifiée elle a varie de 100 à
150 transitions. Les optimisations qui menent à une réduction du nombre de transitions réduisent
légèrement la consommation d’énergie. L’analyse de la forme de la courbe d’activité obtenue pour
la version sécurisée de l’opérateur montre un manque de croissance d’activité caractéristique. De
plus, dans un intervalle entre 1500 et 2400 cycles, il est difficile de déterminer les bords temporels
des opérations consécutives, il est difficile de déterminer le nombre de multiplications faites.
Solution basée sur l’algorithme de Montgomery L’activité de solution non protégée basée
sur l’algorithme de Montgomeryest presenté dans la Figure 4 (figure du haut). Pour comparer
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Figure 4.: L’activite utile de solution basé sur l’algorithme de Montgomery.
de façon adéquate la solution basée sur l’algorithme de Montgomery avec d’autres solutions,
nous montrons ici des résultats obtenus pour le multiplieur complet. Chaque multiplication se
termine par la conversion depuis la représentation de Montgomery.
Dans le cas de cette solution, on peut observer une diminution de l’activité à la fin de l’opé-
ration de multiplication. Il a été constaté que cette baisse est due à l’opération de conversion
de la représentation et due au contrôleur du multiplieur, qui arrête le multiplieur pour rechar-
ger de nouvelles valeurs des arguments. Dans la partie inférieure de la Figure 4, il est presenté
l’activité du multiplieur complet avec un contrôleur amélioré (improved control), et l’activité du
multiplieur avec un contrôleur amélioré et sans la conversion de la représentation Montgomery
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(without reduction). Si on néglige la conversion de la représentation de Montgomery, on peut
observer que l’activité de solution est assez uniforme. L’activité ne contient pas les baisses dras-
tiques ou des accroissements de l’activité qui pourraient aider à localiser des opérations dans le
temps.
La solution utilisant la matrice de Mastrovito La Figure 5 (en haut) montre l’activité du
multiplieur qui utilise les propriétés de la matrice Mastrovito.
L’activité du multiplieur a une forme très particulière de “dents de scie”. Cette forme très
particulière peut fournir à un attaquant beaucoup d’informations utiles. Il était nécessaire de
modifier l’architecture de l’opérateur pour réduire ces variations spécifiques d’activité. Pour
l’architecture de l’opérateur conçu (division sur les sous-matrices) nous avons proposé deux
types des modifications : uniformisation (aplatissement) d’activité et randomisation d’activité
(chaque multiplication aura une activité relativement différente). La première modification devra
rendre plus difficile de localiser la début et la fin des opérations, et la deuxième devra rendre
plus difficile la détermination de type d’opération effectué.
Il est évident que la forme de l’activité se produit en raison d’un nombre inégal de bits qui
changent d’état dans une unité de temps. Le but de l’uniformisation est d’égaliser le nombre de
bits qui changent d’état dans une unité de temps. Le but de randomisation et de randomiser
le nombre de bits qui changent d’état dans une unité de temps. Nous avons proposé plusieurs
modifications qui mènent à une uniformisation ou à une randomisation. Dans ce résumé, nous
présentons des résultats les plus intéressants.
Le meilleur résultat obtenu pour l’uniformisation, sans modifier le nombre des états de la
machine d’états (FSM) est présenté dans la figure 5, avec la courbe V1. Après avoir modifié le
FSM, le nouveau moyen d’uniformiser l’activité est présenté par la courbe V0. À la suite des
modifications réalisées pour randomiser l’activité, nous avons obtenu des courbes V2 et V3. De
plus, la randomisation fait varier la durée de multiplication. Pour les modifications représentés
par la courbe V2, le nombre de cycles d’horloge pour réaliser une multiplication varie de 98 à
126. Dans le cas de la courbe V3, le nombre cycles varie de 64 à 108.
Le but des modifications effectuées était de masquer des formes caractéristiques des opérations
de multiplication. Pour vérifier le niveau de sécurité qui résulte de ces modifications, nous avons
effectué quelques variantes populaires de cryptanalyse de consommation. Par exemple, nous
avons analysé la corrélation entre la forme de la courbe de l’activité et un changement d’un ou
plusieurs bits de données sur lesquelles nous opérons. Nous avons également analysé des chaînes
d’opérations nécessaires pour effectuer des opérations telles que 2P ou P +Q. Les résultats de
l’analyse de chaîne d’operations nécessaires pour effectuer 2P pour des versions originales et
sécurisées sont présentés dans la figure 6.
De plus, pour évaluer des contre-mesures, nous avons utilisé les outils du domaine de traitement
du signal (FFT). En utilisant la transformée de Fourier rapide, nous avons transformé des
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Figure 5.: L’activite des solutions basées sur la conception de Mastrovito (4 versions).
données obtenues dans le domaine temporel vers le domaine fréquenciel. Après nous avons calculé
la mesure de planéité spectrale (SFM) [20]. La figure 7 présente les valeurs obtenues. Plus
la valeur de SFM s’approche de 1 plus la représentation spectrale de l’activité s’atténue. En
observant ces résultats, il est possible de remarquer une amélioration significative de l’uniformité
de la distribution d’énergie pour la solution sécurisée basée sur Mastrovito.
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Figure 6.: L’activité utile pour l’opération 2P réalisée par l’opérateur original ou sécurisée
Comparaison des courbes d’activité obtenues avec des mesures de courant La dernière
étape de la vérification de sécurité était de comparer des courbes d’activité obtenue avec des
mesures de courant. Nos différents multiplieurs ont été implémentés dans un circuit Virtex-
II sur une carte SASEBO-G (side-channel attack standard evaluation board). En utilisant un
oscilloscope rapide LeCroy Waverunner 104Xi-a et sonde Tektronix CT1, nous avons mesuré
le courant instantané qui est utilisé par le circuit pendant la multiplication. Pour éliminer le
bruit autant que possible, nous avons utilisé une alimentation à faible bruit HP E3610A. La
figure 8 montre une comparaison entre les mesures obtenues à partir de moniteurs d’activité et
les mesures de courant. Les deux premières figures (haut) montrent les résultats pour l’opérateur
non sécurisé. Les deux autres figures montrent les résultats pour l’opérateur sécurisé.
L’analyse des résultats permet de conclure que la méthode proposée pour évaluation de l’ac-
tivité (moniteurs d’activité) reflète bien l’activité “réelle” (courant mesuré dans le circuit). Dans
la table 10, nous présentons les résultats d’implementation obtenus pour des opérateurs sé-
curisés. Pour faciliter la comparaison des opérateurs, nous avons introduit le coefficient α :
sécurisé = α× non-sécurisé.
4. Résumé et conclusions
L’objectif de cette recherche était de proposer des opérateurs arithmétiques matériels pour le
corps fini GF (2m) efficaces et résistants à certaines attaques par canaux cachés de type analyse
de consommation d’énergie.
Le premier objectif était de développer des opérateurs arithmétiques sur GF (2m) efficaces, dé-
diés aux circuits reconfigurables (FPGA) et des applications cryptographiques (systèmes ECC).
Afin de réaliser cet objectif, une analyse approfondie des solutions existantes, pendant laquelle
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Figure 7.: Analyse FFT d’activité utile des opérateurs originaux et sécurisés
nous avons implémenté et vérifié plusieurs propositions d’optimisation, a été effectuée. Il a été
supposé que les opérateurs doivent être rapides, de petite taille (occuper une quantité raison-
nable de ressources matérielles) et doivent pouvoir traiter des très grands nombres (150–600
bits). Nos recherches nous ont permis de trouver, combiner et d’améliorer les caractéristiques
des solutions existantes qui permettent de concevoir des opérateurs conformes aux exigences
supposées.
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Figure 8.: Comparaison d’activite utile et les mesures de courant pour solution basée sur Mas-
trovito :
pour des versions non sécurisée et sécurisée (uniformisation)
Table 10.: Les résultats d’implémentation des opérateurs sécurisés
Algorithme
ressources f cycles
LUT (×α) MHz (×α) d’horloge (×α)
Classique 2868 (×0.79) 270 (×0.89) 260 (×0.98)
Montgomery 2099 (×0.96) 323 (×1.00) 264 (×0.98)
Mastrovito v0 3889 (×1.04) 225 (×0.75) 48 (×0.64)
Mastrovito v1 3463 (×1.09) 414 (×1.39) 75 (×1.00)
Mastrovito v2 3700 (×1.02) 306 (×1.03) avg. 116 (×1.55)
Mastrovito v3 3903 (×1.03) 319 (×1.07) avg. 80 (×1.07)
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Le deuxième objectif était de sécuriser les opérateurs arithmétiques développés contre cer-
taines attaques par canaux cachés de type analyse de consommation d’énergie. Selon les sources
connues de la littérature, notre tentative est la première pour sécuriser les opérations au niveau
d’opération le plus bas de l’ECC, les opérations sur des éléments des corps finis, sur laquelle
les courbes utilisées sont définies. Jusqu’à présent, seulement des protections pour sécuriser les
niveaux supérieurs d’opérations des systèmes ECC, telles que les opérations sur les points de
courbes elliptiques, ont été proposée dans la litérature.
Les sources potentielles de fuites d’information ont été identifiées de deux manières : par
l’utilisation de moniteurs d’activité et d’outil ChipScope et en mesurant le courant instantané
consommé par le dispositif à l’aide d’une carte SASEBO-G et d’un équipement spécialisé. À
partir de l’analyse des résultats obtenus, il a été conclu que les courbes d’activité de solutions non
sécurisés ont des formes très spécifiques. Ces formes spécifiques peuvent permettre d’identifier des
opérations sur les points des courbes elliptiques, comme 2P ou P +Q. Afin de réduire les fuites
d’information, nous avons introduit/proposé des modifications structurelles et des algorithmiques
utilisés dans les opérateurs. Des modifications ont été effectuées à très bas niveau pour éviter la
dégradation des performances des opérateurs.
Le troisième objectif poursuivi en parallèle avec le deuxième était de trouver un compromis
entre la performance et la sécurité des opérateurs. Si des protections avaient eu un impact très
négatif sur l’efficacité des opérateurs, il aurait été nécessaire de les modifier ou de les abandonner.
La table 10 présente des paramètres des opérateurs protégés.
Pour conclure, à la suite de nos recherches, nous avons atteint les résultats originaux suivants :
– des opérateurs arithmétiques sur GF (2m) efficaces en matériel dédiés aux systèmes ECC
ont été proposés ;
– des moyens pour sécuriser ces opérateurs arithmétiques contre certaines attaques par canaux
cachés de type analyse de consommation ont été proposés ;
– un compromis entre l’efficacité des opérateurs et l’efficacité des contre-mesures a été trouvé ;
Les résultats obtenus ont confirmé la validité de la thèse formulée.
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RESUMÉ DE LA THÈSE EN FRANÇAIS 
 
Dans la cryptographie à clé privée l'arithmétique joue un rôle important. En particulier, 
l'arithmétique des corps finis doit être très rapide étant donnée la quantité de calculs effectués 
en nécessitant des ressources limitées (surface de circuit, taille mémoire, consommation 
d'énergie) mais aussi tout en offrant un bon niveau de robustesse vis à vis des attaques 
physiques. L'objectif de cette thèse etait d'étudier, comparer, concevoir en matériel et enfin de 
valider expérimentalement et théoriquement des opérateurs arithmétiques matériels pour la 
cryptographie sur courbes elliptiques (ECC) sur des extensions du corps fini binaire (GF(2m)) à 
la fois performants, peu gourmands en énergie et robustes d'un point de sécurité contre les 
attaques physiques par canaux cachés (p.ex. mesure de la consommation d'énergie). 
Des travaux effectues aboutissent à la proposition d'opérateurs de multiplication performants 
(rapides, surface de circuit limitée) dans une architecture modulaire (pouvant être adaptée à des 
besoins spécifiques sans perte de performance). Les calculs requis par ces opérateurs sont 
complexes car les éléments du corps sont grands (160-580 bits) et la multiplication s'effectue 
modulo un polynôme irréductible. En plus la thèse presente des modification et l'optimisation 
des opérateurs pour les rendre plus robustes à certaines attaques par canaux cachés (de type 
mesure de consommation) sans perte de performance. Sécurisation d'opérateurs arithmétiques 
pour ECC au niveau des calculs sur le corps fini est particulièrement intéressant car c'est la 
première proposition de ce type. Ce travail complète un état de l'art en protections aux niveaux 
supérieurs (courbes, protocoles). 
 
 
 
 
RESUMÉ DE LA THÈSE EN ANGLAIS 
 
The efficiency of devices performing arithmetic operations in finite field is crucial for the 
efficiency of ECC systems. Regarding the dependency of the system on those devices we 
conclude that the robustness of the system also depends on the robustness of the operators.  The 
aim of conducted researches described in the dissertation was to propose efficient and robust 
against power analysis side-channel attacks hardware arithmetic operators on GF(2m) dedicated 
to elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) applications. We propose speed and area efficient 
hardware solutions for arithmetic operators on GF(2m). Designed units are flexible and operate, 
due to assumed applications, on large numbers (160-600 bits). Next we propose algorithmic 
and architectural modifications improving robustness against side-channel power analysis 
attacks of designed solutions. The final goal described was to find a tradeoff between security 
of arithmetic operators and their efficiency. We were able to perform such modifications 
increasing robustness of designed hardware arithmetic operators, which do not impact 
negatively overall performance of the operator. 
The attempt to protect the lowest level operations of ECC systems, the finite field operations, is 
a first known attempt of that type. Till now researches described in literature on the subject did 
not concern the finite field level operations protections. They considered only protections of 
curve or ECC protocol level operations. Proposed protections contribute and we may say 
complete already developed means of protections for ECC systems. By combining protections 
of all levels of operation of the ECC system it is assumed that it is possible to make the system 
very robust against side-channel power analysis attacks. 
 
 
 
